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Abstract 
 
The aim of this research was to investigate the role of self-regulatory individual 
differences in counterfactual thinking. In particular, we examined individual 
differences in autonomy, action/state orientation and cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination over the course of seven experiments. Autonomy, which emphasizes 
intrinsic motivation and reduced preoccupation with external outcomes, was 
explored in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The results showed that autonomy influenced 
counterfactual controllability and that the method of eliciting counterfactual 
responses was important to observe this association. Additionally, the experiments 
demonstrated the adaptiveness of controllable counterfactuals in performance 
improvement. Experiments 4 and 5 examined action/state orientation which is the 
capacity to view self-representations as unthreatened following negative outcomes. 
We found that an action-orientation was associated with counterfactual 
controllability when participants encountered prolonged difficulty in a cognitive 
task. Also, by experimentally manipulating action/state orientation we found that 
innately action-oriented and state-oriented participants differed in the counterfactuals 
they generated. Finally, Experiments 6 and 7 demonstrated that individuals high in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination, a tendency to self-affirm, generated more 
controllable counterfactuals, compared to individuals without this tendency. The 
findings from the seven experiments indicate that individual differences in self-
regulatory traits are important in the types of counterfactual thoughts that people 
generate. We discuss the implications of the findings for the functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking and for the use of counterfactual thought in applied settings. 
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Chapter One 
Overview and Summary 
The overall aim of this research is to investigate whether self-regulatory individual 
differences influence the functionality of counterfactual thought. We examine a 
number of potentially important individual difference variables which have 
previously not been examined in relation to counterfactual thinking.  Specifically, we 
examine individual differences that describe variation in self-motives (Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997). Self-motives describe how individuals perceive or maintain a self-
concept in relation to various situations. An individual difference perspective is used 
in conjunction with related experimental manipulations. We suggest that self-
regulatory individual differences that describe variation in the capacity to view the 
self as unthreatened during negative situations may be particularly important in 
terms of counterfactual functionality. Over the course of 7 experiments utilizing a 
variety of cognitive tasks, counterfactual thought listing exercises, experimentally 
induced cognitive styles, and measures of individual difference variables, evidence is 
presented in support of this argument. The remainder of this chapter provides a brief 
overview and summary of the thesis.  
  In the next chapter, Chapter 2, we introduce the area of counterfactual 
thinking. Firstly, in a review of the relevant literature, important concepts and studies 
carried out relating to counterfactual thinking are outlined. A clear definition of 
counterfactual thinking is provided. We examine pervasive categorizations used 
within the social psychological literature used to classify mental mutations of the 
past by their structure, direction, and focus.  Types of counterfactuals identified in 
existing studies as being particularly adaptive are given special consideration. We 
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described factors that are known to influence the amount and type of counterfactual 
thinking people engage in such as negative affect and cognitive evaluations of 
outcome valence. Situational or environmental determinants of counterfactual 
thinking such as outcome closeness, involvement, controllability, and whether action 
or inaction led to an outcome are also touched upon.  
   Next, we introduce some important theories put forward to explain 
the underlying processes involved in counterfactual thinking. Moving on from 
descriptions of counterfactual thinking as a potential source of cognitive bias, the 
evidence for counterfactual functionality is outlined. The varying pathways that 
facilitate performance improvement via counterfactual thinking are described, 
helping to illuminate the general idea that behavioural intentions may be influenced 
by counterfactual thinking. 
   A number of existing studies of individual differences in 
counterfactual thinking helped inform the present research. Thus, a brief review of 
this subset of studies is provided. Following this introduction to individual 
differences in counterfactual thinking, special consideration is given to the handful 
of studies that have examined self-regulatory individual difference factors in relation 
to counterfactual thinking. In introducing the objectives of the present research, the 
mixed findings from studies on self-regulatory individual differences in 
counterfactual thinking are discussed. Explanations as to why some of the self-
regulatory constructs studied in the past demonstrated weak associations with 
functional counterfactual thinking are put forward. Potential problems with the 
particular individual difference constructs used and the means of eliciting 
counterfactual responses are addressed. To conclude the literature review, we 
introduce previously unexamined individual difference variables as potentially 
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important candidates to demonstrate any association between self-regulatory 
individual differences and functional counterfactual thinking.  
  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 report findings from seven experiments conducted 
for the present research. In Chapter 3 a potential link between functional 
counterfactual thinking and autonomy is examined. As an individual difference 
variable, autonomy generally describes the degree to which an individual’s 
behaviour is self-motivated and self-determined (Bekker & van Assen, 2006; Deci & 
Ryan, 2008). Experiment 1 examines whether high autonomy individuals display 
any propensity toward functional counterfactual thoughts after failure. A number of 
counterfactual elicitation methodologies are used. 
  Experiment 2 builds on Experiment 1 by investigating whether 
counterfactual thinking and individual differences in autonomy might influence 
performance improvement. Specifically, we examined whether any potential 
performance improvement associated with counterfactual thinking may be dependent 
on this individual difference factor. Experiment 2 also considers any potential 
association between individual differences in autonomy and control perceptions after 
generating counterfactual thoughts. We investigated whether any potential control 
enhancing effect of counterfactual thinking might be mediated by individual 
differences in autonomy. 
 In a final investigation into the role of autonomy in counterfactual 
thinking, Experiment 3 also examines whether individual differences in this variable 
are associated with functional types of counterfactual thinking and whether it 
mediates the performance improving effects of counterfactual thinking. We also 
examine different ways of eliciting counterfactual responses from participants. By 
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manipulating the means by which counterfactuals were elicited, it could be observed 
whether these means mediate any potential findings for functionality. 
   Chapter 4 examines whether findings observed for the self-regulatory 
individual difference of autonomy might be generalized to other self-regulatory 
individual differences. For this reason, individual differences in action/state 
orientation are examined (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). Action/state 
orientation is thought to be highly correlated with autonomy and according to Kuhl 
(2000), individuals are predisposed to either an action or state-oreintation, a stable 
personality trait over time. Experiment 4 investigates whether individual differences 
in this trait influence counterfactual thinking. We also examine in Experiment 4 
whether potential differences between action-oriented and state-oriented individuals 
in terms of counterfactual functionality may be dependent of the degree of failure 
participants experience. 
  Building from Experiment 4, Experiment 5 measures individual 
differences in action/state orientation and also experimentally induces a temporary 
action or state-orientation. Action-oriented individuals typically get over negative 
events quickly and focus on taking action to solve problems. State-oriented 
individuals typically find it difficult to overcome a negative event, and keep 
ruminating about it and how it affects their current state. This experiment addresses 
whether fostering an action-orientation facilitates the use of potentially functional 
counterfactuals and investigates whether individual difference factors interact 
significantly with related experimental manipulations. 
  In the final experimental chapter, Chapter 5, the focus turns to 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). Cognitive self-
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affirmation inclination describes an individual difference in how people 
spontaneously generate positive self-images that may be used when the self is 
threatened. There is currently little empirical research pertaining to the influence of 
self-affirmations on counterfactual thoughts. Experiment 6 examines individual 
differences in cognitive self-affirmation inclination and whether this variable 
influences functional types of counterfactual thoughts generated after a negative 
outcome. Experiment 6 also experimentally manipulates self-affirmations to observe 
the effect of this manipulation on subsequent counterfactual generation and focus. 
We investigate whether individual differences in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and related experimental manipulations might influence observable 
performance improvement that occurs after counterfactual thinking. 
  Continuing from Experiment 6, Experiment 7 attempts to investigate 
any potential association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination and 
counterfactual thinking about a personally salient life event. Again, we examine 
whether this individual difference factor is associated with more functional types of 
counterfactual thinking. Experiment 7 examines whether findings from earlier 
experiments of the present research which typically elicited counterfactual responses 
utilizing cognitive tasks might also extend to events that people find important and 
are currently committed to achieving success in. 
  Finally, the findings of all seven experiments are outlined in a general 
discussion in Chapter 6. Here, we synthesize our findings and highlight implications 
for existing theories and research. We suggest a number of ways in which this 
research may be continued and built upon in the future. 
 ~ 6 ~ 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Literature review 
The present research focuses on counterfactual thinking – the general cognitive 
process of imagining alternative outcomes to past events. This category of thought 
has been the focus of considerable psychological research in recent decades (e.g., 
Byrne, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2011; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Roese & Olsen, 1995). However, from a non-psychological 
perspective, alternative versions of past events have been contemplated from at least 
as early as the ancient Greek philosophers. Perhaps most notably, subjunctive 
suppositions and unseen yet tangible ideal forms were examined in the writings of 
both Plato and Aristotle.  Later, during the 17th century, the German philosopher 
Leibniz argued that as long as they contradict no formal laws of logic, alternative 
“possible worlds” may exist. For many decades, historians have also utilized 
counterfactual scenarios to consider ‘what might have been’ had important past 
events been different (e.g., Squire & Churchill, 1931) and to illustrate objections to 
deterministic theories of history (e.g., Ferguson, 2000).  
 The present research stems from existing counterfactual research 
within the area of social psychology. Of all disciplines, social psychology is perhaps 
the area in which counterfactual thinking has received the greatest attention. Social 
psychologists are concerned with the global cognitive functioning of people within a 
broad, social context. Unlike philosophers, social psychologists are not typically 
concerned with the objective nature of reality, but in the perceptions of individuals. 
They examine an individual’s interpretation of a situation. In addition to how 
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individuals interpret or utilize counterfactual thoughts, social psychologists are 
concerned with their global psychological impact. For instance, social psychologists 
have examined the relationships between counterfactuals and coping strategies (e.g., 
Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995), functionality (e.g., Roese, 
1994), responsibility (e.g., Markman & Tetlock, 2000), emotions (e.g., Coricelli & 
Rustichini, 2010), and blame (e.g., Branscombe, Wohl, Owen, Allison, & N’gbala, 
2003) to name but a few. 
  The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section describes previous research on, and theories of, counterfactual thinking. The 
second section focuses on the role of individual differences in counterfactual 
thinking and the final section discusses the current research. 
 
2.1 Introduction to counterfactual thinking 
 
Why is counterfactual thinking important? 
Counterfactual thinking is a pervasive element of everyday human cognition 
(Summerville & Roese, 2008). Previous research shows that people regularly and 
spontaneously generate counterfactual thoughts about all sorts of events (Roese, 
1997). For example, after failing an exam someone might think ‘If only had studied 
more I would have done better’. Likewise, after winning the lottery someone might 
think ‘If I hadn’t stopped to buy a lottery ticket I wouldn’t have won’. 
Counterfactual thoughts typically focus on mutating both an outcome and an event 
leading to that outcome in thinking about how things could have turned out 
differently. 
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  The question as to whether counterfactuals are of benefit or not has 
been considered in much of the literature (Byrne, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Roese, 1994). Both 
positive and negative features of counterfactual thinking have been identified. In 
terms of potential drawbacks to counterfactual thinking, severely depressed 
individuals who experience diminished control perceptions and low self-efficacy 
tend to generate less reasonable and feasible counterfactuals than non-depressed 
individuals (Markman & Miller, 2006; Markman & Weary, 1998). According to 
Epstude and Roese (2008), excessive counterfactual thinking about how things could 
have been different may also cause people to worry more and increase levels of 
stress. Other negative behaviours such as procrastination have been associated with 
less effective use of counterfactual thinking (Sirois, 2004). Procrastinators tend to 
use counterfactuals to make themselves feel better about their current situation and 
may therefore become complacent and lack motivation to bring about positive 
change. Perfectionism, also, has been shown to impact negatively on counterfactual 
thinking (Sirois, Monforton, & Simpson, 2010).  
  However, despite these potential downsides to counterfactual 
thinking, research has identified important functions associated with the construction 
of mental alternatives to past events. These functions include learning from past 
mistakes (Morris & Moore, 2000), making sense of life events (Bingham, 2003) and 
playing a role in emotions (Roese & Hur, 1997).  For example, counterfactual 
thinking is regarded as a key psychological process underlying emotions such as 
regret, relief, disappointment, shame, and guilt (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). The relationship between counterfactual 
thought and emotion is thought to be bi-directional; emotions can influence 
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counterfactual thinking and counterfactual thinking can influence emotions (Roese & 
Hur, 1997). Thinking about how a scenario could have been better may lead to 
negative affective experience (Davis et al., 1995; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & 
McMullen, 1993). On the other hand, generating counterfactuals about how a 
scenario could have been worse may improve a persons’ affective evaluation of an 
outcome (Mandel, Hilton, & Catellani, 2005; Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2008). 
Contrast effects of this kind were examined by Medvec, Gilovich, and Madey (1995) 
who demonstrated that Olympic bronze medallists tend to experience positive affect 
due to the ‘might have been’ of finishing fourth with no medal, whereas silver 
medallists experience negative affect due to the salient counterfactual of almost 
winning the gold medal. 
  Regret is an intrinsically aversive emotion and there exists a basic 
motivation to avoid it. However, regrets can serve a useful purpose. In a study that 
explored people’s attitude toward negative emotions, Saffrey, Summerville, and 
Roese (2008) found that regret was generally regarded as being favourable rather 
than unfavourable. Regret, in contrast to other negative emotions, was dominated by 
positive evaluations by participants. The study revealed that regret was in fact 
viewed as the most beneficial of twelve negative emotions, particularly in terms of 
making sense of past experiences, facilitating approach behaviours, facilitating 
avoidance behaviours, and gaining insights into the self. Participants’ responses also 
revealed the self-serving nature of regret, reporting greater regret for their own 
experiences than for others. It seems that while people acknowledge that regret is a 
negative emotion, they value it as a tool in discerning life experiences. Without the 
ability to think counterfactually, people would not be able to imagine how negative 
life events could have turned out differently. 
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  Similarly, counterfactual thinking may serve to instil a sense of 
meaning about important life events. Research by Kray et al. (2010) asked 
participants to reflect on a pivotal event in their lives. Some participants considered 
counterfactual alternatives to the event. Generating counterfactuals increased the 
likelihood that the event was seen as meaningful. Counterfactual thinking may also 
help people make sense of traumatic life events (Bingham, 2003; Davis et al., 1995). 
Learning from and making sense of a traumatic life experience seems to be hindered 
in individuals who cannot easily bring salient counterfactuals to mind. Bingham 
(2003) used a verbal fluency methodology to examine prospective positive and 
negative thinking patterns about traumatic events. The study noted that many 
participants who were asked to generate reasons for a positive conclusion to a 
difficult personal situation in their life could only generate one alternative. Typically, 
this alternative conclusion focused simply on the undoing of the difficulty rather than 
on the construction of a positive alternative outcome. Similarly, El Leithy, Brown, 
and Robbins (2006) postulate that not fully engaging in broad-based counterfactual 
thinking lends itself to maintaining a memory of a past event that draws focus to the 
event’s most traumatic/negative elements. 
  Counterfactual thinking has also been demonstrated to be important in 
learning (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Roese & Olson, 1995). People cannot always 
rely on repeated experience to learn from events. Counterfactual thoughts about what 
“might have been” offer a prime example of how learning may occur due to 
imaginative mental simulation rather than through trial and error. For example, 
Roese (1994, Experiment 2) demonstrated that counterfactuals effect intentions to 
perform success-facilitating behaviours in future. Participants generated 
counterfactuals about a recent exam they had performed poorly in. Compared to a 
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no-counterfactual control group, participants who generated counterfactuals 
subsequently reported higher intention ratings to perform success facilitating 
behaviours for future exams. Roese (1994, Experiment 3) also showed that 
participants induced to generate counterfactuals later performed better in an anagram 
task compared to a no-counterfactual control group. 
  However, categorizing counterfactual thoughts as learned lessons may 
not be conceptually accurate. Morris and Moore (2000) have suggested that the 
definition of ‘learning’ is important in this context. If learning is vaguely defined as 
any cognition resulting from experience, then all counterfactual thoughts may indeed 
be understood as learned lessons. However, applying a more restrictive definition of 
learning - developing specific plans for future outcome improvement - counterfactual 
thoughts should not be thought of as lessons learned because they focus exclusively 
on past events. The focus of a performance improving lesson conversely, is a future 
event. Thus, rather than being finalized learned lessons; counterfactual thoughts may 
instead serve to focus attention in such a way as to facilitate learning. In support of 
this idea, Egan and Byrne (2012) found that some counterfactual statements (e.g., if 
you had been bold I would have grounded you) have an illocutionary force that may 
guide future behaviour. 
 
Classifications of counterfactual thought 
There are a number of ways in which counterfactual thoughts have been categorized 
in the literature (e.g., Davis et al., 1995; Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin, & Gonzalez, 2007; 
Roese, 1997). However, counterfactual thoughts are typically classified according to 
their direction, structure and content (Roese, 1997). Imagine a situation in which an 
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individual is driving along a motorway when their car breaks down and they are 
stuck on the roadside. There are many types of thoughts they may generate to 
imagine an alternative situation. Direction describes whether a counterfactual 
portrays a better or worse alternative reality (e.g., Roese, 1994). When a 
counterfactual suggests an alternative that is comparatively preferable to actuality, it 
is termed an upward counterfactual (e.g., “if only I made it a few more kilometres, 
I’d have been near a mechanic”). Likewise, when a counterfactual portrays a 
somewhat less desirable alternative to the past, it is termed a downward 
counterfactual (e.g., “If the engine had blown, I might have been in a serious 
accident”).  
  Upward counterfactuals have been demonstrated to be more 
beneficial in terms of learning than downward counterfactuals. Roese (1994, 
Experiment 2) showed that students who generated upward counterfactuals after 
receiving academic feedback were more likely than those who generated downward 
counterfactuals to articulate intentions to take improvement-facilitating, preparative 
actions ahead of their next exam. These results were also replicated in a laboratory 
experiment in which upward counterfactuals facilitated learning in a puzzle task 
more effectively than downward counterfactuals (Roese, 1994, Experiment 3).  
  More generally, people’s intentions to prepare, improve performance, 
and apply greater effort have all been shown to increase via the application of 
upward counterfactual thinking (Markman et al., 1993; Markman, McMullen, & 
Elizaga, 2008; Roese, 1994). Some research also shows that while the generation of 
upward counterfactuals may often be associated with negative affect, when there 
remains a chance that a future situation may be changed, upward counterfactuals 
result in relatively positive affect (McMullen & Markman, 2000).  Likewise, 
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Boninger, Gleicher, and Strathman (1994) found that participants who were focused 
on the future were less likely to experience the negative affective consequences of 
upward counterfactual thinking relative to those who were not focused on actions 
that could be taken in the future.  
  Upward counterfactuals may facilitate performance improvement by 
influencing perceptions of control. In a study by Nasco and Marsh (1999), the 
influence of upward counterfactuals on perceptions of control was examined. This 
study was particularly important as counterfactuals generated were self-salient and 
generated in an ecologically valid setting over a 30-day period; the role of 
counterfactual thinking was examined in a study of real-life academic performance. 
The researchers suggested that perceived control was a mediator of the link between 
upward counterfactuals and improved performance. Data revealed that the tendency 
to generate upward counterfactuals was correlated with later changes in 
circumstances. These changes in circumstances were in turn, associated with higher 
perceptions of control. This finding indicates that those who generated more upward 
counterfactual thoughts engaged in adaptive behavioural change and experienced a 
heighten sense of control. 
  Another dimension of counterfactual categorization, counterfactual 
structure, refers to whether the thought is additive or subtractive in nature (Kray, 
Galinsky, & Markman, 2009). An additive counterfactual focuses on adding in 
things that could have been done to alter events. In such instances, the stem ‘If only I 
had’ is common as in: “If only I had serviced my car regularly…” Conversely, 
subtractive counterfactuals typically focus on the undoing of actions or events. For 
instance, a person may think: “If only I had not taken that route home…”  
Counterfactuals may also be composed of a mixture of both additive and subtractive 
 ~ 14 ~ 
 
antecedents such as: “If only I had been smarter and not rushed, I would have 
avoided the accident.” 
  Some evidence suggests that additive counterfactuals may be more 
conducive to performance improvement than subtractive counterfactuals. Roese and 
Olson (1993b) showed that when undoing success, people typically remove a 
successful antecedent action (“If I hadn’t studied I wouldn’t have passed the exam”) 
but when undoing failure, a new antecedent action is introduced (“If I had used my 
own calculator I wouldn’t have failed the exam”). Thus, when adaptation is required 
due to failure, additive counterfactuals are more readily generated.  
  Roese and Olson (1993b) offer an explanation as to why additive 
counterfactuals may be more functional than subtractive counterfactuals. They 
suggest that additive counterfactuals are drawn from several potential responses 
while subtractive counterfactuals merely remove one previous response from 
consideration. Additive counterfactuals may be inherently more creative than 
subtractive counterfactuals. Subtractive counterfactuals are restricted to the original 
set of premises but additive counterfactuals go beyond this restriction to construct 
novel options. In research by Roese (1994), participants induced to focus on regrets 
of inaction rather than regrets of action subsequently demonstrated greater 
performance improvement. Markman, Lindberg, Kray, and Galinsky (2007) found 
that regrets of inaction promote a more expansive processing style, associated with 
broader conceptual attention and creativity. Essentially these studies indicate that 
additive counterfactuals may be useful in identifying adaptive strategies that 
facilitate behaviour modification. 
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  In addition to the direction and structure of counterfactual thoughts, 
researchers are often interested in the focus of the thoughts. Typically, counterfactual 
focus can be categorized in a variety of ways depending on the particular aim of the 
study. For example, one distinction was made by Mandel (2003) who categorized 
participants’ counterfactuals as either self-referent or other-referent. This distinction 
is also discussed by Epstude and Roese (2008). Other classifications have included 
whether or not individuals focus on actions or inactions (e.g., Medvec et al., 1995) or 
on controllable or uncontrollable events (e.g., Markman & Miller, 2006).  
  In terms of counterfactual focus, controllable counterfactuals are 
thought to be particularly adaptive (Morris & Moore, 2000). When regret is 
experienced it is likely that the focus of counterfactual thoughts will be on one’s own 
behaviour. This was highlighted by Davis et al. (1995) who examined counterfactual 
thoughts in victims of traumatic events. Across two complimentary studies, results 
indicated that the focus of counterfactuals was typically on one’s own behaviour 
rather than on the behaviour of other people. Similarly, the emotion of shame has 
also been demonstrated as a prompt to counterfactually alter qualities of the self 
(Niedenthal et al., 1994). Even though controllable counterfactuals are associated 
with negative affective reactions, by their very nature they may also be facilitative. 
For controllable counterfactuals, there is a direct link from an upward comparison to 
a behavioural intention (Roese, 1997). This is not the case for uncontrollable 
counterfactuals. The thought, ‘If only I had practiced more, I would have won the 
tennis match’, translates directly into an action one could take to improve future 
performance. A thought about someone else’s behaviour (e.g.,‘If only he wasn’t so 
athletic, I would have won’) or an uncontrollable aspect of oneself (e.g., ‘if only I 
was taller I would have won’) does not directly translate into mutable actions to 
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improve one’s own future behaviour. Uncontrollable counterfactuals may in fact 
divert attention away from actions a person may be in control of (Morris & Moore, 
2000). 
  The number of features people may focus on when thinking 
counterfactually is limited only by imagination (Byrne, 2005). Thus, developing a 
definitive list of classifications would be onerous. Instead, it is worthy of note that 
counterfactual focus is often categorized in relation to a salient dependent variable, 
with counterfactuals not falling into a nominal category labelled as miscellaneous. 
For instance, after participants selected and attempted a mental multiplication task, 
Girotto et al. (2007) categorized participants’ counterfactuals as being choice-
focused, problem-focused, or other.    
  Besides the focus of counterfactual thought being limited only by 
imagination, so too is the number of counterfactual thoughts people can generate 
about an event. In response to an event people may think of a number of different 
ways in which it could have turned out differently. Some of these thoughts may be 
upward counterfactuals while some may be downward. Some may focus on 
controllable aspects of behaviour while others may focus on uncontrollable aspects. 
Most thoughts will probably be a combination of the classifications described above 
(e.g., a counterfactual thought that is upward, additive and controllable). In 
counterfactual thinking research, individuals are usually given the opportunity to 
generate more than one counterfactual thought about an event (Roese, 1994; Nasco 
& Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1993a). However, the first counterfactual generated 
is considered to be the most salient aspect of the event that individuals think of when 
undoing it (Wells & Gavanski, 1989). For this reason, and because real world 
situations typically don’t involve multiple counterfactual responses, some research 
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has examined the focus of initial or isolated counterfactual responses (e.g., Morris & 
Moore, 2000).  
 
Factors influencing counterfactual thinking 
In conceptualizing the determinants of counterfactual thinking, a distinction has been 
made between factors that influence counterfactual activation and factors that 
influence counterfactual focus (Roese, 1997). Counterfactual activation refers to 
whether the process of counterfactual thinking is initiated or ‘switched on’, while 
counterfactual focus describes the specific informational make-up and content of the 
thought. In order for determinants of counterfactual focus to take effect, activational 
factors must first be encountered or experienced. That is to say, Bill will not form the 
statement, “If only I had concentrated harder, I would have won the prize”, unless 
some factor stimulates him to think counterfactually in the first place. The factors 
that initiate or influence counterfactual thinking are numerous. What follows is an 
outline of a number of important counterfactual determinants. 
  Much of the existing research has identified catalysts that stimulate 
and shape counterfactual thinking (e.g., Boninger et al., 1994; Haynes et al., 2007; 
Meyerslevy & Maheswaran, 1992). In terms of actually sparking counterfactual  
thoughts, outcomes that are in some way inconsistent with expectations are 
considered important (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). For instance, if a highly unusual 
course of action was taken by a student leading up to an exam, then that is typically 
the action they will tend to focus on or undo. For example, if the student usually 
manages to get eight hours sleep each night but only slept for three hours the night 
prior to an exam, they may well construct the counterfactual, “If only I had gone to 
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bed at my usual time, I would have performed much better”. Numerous studies have 
indicated that the focus of counterfactual thought is determined by perceptions of 
situational normality (e.g., Buck & Miller, 1994; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990). Studies such as 
these demonstrate that individuals tend to undo unusual factual antecedents, bringing 
them back into line with normal expectations or behaviour. 
 Negative affect is also thought to be particularly important. A review 
by Roese and Olson (1997) points to numerous studies demonstrating that 
counterfactuals are most often prompted by negative emotional reactions – the 
“affect-driven hypothesis.” People typically construct counterfactuals when faced 
with adversity. Studies on traumatic life events carried out by Davis et al. (1995) 
suggest that negative affect experienced by parents shortly after suffering 
bereavement can be predictive of the number of self-reported counterfactuals 
generated at a later stage of the grieving process. Simply put, the more negative 
affect experienced by a parent, the more ‘if only’ type statements will be produced. 
In this sense, affect has an important influence on whether or not counterfactuals are 
generated or ‘switched on’. This methodological approach of examining 
counterfactual thought frequency is not uncommon when examining activation 
factors.  
  Closely related to the factor of negative affect is outcome valence. 
Overall, a great deal of evidence now supports the claim that negative outcomes (as 
opposed to positive outcomes) result in greater counterfactual thinking (Boninger et 
al., 1994; Gleicher et al., 1990; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Evidence provided by 
Sanna and Turley (1996), observing emotionally neutral cases, suggests that outcome 
valence plays a crucial role in the activation of counterfactuals. Their research 
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demonstrated that counterfactuals were more frequently generated after negative 
outcomes in a number of experimental tasks ranging from academic type assessment 
to performance on an anagram task. There is some conflicting evidence however. 
Roese and Olsen (1993b, 1995) reported that regardless of whether a scenario is 
perceived as positive or negative, participants generated counterfactual thoughts with 
similar frequency. These studies seem to be somewhat exceptional however, with 
most of the empirical research supporting the notion that counterfactual thinking is 
most likely to occur after negative events (Davis et al., 1995; Grieve, Houston, 
Dupuis, & Eddy, 1999). 
  It may be however, that outcome valence effects are in fact mediated 
by changes in affect. Roese and Olson (1997) attempted to examine the impact of 
outcome valence on counterfactual thought generation, but investigated whether it 
was affective experiences or changes in cognitive perceptions of outcome valence 
that mitigated changes in counterfactual generation frequency. Response times were 
used as a measure of counterfactual generation; yes/no agreement responses to 
counterfactual statements were timed after both negative and positive outcomes. 
Over a range of experiments, self-report ratings of affect were shown to mediate the 
effects of outcome valence on activation. Negative emotions in particular, were 
shown to account for a significant portion of the variance in counterfactual 
activation. Importantly, the direction of a counterfactual thought may often be 
determined by outcome valence; various research has shown that people are more 
likely to generate upward counterfactuals following failure, and downward 
counterfactuals following success (Gleicher et al., 1990; Grieve et al., 1999; 
Markman et al., 1993; Sanna et al., 2001). 
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  Outcome closeness – how an outcome almost, but did not quite occur 
– has been shown to influence counterfactual thought generation (e.g., Johnson, 
1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Meyerslevy & Maheswaran, 1992). Take, for 
instance, the case of a person who forgets to file a fire insurance policy on time. This 
scenario was presented to participants in an experiment carried out by Meyerslevy 
and Maheswaran (1992). In one trial, participants considered how things could have 
been different when the insurance form was due to be filed three days before a fire 
occurred. In another trial, participants considered alternatives when the form was due 
to be filed six months prior to the fire. Results indicated that when the missed 
opportunity – not filing the insurance form – was temporally close, counterfactuals 
were more frequently produced in a subsequent thought-listing task.  
  Other studies examining the determinant of temporal closeness have 
utilized a scenario in which a person misses a plane/train by either a few minutes or a 
few hours (Johnson, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). These studies also suggest 
that temporal closeness influences the number of counterfactual thoughts being 
generated. Other studies have shown that outcome closeness is influential even in the 
absence of plausible causal factors. For instance, Turnbull (1981) found that 
participants whose lottery numbers were close to the winning numbers, experienced 
greater disappointment than participants whose numbers were more remote from the 
winning numbers. Outcome closeness may also refer to distance: missing a 
touchdown by a single yard as opposed to 15 yards; or it may refer to numerical 
quantity: being the 999th customer when the 1000th customer wins a prize (Roese, 
1997).  
  The degree of involvement a person has in determining an outcome 
has also be shown to influence counterfactual generation. Meyerslevy and 
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Maheswaran (1992) examined this factor. The study mainly involved participants 
reading advertisements from charitable aid organizations. They were informed that 
their input was required in determining how charitable funds may be allocated. 
Highly involved participants were told that a university was interested in their 
opinion regarding which charitable organization should receive funding and that they 
were part of a very select group of people whose assistance was being sought. Low 
involvement participants were informed that their contributions might be added to a 
list of possible organizations in a nationwide study of opinion. An outcome closeness 
variable was also introduced in the study. Participants read a harrowing story of 
children who had been orphaned due to a recent military coup in Chile. Depending 
on the experimental condition allocated, participants learned that plans by the 
charitable organization to offer assistance had been halted either one day or nine 
months before they could take effect. The researchers postulated that in cases where 
personal involvement was low, people should produce more counterfactuals when 
short rather than long temporal distance separate actual and alternative outcomes. 
However, if an individual had high personal involvement, the temporal distance 
variable should have little effect on the amount of counterfactuals generated. 
Analysis of participants’ responses revealed that temporal distance effects on 
counterfactual generation were only important when personal involvement with the 
situation was low. In other words, issue involvement superseded the temporal 
distance factor in counterfactual activation.  
  Counterfactual thoughts may also be influenced by whether it is an 
action or some perceived inaction that leads to an outcome (Byrne & McEleney, 
2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman & Petty, 2000). People may more 
typically focus counterfactually on actions rather than inactions. In fact, studies have 
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controlled this variable when manipulating counterfactual focus (Gleicher et al., 
1990; Miller et al., 1990). To say that counterfactuals typically tend to focus on 
actions rather than inactions may however be something of an oversimplification. 
While some studies have failed to detect any tendency toward action-focused 
counterfactuals (e.g., Davis et al., 1995), others have suggested that outcome valence 
(Roese & Olson, 1993a) and temporal distance (Medvec et al., 1995) moderate 
whether people focus on action rather than inaction. For instance, the argument made 
by Medvec et al. (1995) suggests that while people may tend to undo actions taken in 
the short term, over the long term it is inaction that constitutes the greatest source of 
regret. However, this temporal switch is thought to occur only for particular sorts of 
situations (Byrne & McEleney, 2000). Research by Walsh and Byrne (2007) also 
suggests that counterfactuals about actions tend to vary depending on whether or not 
there is a clear and justifiable reason behind the action taken. 
  Controllability has been identified as an important factor in 
counterfactual thinking (Egan, Frosh, & Hancock, 2008; Markman & Miller, 2006; 
Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Walsh & Byrne, 2005). 
Controllability refers to the perception of personal control an individual had over an 
outcome. For instance, after receiving a negative grade, a student may feel they had 
more control over going to bed on time as opposed to whether their teacher was 
effective that semester. Research has shown that people are indeed more likely to 
mutate preoutcome features that they personally have control over (Girotto, 
Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000; Miller et al., 1990).  
  The influence of controllability has also been highlighted by 
Markman et al. (1995) who developed a “controllability hypothesis” suggesting that 
controllable aspects of an event take precedence over uncontrollable aspects in being 
 ~ 23 ~ 
 
counterfactualized due to the fact that the former typically receive more attention. 
Markman et al. (1995) argue that judgements of controllability may influence the 
ease with which counterfactuals are generated. Compared to other mental 
simulations however, such as thinking about what might happen in the future (i.e., 
prefactuals), counterfactuals may not be as likely to focus on controllable elements. 
Recent research suggests that after experiencing failure, counterfactuals tend to focus 
on uncontrollable antecedents more so than prefactuals (Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, & 
Walsh, 2013). 
 
Theories of counterfactual thinking 
A number of theories have been put forward to explain the underlying processes 
involved in counterfactual thinking. From a theoretical perspective, counterfactuals 
were originally thought of as a form of biased judgement in heuristics. For instance, 
norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) largely describes counterfactual thinking as 
a hindrance to sound reasoning and decision making. Norm theory purports that 
counterfactual thinking is the activation from memory of positive examples of how 
present similar situations should be handled. Abnormal outcomes, or those that are 
inconsistent with expectancies, elicit representations that are counterfactual and 
congruent with expectations. In other words, when faced with unusual or unfortunate 
events, people generate “if only” type thoughts which aid in bringing events back to 
normal. Essentially, norm theory addresses the comparison between a cognitive 
anchor and an existing outcome. A variety of cognitive and affective reactions are 
based on the difference between the two items being compared. In this context, 
judgmental standards (norms) are constructed from both a priori beliefs and actual 
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outcomes. Instead of viewing anchors as global and fixed, norms are specific and can 
be variable depending on the situation.  
  The postulated bias of norm theory results when judgements of 
relatively objective outcomes become distorted due to the presence of a 
counterfactual alternative. Even in instances when decisions are made relatively 
soundly, the realization that a more favourable outcome may have occurred had 
some alternative course been selected, results in a harsher evaluation of the action or 
actor. Thus, the presence of a counterfactual thought may distort reactions that stem 
from reasonable judgement. This view of counterfactual thinking as bias has been 
supported and developed by subsequent research. For instance, the “counterfactual 
fallacy” put forward by Miller et al. (1990) also suggests a judgemental bias. This 
fallacy refers to the tendency to think that what need not have occurred ought not to 
have occurred. Further cognitive flaws have been highlighted by McCloy and Byrne 
(2000) who suggest that in addition to the “counterfactual fallacy” heuristic, the 
converse of this fallacy may also be true: people think that what ought not have been 
need not have been.  
  Another approach that has helped shape the nature of counterfactual 
research is that of the simulation heuristic proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982). The simulation heuristic was developed chiefly to explain counterfactual 
thinking and regret. The simulation heuristic posits that the ease with which an event 
can be cognitively undone determines cognitive judgements regarding the likelihood 
of the event actually happening. This heuristic explains why people generally 
experience greater regret after “near misses” than if the outcome were more difficult 
to mentally undo. For instance, Miller and McFarland (1986) observed that baseball 
players experienced greater frustration when their opponent made a hit with two outs 
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than when they made a hit with no outs. The pitcher could more easily 
counterfactually simulate success because the batter was almost out. Thus, the 
simulation heuristic describes a means by which individuals may assess 
probabilities. 
   An important theory put forward to explain counterfactual thinking 
was proposed by Byrne (2005) who outlined a set of cognitive principles that govern 
what people typically consider when thinking counterfactually. Based on the mental 
models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002), Byrne suggests that people can 
easily imagine alternatives to events because they think about multiple possibilities 
to understand the event from the outset. For Byrne, counterfactual or imaginative 
thoughts are largely guided by the same principles that underlie rational thoughts. 
This theory of rational imagination approaches counterfactual thinking in terms of 
the basic rules used in reasoning and how individual pieces of information may be 
pieced together to form inferences. Unlike earlier work which emphasized that 
counterfactual thinking may frequently be a hindrance to sound judgement (Gleicher 
et al., 1990; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Wells & 
Gavanski, 1989), Byrne emphasized how counterfactuals may be constructed using 
formal laws of logic and may frequently be reasonable. Similarly, the reflection and 
evaluation theory of counterfactual thinking (Markman & McMullen, 2003) which 
integrates cognitive processes of assimilation and contrast in counterfactual 
judgement, suggests that counterfactuals may typically facilitate sound judgement. 
   More formally, the idea that counterfactuals may largely be of benefit 
to people in terms of everyday cognition and behaviour modification is referred to as 
the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008, 2011; 
Markman & McMullen, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1997; Roese, 1994, 1997). While 
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functional accounts of counterfactual thinking suggest that mental simulations of the 
past are largely adaptive, instances when they become less than functional are 
acknowledged. For example, when individuals focus only on a narrow range of 
counterfactuals, perhaps simply undoing an outcome rather than proposing salient 
alternatives, counterfactual thinking may become chronically dysfunctional. Also, 
for depressed individuals, there exists an adverse cost-benefit ratio of emotional 
discomfort relative to successful behavioural adjustment (Bingham, 2003). However, 
according to Roese and Olsen (1997), under normal circumstances there is a trade-
off between the negative emotional consequences associated with counterfactual 
thinking and the logical inferences gained from it. For Roese and Olsen, 
counterfactual thinking is normally functional because the logical inferences 
generated continue to be available while the associated negative affect becomes less 
frequent over time. In support of this view, additional research (e.g., Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Epstude & Roese, 2011; Kray & Galinsky, 2003; Markman et al., 
2008; Roese, 1994) has argued that counterfactual thinking can be beneficial in 
terms of self-regulation and planning. 
  Research has demonstrated that counterfactuals can help people to 
learn from mistakes and consider how things could be better (e.g., Byrne, 2002; 
Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). Research by Markman et al. (1993) was the 
first to demonstrate the preparative functions of counterfactual thinking. Their study 
involved participants playing blackjack against a computer. Participants were told 
they would be playing three additional hands or no additional hands of blackjack. 
The study revealed that participants who expected to play again generated more 
upward counterfactuals relative to those participants who did not expect to play 
again. Markman et al. inferred from this that participants who expected to play again 
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generated upward counterfactuals to gain preparative information that might 
facilitate better performance. However, participants who did not expect to play again 
needed no such information and were motivated to avoid feeling bad about the game. 
Thus, they utilized downward counterfactuals to serve an affect enhancing function. 
Counterfactual thinking has also been demonstrated to improve performance in other 
types of tasks such as college assignments and anagrams (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; 
Roese, 1994). 
  It is worth considering what exactly it is about counterfactual thinking 
that might potentially facilitate adaptive planning and behaviour modification. 
Counterfactuals may be adaptive largely because they help determine behavioural 
intentions (Page & Colby, 2003). Epstude and Roese (2008; 2011) have proposed 
two pathways by which counterfactual thoughts can influence future behaviour: a 
content-specific pathway and a content neutral pathway. The content-specific 
pathway refers to the information contained within counterfactual thoughts. As 
Epstude & Roese, (2008) suggest, a direct semantic connection occurs due to the 
specific causal insight within the counterfactual. For example, if a person were to fail 
an exam they might think, “If only I had studied instead of going out then I would 
have passed the exam”. This action step – studying – may become more likely to be 
adopted in future similar scenarios. Thus, behavioural intentions are formed based on 
information contained within the counterfactual.  
  The content-neutral pathway refers to a general increase in motivation 
resulting from a failure. The content neutral pathway describes the way in which 
information is handled rather than how the details of the information may be applied. 
Thus, factors such as negative affect experienced due to considering “what might 
have been” may cause people to try harder generally and influence future intentions. 
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Similarly, the content-neutral pathway may influence intentions due to mind set 
changes. This refers to how the style of information processing a person uses may be 
influenced by previous cognitive strategy in an unrelated domain. For example, 
thinking counterfactually about a task may increase the likelihood that 
counterfactuals will be generated more liberally in subsequent unrelated tasks (e.g., 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Generating counterfactuals about how a negative 
situation may have been avoided may also make people aware that they are active 
agents of change. The resulting self-inferences may influence behavioural intentions 
independently of any learned lessons that stem from considering counterfactuals. 
  It is somewhat unclear whether future intention ratings are influenced 
by counterfactual content or whether factors such as negative affect cause people to 
try harder generally, thus shaping intentions. Epstude and Roese (2008) suggest that 
a counterfactual thought may exert its influence by one pathway, or by both 
pathways. Research by Smallman and Roese (2009) attempted to show that it is the 
content of counterfactual thoughts, and not only fluctuations in motivation or affect, 
that determines behavioural intentions. In their study, participants were initially 
shown a negative event (e.g., “got a bad sunburn”) and then asked to imagine they 
had experienced it. Two seconds later, a cue and an action phrase appeared together 
below the negative event statement. The cue was either counterfactual or non-
counterfactual. Those given a counterfactual cue were asked to determine whether 
this behaviour could have changed the negative event while the control group were 
asked whether this was something they had done in the past two weeks. The control 
condition was designed to draw participants’ attention to the action phrase without 
encouraging inferences of a counterfactual nature. Subsequently, participants were 
asked to make a behavioural intention judgement. Results indicated that 
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counterfactuals led to faster behavioural intention judgements relative to control 
conditions. Thus, counterfactual thinking was shown to facilitate intentions to 
perform specific content-related acts.    
    
2.2 Individual differences and counterfactual thinking 
 
Previous research on individual differences and counterfactual thinking 
A great deal of research (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Medvec et al., 1995; 
Meyerslevy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese, 1997) has identified or described 
situational factors that influence counterfactual thinking (e.g., exceptional events, the 
first event in a causal sequence, controllable events, actions). Petrocelli, Percy, 
Sherman, and Tormala (2011) recently referred to these types of findings as ‘The 
List’, by which they mean that ‘...rather than a synthesis or explanation of what 
makes counterfactual thoughts impactful, the existing literature delineates only the 
types of events associated with counterfactual thoughts’ (p.2). Petrocelli et al. (2011) 
attempt to address this problem by focusing on the impact of the counterfactual 
thought itself. However, individual differences in personality may also be influential 
in counterfactual thought activation and focus. 
  To illustrate, imagine two fishermen who invest in a new boat. On 
their maiden voyage the ship is lost due to a freak storm; both men are lucky to be 
rescued and escape with their lives. Counterfactuals produced by the fishermen may 
indeed be influenced by factors such as normality (“If only the weather had not 
turned so harshly…) and controllability (“If only I had paid more attention to 
weather conditions before setting out…). However, it is possible that both men will 
 ~ 30 ~ 
 
differ significantly in the way they mentally simulate alternative scenarios, even 
when they have experienced such similar outcomes. In this sense, counterfactuals 
may potentially be influenced as a result of individual personality differences as well 
as situational factors. Varying personality characteristics and individual differences 
have previously been shown to influence counterfactual thinking (Sanna, 2000).  
  Some recent research has highlighted the potential importance of 
considering individual difference factors in relation to counterfactual thinking. 
Epstude and Roese (2011) suggest that more research is needed, particularly in 
understanding how individual differences may influence counterfactual functionality. 
Similar suggestions have been made by Murphy (2005). Bacon, Walsh, and Martin 
(2013) also point out that relatively little is known about how personality influences 
counterfactual thinking and that understanding how individual differences shape 
counterfactual thinking may have important implications for learning. 
  Relatively little research has focused on the role of personality traits 
and individual differences in influencing counterfactual thoughts, but what research 
has been done demonstrates that personality traits may have an important role to play 
in counterfactual thinking. For instance, Sanna (1998) investigated counterfactual 
thinking in defensive-pessimists and optimists. Defensive pessimists and optimists 
represent opposing ends of a personality continuum. Essentially, defensive 
pessimists are people who benefit from adopting a negative outlook for tasks they 
are about to undertake. According to Showers (1992), defensive pessimists 
acknowledge a history of success in certain situations, such as in social interactions, 
but will enter future similar situations expecting the worst outcome. In contrast, 
optimists tend to use retrospective strategies, analysing performance after the event 
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has taken place. Sanna (1998) found that when optimists think counterfactually they 
tend to generate mood repairing downward counterfactuals more so than pessimists. 
   Another personality characteristic shown to influence counterfactual 
thinking is self-esteem. The construct of self-esteem refers to an individuals’ 
perception of their own self-worth (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010). There are 
several reasons why self-esteem may be relevant in terms of mental simulation and 
counterfactual thinking. Firstly, research indicates that high self-esteem and low self-
esteem individuals differ in terms of the coping styles they utilize (Sheppard & 
Arkin, 1991). While high-self-esteem individuals are generally quick to accept credit 
and deny blame, low-self-esteem individuals are more likely to accept a greater share 
of responsibility for failures. As Sanna and Meier (2000) suggest, those with low 
self-esteem are generally more even handed in accepting responsibility for both 
positive as well as negative outcomes.  A study by Roese and Olson (1993a) was one 
of the first studies to link self-esteem and counterfactual thinking. Their research 
indicated that individuals with low self-esteem were more likely to undo their own 
actions following failure, while people with higher self-esteem were more likely to 
undo their own actions after success.  
   Research by Bacon et al. (2013) examined individual differences in 
fantasy proneness in relation to counterfactual thinking. Fantasy proneness describes 
a personality trait typified by excessive fantasies that are difficult to distinguish from 
reality. The researchers asked participants to engage in a fictional diary entry used to 
measure spontaneous counterfactual generation, and then complete a measure of 
individual differences in fantasy proneness. Results indicated that higher levels of 
fantasy proneness were correlated with higher levels of spontaneous counterfactual 
thinking. This study was one of the first to demonstrate a significant association 
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between a specific personality trait and individual differences in the activation of 
counterfactual thoughts. 
  Broader perspectives focusing on numerous individual difference 
factors have also been taken (e.g., Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Murphy, 2005). To 
date, one of the most significant contributions in the area of counterfactual thinking 
and individual differences has been made by Kasimatis and colleagues (Kasimatis & 
Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 1995). Kasimatis and Wells (1995) asked college 
students to consider six hypothetical scenarios relating to course registration, then to 
generate counterfactuals, and complete a number of personality measures. 
Personality constructs examined in their study included optimism and self-esteem. 
After waiting for a period of a few weeks, the researchers asked the same students to 
consider six different but similar scenarios before completing a series of 
counterfactual generation tasks and additional personality measures. A fundamental 
finding of the study was that some people were consistently more likely to engage in 
counterfactual thinking and those who did engage more frequently typically utilized 
more upward counterfactuals. In terms of the various personality measures, there 
were a limited number of correlations between counterfactual generation and 
personality measure scores. A person’s outlook or disposition seemed to be a 
significant factor. Optimists were more likely to engage in downward 
counterfactuals than pessimists, and were less likely to use upward counterfactuals. 
Similar results were reported for self-esteem; those low in self-esteem were more 
likely that those high in self-esteem to generate upward counterfactuals. Essentially, 
viewing events in a positive manner seems to be related to more infrequent use of 
upward counterfactuals (i.e., thinking about how things could have turned out 
better). 
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  Kasimatis and Wells (1995) also investigated whether analytical 
abilities influenced counterfactual thinking.  They observed that all participants were 
capable of engaging in counterfactual thoughts regardless of intellectual or analytical 
ability. In a subsequent experiment with minor methodological changes, they 
examined whether belief in a just world or a deity had an impact on counterfactual 
thought. Data indicated that people were less likely to consider how things could 
have turned out better if they reported having a strong belief in a just world. The 
same was also true for those who held a belief in god.  
 Another study to research a wide variety of individual differences in 
relation to counterfactual thinking was that of Murphy (2005). This study, like those 
of Kasimatis & colleagues, examined a wide range of individual difference variables 
while utilizing vignettes to elicit counterfactual responses. Murphy addressed the 
neglect of personality styles in the counterfactual literature by examining the 
Digman (1990) five-factor model. Several significant findings emerged from this 
study. Firstly, higher levels of neuroticism were correlated with the use of upward 
counterfactual thoughts. Secondly, openness to experience was correlated with the 
generation of more downward counterfactuals. 
  What may be concluded from this series of studies is that personality 
deserves consideration in counterfactual thinking research.  People who score high in 
optimism, self-esteem, or who use emotion-focused coping strategies may use 
counterfactuals to serve an affective function. These studies have demonstrated that 
personality may have an influence over both the activation and focus of 
counterfactual thoughts. However, the majority of studies have examined individual 
difference variables relating to outlook or positive disposition. In the next section we 
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consider whether or not self-regulatory traits/individual differences might influence 
counterfactual thoughts. 
 
Self-regulatory individual differences and counterfactual thinking 
That many of the studies of individual differences in counterfactual thinking have 
tended to focus largely on affective traits (e.g., self-esteem, optimism, positive 
outlook) rather than on self-regulatory individual differences, may be partly due to 
the fact that self-regulatory orientations have been somewhat ignored generally in 
the personality literature (Hoyle, 2006). However, self-regulatory individual 
differences have not been entirely ignored; a handful of studies have examined self-
regulatory individual differences in relation to counterfactual thinking (Haynes et al., 
2007; Kasimatis & Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Markman, Balkin, & 
Baron, 2002; Murphy, 2005; Sanna, 1997). The findings from these studies have 
been mixed. 
  Successful self-regulation allows people to set important goals and 
alter their actions if needed in pursuit of those goals. A lack of self-regulation is 
synonymous with a lack of control over one’s life and capacity to attain desired 
outcomes. Essentially, adaptive functioning in many areas of life is largely 
dependent on effective self-regulation. Individual differences are thought to exist in 
terms of how people typically self-regulate (Kuhl, 1992).  
  Particularly in developmental psychology, research has identified a 
number of important self-regulatory traits. One such construct is effortful control 
(Rothbart & Rueda, 2005). This capacity allows a child to inhibit dominant 
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responses when such responses conflict with successfully implementing a task in 
which they are engaged. Temporally stable individual differences in effortful control 
are thought to emerge by the time a child is 4 years of age (Kochanska, Murray, & 
Harlan, 2000). Another important self-regulatory individual difference identified by 
developmental theorists is that of behavioural inhibition (Fox, Henderson, Marshall, 
Nichols, & Ghera, 2005). This construct examines individual differences in how 
children react to unexpected stimuli in their environment. Those who are 
behaviourally inhibited typically experience significant levels of distress when they 
encounter unexpected stimuli. Unexpected feedback is vital in the self-regulatory 
process and as such, behaviourally inhibited children must manage this feedback 
while also tending to their aversive affective response.  
   In terms of self-regulatory individual differences in adults, Hoyle 
(2006) suggests that the broader construct of conscientiousness may be particularly 
important. Conscientiousness refers to the general manner in which an individual 
manages their behaviour. A person high in conscientiousness would typically be 
disciplined, orderly, reliable, and would also frequently engage in planning strategies 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992). As conscientiousness is a higher order personality trait, it 
may also be described in terms of its more narrowly focused facets. Facets associated 
with conscientiousness include self-efficacy, achievement striving, self-discipline, 
and deliberation. Individual differences in these facets are thought to be particularly 
important in terms of behaviour modification (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & 
Goldberg, 2005).  
  Of the studies that have examined self-regulatory individual 
differences in relation to counterfactual thinking, a number of constructs have been 
examined. The studies by Kasimatis and colleagues (1995, 1994) looked at 
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individual differences in gaining mastery over a negative outcome. Desire for control 
is a stable personality trait reflecting the degree of control a person seeks over events 
in their lives. A person with a high desire for control is said to prefer making their 
own decisions, taking action to avoid losing control, and assuming leadership roles 
in group settings. A low desire for control is associated with a preference to 
relinquish control and have other people make decisions. Individuals high in desire 
for control respond to challenges with more effort and persistence than participants 
with low desire for control. High desire for control individuals also exhibit an 
attribution pattern for successes and failures that suggests a high level of motivation 
on subsequent achievement tasks (Burger & Cooper, 1979). Kasimatis and Wells 
postulated that if indeed counterfactual simulations do serve preparative functions, it 
is likely that people who have a high desire for control over circumstances in their 
lives will be more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking that allows them to feel 
more in control of future situations, compared with people who have a low desire for 
control. However, the researchers found that desire for control was not related to a 
propensity to engage in overall or upward counterfactual thinking. For the 
researchers, this implied that the instances when counterfactuals serve a preparative 
function may well be limited in scope. 
 A conceptually similar construct to that of desire for control – locus 
of control (Rotter, 1966) – was also examined by Kasimatis and colleagues (1995, 
1994). Locus of control is only slightly correlated with desire for control (Burger & 
Cooper, 1979). Unlike desire for control, a construct pertaining to motivation, locus 
of control describes a perception. Locus of control orientation is a belief about 
whether the consequences of an individual’s actions are determined by what they 
themselves do (internal locus of control) or by events outside personal control 
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(external locus of control). It was hypothesized by the researchers that due to the 
control aspect of mental simulations, internal locus of control may be a relevant 
characteristic. Again however, no evidence was found to suggest that individual 
differences in locus of control influence preparative counterfactual thinking. 
Kasimatis and colleagues again inferred from this that instances when 
counterfactuals are preparative may be limited. However, the authors suggested that 
further research is needed to understand how counterfactuals influence preparative 
functions as a result of personality characteristics. 
  Murphy (2005) also failed to link self-regulatory individual 
differences to functional counterfactual thinking. Of most importance to self-
regulation in this study was the trait of conscientiousness. As discussed, 
conscientiousness has clear implications for self-regulation. It refers to the general 
manner in which an individual manages their behaviour. It was predicted by Murphy 
(2005) that those with higher conscientiousness scores would produce a higher total 
number of total counterfactuals, given that counterfactuals may serve a preparative 
function.  However, correlation analysis revealed no significant relationship between 
the variables. 
  In terms of self-regulation, self-efficacy has been shown to influence 
the way in which counterfactual simulations are utilized. Self-efficacy involves a 
belief that one can organize, act and produce desirable outcomes in a specific domain 
(Bandura & Locke, 2003). A study by Sanna (1997) examined self-efficacy as a 
moderator of the affective consequences of both upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking. Participants were asked to perform simple anagram tasks 
while self-efficacy was influenced by providing false feedback after the task was 
attempted. Analysis of affect scores indicated that when participants thought they 
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would be attempting the task again, low self-efficacy participants felt significantly 
worse than high self-efficacy participants when generating upward counterfactual 
thoughts. These affective differences were not observed for downward 
counterfactual thoughts. Moreover, when there was no repeat task to perform, 
affective reactions to counterfactual direction did not differ as a result of self-
efficacy.  
  From these findings, it may be inferred that people with high self-
efficacy interpret upward counterfactuals as being achievable goals and assimilate 
them for behaviour regulation, whereas individuals scoring low in self-efficacy tend 
to contrast counterfactuals to reality, resulting in negative affective experience. 
Rather than demonstrating functionality, the study by Sanna (1997) demonstrated the 
influence of individual difference variables on affective reactions to counterfactual 
thinking. From a functional perspective, it may be the case that people with high 
self-efficacy are more likely to make better use of the self-improvement function of 
upward counterfactual thoughts (Sanna, 2000).  
 Haynes et al. (2007) offer some compelling evidence suggesting that 
self-regulatory individual differences may indeed influence counterfactual 
functionality. Their research examined the influence of uncertainty orientation on 
counterfactual thinking. Uncertainty orientation is a formal theory of self–regulation 
that says people differ in how they handle uncertainty. Within this construct there are 
two main types of people: uncertainty–oriented and certainty–oriented. Uncertainty–
oriented people are the need to know types who are willing to question things, 
including self-related beliefs, when faced with uncertainty. Certainty–oriented 
people are more concerned with maintaining self-representations and are less willing 
to question deeply held beliefs when faced with uncertainty. Haynes et al. (2007) 
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remind us that counterfactuals involve running hypothetical ‘what ifs’ and that they 
allude to past failures in dealing with the environment. If people generate upward 
counterfactuals after a negative event because they feel uncertain, about themselves 
or things that happen, then uncertainty–oriented people should be more likely than 
certainty–oriented people to engage in upward counterfactual thinking. The study 
also examined temporal order effects (e.g., Medvec et al., 1995; Walsh & Byrne, 
2004). Participants generated counterfactuals about events that were framed as either 
psychologically recent or distant. Results indicated that individuals who are 
uncertainty–oriented are more likely to generate upward counterfactual thoughts to 
psychologically recent negative outcomes than are certainty-oriented individuals. 
The findings by Haynes et al. (2007) suggest that self-regulatory individual 
differences may be important in terms of how and when functional counterfactual 
thoughts are used. 
   It appears that there is no strong consensus about the role of self-
regulatory individual differences in counterfactual thinking.  However, there may be 
a number of reasons why previous research such as that of Kasimatis and colleagues 
(1994, 1995) found little evidence that self-regulatory individual difference factors, 
such as locus of control, facilitate preparative counterfactual thinking. Two possible 
reasons relate to the types of traits examined and to the methodology used and these 
will be discussed in turn. 
  Firstly, the types of self-regulatory individual difference factors 
studied may reflect more of a neurotic need to control events rather than a capacity 
to react well to negative setbacks and choose adaptive responses. For instance, while 
at times it may be psychologically healthy to have an internal locus of control, this 
may not always be the case (Rotter, 1966). Rotter, who conceptualized the construct 
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of locus of control, warned against the simplistic view that internal is good and 
external is bad; there are important subtleties to consider. According to Rotter, 
individuals with an internal locus of control can be psychologically unhealthy, 
unstable, neurotic, anxious, and depressed. Moreover, individuals with an external 
locus of control can lead easy-going, happy lives. 
 Similar points can be made about the individual difference variable 
‘desire for control’ examined by Kasimatis and colleagues (1995, 1994). According 
to Burger & Cooper (1979), it is possible that high desire for control can become a 
liability. Although people high in desire for control may at times react to challenges 
with increased effort, the inability to control elements of a situation may also cause 
performance-inhibiting reactions. Burger (1984) also found that those with a high 
desire for control, who were in situations in which they did not feel in control, 
typically exhibited more depressive symptoms than those with a low desire for 
control. Rather than being universally adaptive, those with a high desire for control 
may also mistakenly attempt to control events over which they have little or no 
influence (e.g., Burger & Cooper, 1979; Burger & Smith, 1985). 
  Secondly, the studies by Kasimatis and colleagues (1995, 1994) and 
Murphy (2005) relied entirely on the use of vignettes to elicit counterfactual 
responses from participants. It has been suggested that this narrative method is 
capable of transporting recipients, generating a sort of genuine vicarious experience. 
This transportation, according to Green and Brock (2000), involves the absorption of 
the recipient into the story, or a sense of being deeply involved in the story. 
Absorption into the story facilitates the acceptance of the narrative world created by 
the story. Vignettes have been used extensively in counterfactual thinking research 
and have proved to be a reliable and effective way of eliciting counterfactuals 
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(Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Dixon & Byrne, 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; McCloy & Byrne, 2000). Vignettes allow a high 
number of participants to engage with a particular scenario within a relatively short 
time frame. They also allow participants to consider scenarios that would otherwise 
be impossible to experimentally induce. 
  However, problems with this approach have been identified recently 
(Girotto et al., 2007; Pighin, Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, & Girotto, 2011). Girotto et 
al. (2007) suggest that readers (participants who read about a scenario via vignette) 
and actors (participants who actually attempt a task) differ in postdecisional 
counterfactual thinking. They claim there are two main reasons why this may be the 
case. One reason is that actors and readers may be directed by divergent motivational 
goals. Actors, unlike readers, may be motivated to avoid self-blame following a 
negative outcome. Research by Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, and Wilson (2004) 
compared counterfactual thinking in people who had actually missed their train by 1 
minute with those who imagined the same situation. Analysis of counterfactual focus 
determined that people who actually missed their train (actors) were more likely to 
produce externally focused counterfactuals (e.g., “I would not have missed the train 
if all the gates had been opened instead of just one”) than people who merely 
imagined missing a train. Readers were apparently more comfortable with generating 
self-blame counterfactuals (e.g., “If only I had skipped breakfast”) than were actors.  
  The other reason Girotto et al. (2007) suggest that readers and actors 
generate counterfactual thoughts differently is because they experience 
tasks/situations in different ways. After reading a vignette, readers tend to undo 
choices made by the protagonist which lead to subsequent failure. Those who 
actually attempt a task can however, retrieve from memory detailed elements of the 
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problem-solving phase. An actor’s role can make available, as counterfactual 
alternatives, problem features in addition to the actor’s choice. Girotto et al. (2007) 
demonstrated this over a series of experiments in which participants either read about 
a protagonist who participated in a task (game or lottery) or attempted the task 
themselves. The outcome of the task was always negative. For instance, a difficult 
mental multiplication task was presented to participants who were asked to solve it 
within 30 seconds (or read about a person attempting to solve the problem). All 
participants failed the task (or read about someone failing the task). A counterfactual 
thought listing task where participants noted ways in which the outcome may have 
been better was then completed. It was shown that differences in counterfactual 
thought for actors and readers depended on the differential availability of 
information about the problem-solving phase to actors and readers. The differences 
were diminished when problem-solving information was made less available to 
actors. 
  In a similar vein, Pighin et al. (2011) demonstrated that even 
individuals who merely observe a real event generate counterfactuals differently to 
individuals who read about the event. Observers generate counterfactuals in a similar 
way to actors, tending to focus more on alternative ways to solve a problem rather 
than simply undoing a choice that lead to a negative outcome as do readers. The 
researchers suggest that these role effects may be due to the fact that observers and 
actors’ attention is engaged more than the attention of readers. 
  Findings by Girotto et al. (2007) and Pighin et al. (2011) suggest that 
the methodological approach may have implications for the types of counterfactuals 
generated. While the methodologies used by Kasimatis and Sterling (1994), 
Kasimatis and Wells (1995), and Murphy (2005) led to significant findings regarding 
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the association between counterfactual thinking and traits such as self-esteem, 
neuroticism, and dispositional outlook, it may be that the use of vignettes does not 
lend itself as effectively to demonstrating any potential association between self-
regulatory individual differences and counterfactual thinking. For self-regulatory 
individual differences to influence counterfactual thinking, it may be the case that 
the stimulus that encourages counterfactual thinking needs to be tangible rather than 
hypothetical. 
  While Girotto et al. (2007) have shown that there are methodological 
concerns with vignettes used in studies such as Kasimatis and Wells (1995), their 
findings may also suggest that functional counterfactuals are less likely to surface 
when participants actually take action. Girotto et al. (2007) suggest that actors and 
observers are directed by divergent motivational goals; actors, unlike observers, are 
motivated to avoid self-blame following a negative outcome. It seems likely that, due 
to self-enhancement strategies, people may make harsher evaluations when they 
themselves have not been implicit in a negative outcome. However, if self-regulatory 
traits do indeed influence the functionality of counterfactual thoughts, the means 
with which counterfactuals are elicited should be taken into consideration. 
 
2.3 The current research 
We suggest that while previous studies of individual differences and counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., Kasimatis & Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Murphy, 2005) 
are particularly important in that they demonstrate how individual differences do 
indeed influence counterfactual thinking, the potential for self-regulatory individual 
difference factors to influence counterfactual functionality should not be dismissed 
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based solely on their findings. Further investigation, utilizing varying methodologies 
is necessary. Indeed, Murphy (2005) suggests that additional research is required in 
order to understand the role of individual differences in preparative counterfactual 
thinking. Therefore, the aim of this research is to investigate a number of self-
regulatory individual differences in relation to counterfactual thinking. In particular, 
we are interested in whether certain types of individual difference factors may be 
important to counterfactual functionality. 
  Self-regulatory individual difference factors such as self-efficacy 
(Bandura & Locke, 2003), desire for control (Burger & Cooper, 1979), locus of 
control (Rotter, 1966), conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992), and uncertainty 
orientation (Sorrentino, Short, & Raynor, 1984) have all been studied in relation to 
counterfactual thinking, with mixed findings reported (Haynes et al., 2007; 
Kasimatis & Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Murphy, 2005). These traits 
typically describe an inclination towards controlling events or perceiving control 
over outcomes. We acknowledge that control needs and efficacy may be important. 
However, we suggest that self-regulatory individual differences that describe 
variation in the capacity to view the self as unthreatened during negative situations 
may be particularly important. 
  The concept of self-motives is relevant to the present research. Self-
motives describe how individuals perceive or maintain a self-concept in relation to 
various situations (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). There are numerous ways in which 
self-motives may be conceptualized or delineated. Although not exhaustive, 
Sedikides and Strube (1997) identify the self-motives of self-repair, self-
maintenance, and self-protection. Generally, the present research focuses on the self-
motive of self-maintenance. That is to say, we are interested in self-regulatory 
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individual differences that describe how a person’s sense of self is left largely 
unchanged during thoughts of negative past events. 
  Self-motives have previously been examined using an individual 
difference approach. For instance, when Sanna et al. (2001) investigated self-
protection motives, they measured individual differences in self-esteem. Instead of 
experimentally controlling motives, the researchers preselected high-self-esteem and 
low-self-esteem persons because they differ in dispositional self-motives. High-self-
esteem persons are thought to accept credit for success but deny blame for failure 
more so than low-self-esteem persons (Sanna, Meier, & Turley-Ames, 1998). Thus 
high-self-esteem persons may be motivated by mood-repair while low-self-esteem 
persons may be motivated by self-protection. 
  There are many individual difference factors which may influence 
self-motives that have not been examined in relation to counterfactual thinking. To 
address this gap in the literature, we examine a number of potentially important 
individual difference variables that have not been investigated before in 
counterfactual thinking research. Specifically, we examine individual differences in 
the traits of autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), action/state orientation 
(Diefendorff et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1994), and cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012; Steele, 1988). Essentially, the central connection shared 
by these constructs is that they are all thought to involve the capacity to perceive 
external sources of self-relevant information as unthreatening to self-representations. 
We propose that these individual difference factors may facilitate the use of more 
functional types of counterfactual thinking. 
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  Traits examined in the present research were also selected because 
they were associated with various positive behavioural outcomes and because prior 
studies have identified them as potentially important and in need of investigation. 
Epstude and Roese (2011) have emphasized the importance of investigating self-
regulatory personality traits in relation to counterfactual thinking. Investigation of 
these various personality traits will contribute to our understanding of counterfactual 
thinking. Knowledge of which traits are important, and how they interact with 
experimental manipulations will enable refinement and extension of the functional 
theory of counterfactual thinking. We start our investigation by examining individual 
differences in autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Autonomy 
3.1 General introduction 
An area that has thus far been overlooked in counterfactual research is that of 
autonomy. While research has focused on factors such as responsibility (Meyerslevy 
& Maheswaran, 1992) and external accountability to organizational superiors 
(Morris & Moore, 2000) little is known about the influence of beliefs about self-
initiation, self-motivation, and autonomy. We suggest that beliefs regarding ones 
underlying sense of autonomy, characteristic of a freedom from self-implication 
from extrinsic outcomes, may be particularly important in terms of counterfactual 
functionality. In framing this exploration, given that the concept of autonomy holds 
multiple definitions in the psychological literature, it is necessary to outline the 
conceptualization of the construct used in the present research. 
 
3.1.1 Autonomy 
Generally, autonomy focuses on the degree to which an individual’s behaviour is 
self-motivated and self-determined (Bekker & van Assen, 2006; Deci & Ryan, 
2008). Actions which are autonomous and volitional are carried out by people who 
fully endorse such actions and experience an underlying sense of choice. According 
to developmental theorists (e.g., Bronson, 2000), autonomy is a psychological 
condition which can be expected to manifest in early adulthood. The term is 
generally perceived as being positive, as an autonomous person will typically be 
considered psychologically well adjusted. Deficits in autonomy have been associated 
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with fundamental defects in mental health (e.g., Davidson & Strauss, 1992; Laor, 
1982). 
    Classical theories of autonomy (e.g., Erikson, 1974; Kohlberg, 1984; 
Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) describe it as a tendency to behave in an isolated 
manner, with heavy emphasis placed on individual independence. These perspectives 
hold that autonomy involves the development of a separate self. According to 
Mahler et al., autonomy is the final stage of individuation – separation. However, 
these theories of autonomy have been criticised more recently for placing too much 
emphasis on independence and isolation. Research by Hmel and Pincus (2002), in 
which they conducted factor analysis involving 15 distinct self-report autonomy 
scales, revealed multiple unique conceptualizations of autonomy. It was shown that 
at least one of these – “autonomy as self-governance” – was correlated positively 
with the personality factors of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness. From 
such findings, it appears that classical theories may undermine the possibility that 
healthy, autonomous functioning permits not only the awareness of personal goals 
and the ability to realize them, but also the ability to interact within meaningful 
social relationships.  
  Bekker (1993) suggested that the need for connectedness might be as 
important to healthy autonomous functioning as the need for separation and 
independence. It is argued by Bekker that desire to seek out meaningful relationships 
should not suggest that an individual is incapable of acting and thinking 
independently. Due to the tendency for older theories to describe autonomy only as a 
capacity for acting and thinking independently, Bekker (1993) developed an 
alternative autonomy scale. The scale moves away from the classical description of 
autonomy and instead reflects a capacity to feel and behave independently while 
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incorporating the capacity for functioning in intimate relationships. A revised 
shortened version of this scale was developed by Bekker and van Assen (2006). This 
conceptualization of autonomy was selected for use in the present research. 
  Essentially, one of the main reasons this construct of autonomy was 
selected for use in the present research is that it focuses on autonomy rather than on 
dependence, as with numerous other autonomy measures (e.g., Hirschfeld et al., 
1977; Zuckerman, Levitt, & Lubin, 1961). For instance, these older measures include 
items referring to ones ‘need to seek assistance’, rating autonomy as low when 
interdependence is high. This type of characterization of autonomy is more in line 
with individual difference factors such as desire for control (e.g., Burger, 1984) or 
locus of control (Rotter, 1966) which have previously been examined in 
counterfactual thinking research (Kasimatis & Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 
1995). These individual differences describe an inclination or need to control while 
the construct of autonomy proposed by Bekker (1993) describes a condition in which 
interdependence may be high while a sense of not being controlled by external 
sources is also emphasized. High autonomy participants are thought to place greater 
emphasis on self-initiation and self-motives rather than on external ego involvements 
or extrinsic rewards (Bekker, 1993). 
 
3.1.2 Autonomy and counterfactual thinking 
In terms of research investigating the potential association between autonomy and 
counterfactual thinking, to date this area has not received much attention. One recent 
study (Leach & Patall, 2013) indirectly examined the relationship. The main focus of 
the research by Leach and Patall was on the effects of decision related orientation 
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and counterfactual thinking on student satisfaction with their choice of college 
major. Specifically, they examined individual difference in maximizing (Schwartz et 
al., 2002). This individual difference variable categorizes people as either 
maximizers or satisficers. Maximizers typically seek to find the best option among 
alternatives when making a choice. These individuals perceive that out of a 
multitude of options, there is one perfect match to their wants and needs. Thus, for 
maximizers, an increasing number of options can be problematic because their goal 
of finding the perfect choice requires them to examine all the alternatives before 
making a choice. Satisficers on the other hand are content to select an option as long 
as it satisfies their minimum requirements. Rather than being perfect, decision 
making must only be good enough for these individuals. Research indicates that 
compared to satisficers, maximizers often feel less competent in their decision 
making (Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischoff, 2007) and feel less satisfied with their 
choices (Sparks, Ehrlinger, & Eibach, 2012). Leach and Patall (2013) anticipated 
that when options are abundant, because of the impracticality of exhaustively 
examining every option, maximizers would generate more upward counterfactual 
thoughts about how things could be better than satisficers. Results indicated that 
maximizing was significantly associated with upward counterfactual thinking, 
suggesting that maximizers engaged in more upward counterfactual thinking than 
satisficers.  
  In terms of autonomy, Leach and Patall (2013) anticipated that the 
upward counterfactuals generated by maximizers would reduce levels of autonomous 
motivation in learning practices. To assess autonomy, they used the learning self-
regulation questionnaire developed by Black and Deci (2000). This questionnaire 
specifically concerns the regulation of learning behaviour and the extent to which it 
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is self-directed and initiated. Black and Deci state that the questionnaire assesses 
regulatory styles. While considered individual differences, these regulatory styles are 
not categorized as trait concepts because they are not particularly stable. However, 
they are also not considered state concepts because they are more stable than typical 
states which can fluctuate easily as a function of time and place (Black & Deci, 
2000). Leach and Patall (2013) found that when maximizers generated upward 
counterfactuals, there was a marked decrease in autonomous motivation. 
  Although stable individual differences were not assessed, the study by 
Leach and Patall (2013) suggests that there may be an association between autonomy 
and counterfactual thinking. Dysfunctional decision related orientations were 
associated with dysfunctional types of counterfactual thinking about past events that 
could not be altered or improved in the future. These dysfunctional counterfactuals 
were in turn associated with reduced levels of autonomous motivation. The research 
by Leach and Patall did not investigate any potential association between 
counterfactual thinking and autonomy when improvement motives were salient. The 
researchers suggest that future research might aim to identify more directly the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and autonomy. 
  Apart from the recent research undertaken by Leach and Patall 
(2013), there are a number of reasons for investigating whether individual 
differences in autonomy might be important in terms of counterfactual thinking, and 
particularly functional types of counterfactual thinking. Firstly, previous research on 
autonomy indicates that high autonomy may be responsible for numerous positive 
behavioural outcomes. Outcomes such as improved academic grades (Black & Deci, 
2000), greater persistence at academic and sporting pursuits (Pelletier, Fortier, 
Vallerand, & Briere, 2001), and higher levels of psychological well-being (Ryan, 
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Rigby, & King, 1993) have previously been associated with autonomy. The 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1994; Epstude & Roese, 2008) 
states that counterfactual thoughts are best understood in terms of behaviour 
regulation. It may be the case that high autonomy facilitates the use of functional 
types of counterfactual thinking, allowing adaptive behaviour regulation. 
    Secondly, research has shown that people are more likely to 
counterfactually mutate events prior to the outcome that they personally have greater 
control over (Miller et al., 1990). Such research is consistent with a functional 
perspective of counterfactual thinking. It is, after all, more likely that future 
performance may be altered or improved by focusing on factors that are personally, 
and more easily controlled. Given that autonomy concerns the degree to which an 
individual is driven by self-focused directives, it may be possible that this inclination 
toward emphasising personal control influences counterfactual thinking as is the case 
with situational or event-related controllability.  
   Thirdly, it has been shown that accountability to external sources has 
an influence on counterfactual functionality. Morris and Moore (2000) investigated 
this influence in a study focusing on how lessons may be learned through 
counterfactual thinking in pilots. The researchers hypothesized that accountability to 
superiors would inhibit learning through counterfactual thinking. Specifically, they 
hypothesized that individuals would be more likely to draw performance-promoting 
lessons from ambiguous outcomes after they have responded with a self-focused 
upward counterfactual comparison than after they have responded with other types 
of comparisons or no comparison at all, and that working for an airline who 
demanded reports of what went wrong would result in fewer learned lessons 
compared to more autonomous private pilots. Results indicated that although self-
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focused counterfactuals were particularly adaptive, situational accountability (as 
determined by the degree of accountability to organizational superiors) inhibited the 
likelihood of their generation. Given that autonomy is also thought to influence 
whether attention is focused on self-driven motives or on external ego involvements 
(Bekker, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 2008) it may be the case that individual differences in 
autonomy also influence the likelihood of functional counterfactual generation. 
  In the three experiments reported below we investigate whether or not 
autonomy plays a role in counterfactual thinking and how it might mediate 
performance improvement on a task following counterfactual thinking. To the best of 
our knowledge, no other research has attempted to link individual differences in the 
construct of autonomy as outlined above, to counterfactual activation and focus. 
 
3.2 Experiment 1: Does autonomy influence counterfactual thinking? 
The primary aim of this experiment was to investigate whether individual differences 
in autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) influenced counterfactual activation and 
focus. To test this hypothesis, we examined participant’s counterfactual responses 
after they experienced failure in a mental multiplication task. We expected that 
individuals high in autonomy, compared to those low in autonomy, would generate a 
greater number of counterfactuals overall, more functional counterfactuals overall 
and be more likely to generate a functional counterfactual as the first counterfactual 
they listed. 
  Regarding functional counterfactuals we were specifically interested 
in examining the direction, structure and focus of the counterfactuals generated. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, research has identified upward, additive and 
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controllable counterfactuals (Markman et al., 2007; Morris & Moore, 2000; Roese, 
1994) as important to counterfactual functionality. We anticipated that given the 
nature of the task the majority of counterfactuals generated would be upward and 
additive so whether or not the counterfactuals generated were controllable was of 
primary interest. 
  A secondary aim of this experiment was to examine whether any 
potential influence of autonomy on counterfactual thinking patterns might be 
dependent on whether participants read about or actually attempted a task.  
Methodological concerns outlined by (Girotto et al., 2007) and discussed in the 
previous chapter were addressed by presenting a problem to participants in one of 
two ways; half of the participants read about and imagined themselves encountering 
a problem, while half actually attempted to solve a problem first hand. To induce 
failure, participants were asked to attempt (or read about and imagine attempting) a 
difficult mental multiplication problem similar to that used by (Girotto et al., 2007). 
We anticipated that due to the difficult nature of the task, no participants would 
complete it successfully, thus permitting counterfactual thought after a negative 
outcome. Girotto et al. (2007) may indeed be correct in asserting that actually doing 
a task and failing leads to more affect enhancing counterfactuals than when the task 
is presented as a narrative. However, we suggest that the influence of self-regulatory 
individual differences on counterfactual thinking may be more readily observed 
during instances involving actual task performance. 
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3.2.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 160 undergraduate students (117 women and 43 
men) with an average age of 19.87 years (SD = 2.00). Participants were randomly 
assigned to either an actor (n = 80) or to a reader (n = 80) condition. 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: task performance (actor versus reader) and autonomy 
(high versus low). 
 
Materials: Participants were randomly assigned to the actor condition or the reader 
condition. Participants in the actor condition were invited to participate in a problem 
solving task. By successfully completing the task, a small prize would be awarded 
(chocolates). The task involved completing a difficult maths problem similar to the 
method used by Girotto et al. (2007). Participants were asked to choose one of two 
identical sealed envelopes. One of the envelopes was said to contain an easy problem 
(e.g., multiply two one-digit numbers such as 5x8 in 30 seconds) and the other a 
difficult problem (e.g., multiply two two-digit numbers in 30 seconds). In actuality, 
both envelopes contained the difficult problem (multiply 69x73 in 30 seconds). As 
expected, no participant successfully completed the task. Participants in the reader 
condition read a vignette corresponding to the actor condition described above (see 
Appendix A). 
  Once participants had finished attempting the mental multiplication 
task, or reading the vignette about it, all participants were then asked to list as many 
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“if only” type ways in which the outcome could have been turned out differently. 
They were provided with multiple lines in which to write the responses (see 
Appendix B).  
  Finally, participants filled out a self-report measure of autonomy 
(Bekker & van Assen, 2006) (see Appendix C). The questionnaire contains 30 items. 
Answering the questionnaire involved noting how much various statements refer to 
oneself on a 7-point Likert response scale. Answer options ranged from 1 (doesn’t fit 
me) to 7 (completely fits me). Examples of statements included in the autonomy 
measure are: “Usually it is very clear to me what I like most”, “I often go deeply into 
other people’s feelings”, “I am a very adventurous person”, and “I easily come to 
grips with a new problem on my own”. Autonomy scores are calculated by adding 
the scores of each participant response to give an overall score with higher scores 
indicating higher autonomy. According to Bekker & van Assen (2006), the 
autonomy measure has good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient 
reported of .82. In the current experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .76 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the study was interested in how 
people think while problem solving. All participants were assured confidentiality and 
told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An information sheet (see 
Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data collection. Individuals 
who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a consent form (see 
Appendix E). They then either took part in or read about the mental multiplication 
task, generated counterfactual thoughts and completed the autonomy questionnaire. 
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All participants were debriefed and offered the prize at the end of the experiment. 
Ethical clearance for this experiment and all experiments reported in this thesis was 
granted by the Mary Immaculate Research Ethics Committee (MIREC). 
 
Coding of counterfactual statements: After data collection, counterfactuals were 
coded. First, each thought was analyzed for whether it was in fact counterfactual. 
The working definition used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) describes 
counterfactuals as mental constructions of plausible alternatives that may change the 
outcome of an event. Using this definition, to be considered counterfactual, thoughts 
must incorporate both an antecedent and a consequence. Thus, merely imagining a 
different outcome (e.g., “I could have solved the puzzle”) without reconstructing a 
changed antecedent (e.g., “Had I concentrated more”) to bring about the changed 
circumstance would not be considered counterfactual. The present study used a less 
rigid definition of counterfactual. Thoughts were considered counterfactual if they 
mentioned any changes in antecedents that could mentally undo the task 
performance (e.g., by using terms such as at least, if only, should've, could’ve, etc.; 
see Roese & Olson, 1995). Thoughts that merely involved a very basic undoing of 
outcomes (e.g., “Things could have been different.”) were not considered 
counterfactual. 
  Using similar categorizations to those used by Nasco and Marsh 
(1999), and commonly used in the counterfactual literature, the counterfactuals were 
coded as: upward versus downward, additive versus subtractive, and controllable 
versus uncontrollable. Thoughts were considered upward if they imagined outcomes 
that were preferable to reality (“If only I had gotten an easier number…”) and 
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downward if they imagined outcomes worse than reality (“I suppose I could have 
done worse…”). Thoughts were considered additive if they inserted events into 
reality (“If only I had started with the tens.”), whereas thoughts were considered 
subtractive if they removed events from reality (“If I hadn’t panicked…”). An 
example of a controllable counterfactual was: “If only I had focused on the tens first 
and then the units, I would have solved it in time”. Such controllable thoughts 
suggested mutable actions participants had full control over which could feasibly 
lead to performance improvement in subsequent attempts. Uncontrollable 
counterfactuals such as “If only I had been given more time, I would have won the 
prize”, typically mutated features beyond the control of the participant (e.g., 
experimental parameters). Additionally, as was the case in research by Markman and 
Weary (1998), counterfactuals that undid chronic aspects of the self (e.g, “If only I 
wasn’t stupid”) were categorized as uncontrollable.  
   Two trained coders, both unaware of the experimental hypotheses, 
independently coded all counterfactual thoughts. Inter-rater agreement was high 
(98.5%). Agreement ranged from 94% for coding additive versus subtractive 
counterfactuals to 98% for coding whether the thought was a counterfactual. 
Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
Omitted data: Out of all respondents, data from 4 were discarded due to failure to 
follow instructions adequately. For an additional 5 participants, a small number of 
items (no more than 3) on the autonomy measure were left unanswered. Rather than 
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eliminate these respondents altogether, a mean score was recorded for these missing 
items.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores on the autonomy scale (Bekker & van Assen, 
2006) could range between 30 and 210. In this sample the mean score total for 
autonomy was 136.9 (SD = 13.09), ranging from 101 to 174. Using a median split, 
78 participants were categorized as high autonomy while 82 were categorized as low 
autonomy. This approach of categorizing participants nominally in terms of an 
individual difference variable has been used in previous counterfactual thinking 
research (Roese & Olson, 1993a; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1997; Sanna, Turley-Ames, & 
Meier, 1999; Sanna & Meier, 2000; Seta, Seta, McElroy, & Hatz, 2008). The mean 
score for the high autonomy group was 147.6 (SD = 7.5) and the mean score for the 
low autonomy group was 126.7 (SD = 7.9). 
 
Number and type of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 505 counterfactual thoughts. All participants generated at least one 
counterfactual statement, resulting in 160 opening/initial counterfactuals. 
Participants recorded a mean of 3.16 (SD = 1.24) counterfactual items each, ranging 
from 1 to 5 items. Descriptive statistics for each counterfactual categorization are 
shown below in Table 1. Both the initial counterfactuals generated and the total 
number of counterfactuals generated are displayed as both measures are commonly 
used in counterfactual thinking research (Davis, 1991; Haynes et al., 2007; Kasimatis 
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& Wells, 1995; Markman, Balkin, & Baron, 2002; Markman & Miller, 2006; 
Markman & Weary, 1998; Murphy, 2005; Roese & Olson, 1993a; Sanna, 1996) and 
will be used to analyse the data. As Table 1 shows, nearly all participants generated 
upward additive counterfactuals and this was the case for both initial counterfactuals 
(i.e., the first counterfactual listed) as well as for the number of counterfactuals 
overall. Participants generated more uncontrollable than controllable counterfactuals 
both for initial counterfactuals and overall. 
 
Table 1 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 1 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=160) Overall (N=505) 
Upward versus Downward 100% vs 0% 95% vs 5% 
Additive versus Subtractive 94% vs 6% 95% vs 5% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable 37% vs 63% 26% vs 74% 
 
 
Counterfactual activation 
Overall, there was a small, positive correlation between autonomy score and the total 
number of counterfactuals generated, r = .20, n = 160, p = .009, indicating that the 
higher in autonomy an individual scored, the more counterfactuals they generated. 
There was also a small, positive correlation between autonomy score and the total 
number of controllable counterfactuals generated, r = .16, n = 160, p = .042, 
indicating that the higher in autonomy an individual scored, the more controllable 
counterfactuals they generated. 
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  In order to explore the impact of high vs. low autonomy and the actor 
vs. reader manipulation on the number of counterfactuals generated, a two-way 
between participants ANOVA was conducted. The interaction effect between 
autonomy and task presentation was not statistically significant, F(1, 156) = .24, p = 
.62, nor was the main effect of task presentation, F(1, 156) = .06, p = .80. However, 
the main effect for autonomy approached statistical significance, F(1, 156) = 3.57, p 
= .06, with slightly more counterfactuals generated in the high autonomy group than 
in the low autonomy group (52% versus 48%). This finding suggests that although 
autonomy may have a small influence on counterfactual activation, task presentation 
is not important in observing this effect. Actors and readers did not differ in the 
number of counterfactuals that they generated, nor did they differ significantly in 
terms of the total number of controllable counterfactuals generated, t (158) = 1.12, p 
= .26. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
We compared high and low autonomy participants for initial counterfactual 
controllability; counterfactual direction and structure were predominantly upward 
and additive as an initial response and so were not included in these statistical 
analyses. For the first counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test for 
independence indicated that there was no significant association between autonomy 
and counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 160) = 2.41, p = .12.  
    We then compared the initial counterfactual controllability of high 
and low autonomy participants taking into consideration task presentation; data were 
divided in terms of actors versus readers. We observed a statistically significant 
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association between autonomy and counterfactual controllability in the actor 
condition, χ 2 (1, n = 160) = 10.11, p = .001, with a medium effect size (phi = -.38). 
No association was observed in the reader condition, χ 2 (1, n = 160) = .78, p = .37. 
Percentages of controllable and uncontrollable initial counterfactual responses are 
provided in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
 
Table 2 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Autonomy Participants in the Actor Condition in Experiment 1 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    60%   40%  
 
Low    23%   77% 
 
 
   
  An examination of Table 2 indicates that in the actor condition, high 
autonomy participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an initial response 
more so than low autonomy participants (60% versus 23%). Table 3 below, shows 
that there was little difference between high and low autonomy participants and that 
both generated more uncontrollable than controllable counterfactuals as an initial 
response. Comparing across the tables the pattern of controllable and uncontrollable 
counterfactuals is similar for the low autonomy participants, regardless of whether 
they attempted or read about the task. However, a different pattern emerges for the 
high autonomy participants. They generated more controllable counterfactuals as an 
initial response when they attempted the task rather than when they read about it 
(60% versus26%). 
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Table 3 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Autonomy Participants in the Reader Condition in Experiment 1 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    26%   74%  
 
Low    38%   62% 
 
3.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
We found a small association between autonomy scores and counterfactual 
activation. This finding however, may not be due to any propensity toward self-
driven motivation. It is possible that because Bekker and van Assen (2006) include 
tenets such as ‘sensitivity to others’ in their autonomy construct, failure in the 
experimental task may have caused high autonomy participants to feel more self-
conscious after failure, leading to more counterfactual thinking. Essentially, this 
observed association between autonomy and the overall number of counterfactuals 
generated needs to be interpreted very cautiously. 
  We found some evidence that autonomy is associated with 
counterfactual controllability. High autonomy was associated with a higher overall 
number of controllable counterfactuals and a higher percentage of initial 
counterfactuals focusing on controllable antecedents. 
 Initially, we observed no association between high autonomy and the 
use of controllable counterfactuals as an initial response. Significant findings only 
emerged when we considered task presentation. We observed a statistically 
significant association between autonomy and initial counterfactual controllability in 
the actor condition, but not in the reader condition. This suggests that task 
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presentation may be particularly important when investigating any potential 
influence of self-regulatory individual difference variables on the focus of 
counterfactual thinking.  
  We did not observe a strong preference towards controllable 
counterfactuals for actors as might have been anticipated given findings from Gilbert 
et al. (2004). Gilbert et al. determined that people who actually missed a train 
(actors) were more likely to produce uncontrollable counterfactuals (e.g., “I would 
not have missed the train if all the gates had been opened instead of just one”) than 
people who merely imagined missing a train. Readers were apparently more 
comfortable with generating self-blame, controllable counterfactuals (e.g., “If only I 
had skipped breakfast”) than were actors. Thus, it may have been anticipated that 
participants who actually attempted a task in Experiment 1 would be less likely than 
participants who read vignettes to generate self-implicating counterfactuals. 
However, this was not the case. There was no significant difference in the number of 
controllable counterfactuals generated by both readers and actors. Experiment 1 
suggests that actors may not always be as prone to shirking responsibility for 
outcomes as previous research indicates.  
  This experiment demonstrated that those high in autonomy, compared 
to those low in autonomy, tend to generate more counterfactual thoughts overall, 
more controllable counterfactuals and they are also more likely to initially focus on 
undoing controllable aspects of their behaviour when they perform a task. Previous 
research suggests that controllable counterfactuals are facilitative (Morris & Moore, 
2000) and can improve performance. Experiment 2 investigates whether generating 
controllable counterfactuals may facilitate observable performance improvement in a 
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laboratory type task and whether any potential benefits of controllable counterfactual 
thinking are moderated by individual differences in autonomy. 
 
3.3 Experiment 2: Does autonomy influence the functionality of 
counterfactuals? 
Experiment 1 demonstrated an association between the individual difference factor 
of autonomy and controllable counterfactuals. In Experiment 2 we invited 
participants to engage with two experimental tasks, separated by a counterfactual 
thought listing exercise or a filler exercise. We also measured individual differences 
in autonomy.  The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether counterfactual 
thinking and individual differences in autonomy might influence performance 
improvement. Through analysis of the counterfactuals generated by participants, it 
may be observed whether the personality trait of autonomy is associated with the 
activation and focus of counterfactual thoughts. 
  Experiment 2 also investigates any potential association between 
individual differences in autonomy and control perceptions after generating 
counterfactual thoughts. If individual differences do facilitate functional 
counterfactual thinking, considering potential mediators of this association may be 
important. Although it is unclear from Experiment 1, autonomy may influence 
control perceptions after counterfactual thinking. Nasco and Marsh (1999) suggest 
that individual differences may be important in determining control perceptions after 
counterfactual thinking. In an investigation of the relationship between individual 
difference variables and control perceptions after generating upward counterfactuals, 
we anticipated that individuals who score high in autonomy would rate their feelings 
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of ‘control ahead of the next trial’ more highly than individuals who score low in 
autonomy. 
 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 80 (68 women and 12 men) undergraduate students 
with an average age of 22.46 years (SD = 6.06). Participants were randomly 
assigned to either a counterfactual condition (n = 40) or a control condition (n = 40). 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: experimental group (counterfactual group versus control 
group) and autonomy (high versus low). 
 
Materials: The experiment involved solving two sets of anagram problems (see 
Appendix F). The order in which each set appeared was randomized. Participants 
were asked to read the instructions on the cover page of the booklet. The instructions 
were as follows: 
 
“For this experiment, you will be solving anagrams. Anagrams are 
scrambled word combinations – solving them means unscrambling 
them into an actual word. For example, “YHAPP” is an anagram, 
and its solution is “HAPPY”. All the anagrams in this study have only 
ONE solution. You will have 3 minutes to find as many answers as 
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possible. Following completion of the anagrams, you will receive 
feedback concerning your performance. The anagrams are awarded 
points on the basis of their difficulty. There are more points to be 
earned from solving a difficult anagram than from solving an easy 
anagram. You may choose which anagram to attempt in order to 
maximize your score”. 
 
  The varying difficulty level of the anagrams meant there was a certain 
level of strategy involved in maximizing ones score. Participants were free to decide 
whether they wanted to spend the 3 minutes on the easier anagrams (e.g. ACNFY – 
FANCY, Score of 1 point), medium difficulty anagrams (e.g. LTIGN – GLINT, 
Score of 3 points), or most difficult anagrams (e.g. RETIV – RIVET, Score of 5 
points). This degree of participant control over the experimental task was central to 
the methodological design. Decisions participants could make represented obvious 
mutation targets; that is, antecedent elements out of which participants could 
construct counterfactual alternatives to their actual performance. It also allowed 
participants to formulate performance improving strategies for subsequent anagram 
trials. 
   All anagrams were selected from Gilhooly and Johnson (1978). The 
anagrams selected had no repeated letters, had only one correct solution, and were 
not plural words. All anagrams in each respective difficulty-category were equated 
on the dimensions identified by Gilhooly and Johnson as determinants of anagram 
solution time (bigram rank, pronounceability, anagram-word similarity, and vowel 
 ~ 68 ~ 
 
vs. consonant starting letter). Thus, differences in solution rates across trials could 
not be attributed to differences in anagram difficulty. 
  Following completion of the anagrams, correct answers were 
provided to participants. Participants listened as the answers were read aloud before 
totalling their own correct answers to calculate a task score. However, participants 
were also provided with false information about the normative performance of all 
participants who had previously completed the anagram task. Participants were 
shown a number said to indicate the average score of all participants who had 
previously run through the task. This number was in actuality set higher than the 
highest score achieved by participants in an earlier pilot study. Technically, a total 
score of 54 was possible if all anagrams were solved in the 3 minute test period.  
However, from all the participants who attempted the task, the highest score 
achieved was 36. Participants were told that the average score achieved in the trial 
was 42. This number was intentionally high so the vast majority of participants 
would perceive their score as being improvable in subsequent trials. This feedback 
also meant that participants might potentially feel dissatisfied with their score. A 
manipulation check (see Appendix G) was included in the form of a Likert-scale 
type rating; participants were asked to rate the degree of satisfaction they had with 
regard their performance in the first set of anagrams on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
satisfied at all) to 7 (very satisfied). 
  Next, half of the participant’s generated counterfactual alternatives to 
their actual performance. The other half – the control group – attempted a simple 
filler task involving grammatical correction of sentences (see Appendix H). After the 
counterfactual generation/filler task was completed, participants were informed for 
the first time that they would be attempting a second set of anagrams. It was decided 
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that participants not be informed earlier of this second set of anagrams so that 
counterfactual thoughts generated between tasks focused explicitly on past events. 
Before attempting the second set of anagrams, participants were asked to rate control 
perceptions in another Likert-scale type measure (see Appendix I). The measure 
assessed the degree of control the participant felt they had over their performance in 
the upcoming trial. Following completion of the second set of anagrams, participants 
were again informed of the correct answers so that they could calculate a score for 
the trial. No false information about normative scores was provided after the second 
trial. 
  Finally, participants filled out a self-report measure of autonomy 
(Bekker & van Assen, 2006) as described in Experiment 1 (see Appendix C). 
According to Bekker and van Assen (2006), the autonomy measure has good internal 
consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of .82. In the current 
experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .74. 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the study was interested in how 
people think while problem solving. All participants were assured confidentiality and 
told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An information sheet (see 
Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data collection. Individuals 
who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a consent form (see 
Appendix E). Participants were given booklets containing all experimental materials 
and were asked not to open or flick through it until instructed. A full debriefing was 
given to all participants post testing. 
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 Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as in Experiment 1. Inter-rater agreement between the two trainer 
coders was high (96.9%). Agreement ranged from 89% for coding controllable 
versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 99% for coding whether the thought was a 
counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
Omitted data: Out of all respondents, data from 2 were discarded due to failure to 
follow instructions adequately. For an additional 3 participants, a small number of 
items (no more than 2) on the individual difference measures were left unanswered. 
Rather than eliminate these respondents altogether, a mean score was recorded for 
these missing items. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores on the autonomy scale (Bekker & van Assen, 
2006) could range between 30 and 210. In this sample the mean score total for 
autonomy was 132.3 (SD = 12.89), ranging from 98 to 172. Using a median split, 47 
participants were categorized as high autonomy while 33 were categorized as low 
autonomy. The mean score for the high autonomy group was 143.9 (SD = 7.3) and 
the mean score for the low autonomy group was 122.5 (SD = 6.9). 
 
Number and type of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 139 counterfactual thoughts. Participants recorded a mean of 3.48 (SD = 
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1.06) counterfactual items each, ranging from 1 to 6 items. All participants in the 
counterfactual group generated at least one counterfactual statement, resulting in 40 
opening/initial counterfactuals. Descriptive statistics for each counterfactual 
categorization are shown below in Table 4. As Table 4 shows, nearly all participants 
generated upward additive counterfactuals and this was the case for both initial 
counterfactuals (i.e., the first counterfactual listed) as well as for the number of 
counterfactuals overall. Participants generated more controllable than uncontrollable 
counterfactuals both for initial counterfactuals and overall. 
 
 
Table 4 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 2 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=40) Overall (N=139) 
Upward versus Downward 100% vs 0% 96% vs 4% 
Additive versus Subtractive 79% vs 21% 84% vs 16% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable 70% vs 30% 53% vs 47% 
 
 
Satisfaction ratings: As expected, participants generally felt dissatisfied with their 
performance in the first trial of anagram problems. On a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(not satisfied at all) to 7 (very satisfied), participants recorded an average satisfaction 
score of 2.18 (SD = 1.18). This meant that the anagram task resulted in consistently 
low satisfaction ratings. 
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Counterfactual activation 
There was no correlation between autonomy score and the overall number of 
counterfactuals generated, r = .14, n = 40, p = .38. We observed a small, positive 
correlation between autonomy score and the overall number of controllable 
counterfactuals generated, r = .28, n = 40, p = .04 (one-tailed), indicating that the 
higher in autonomy an individual scored, the more controllable counterfactuals they 
generated. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
We compared high and low autonomy participants for initial counterfactual 
controllability; counterfactual direction and structure were largely upward and 
additive as an initial response and so were not included in these statistical analyses. 
We sought replication of the finding of Experiment 1 that high autonomy (Bekker & 
van Assen, 2006) was associated with the use of controllable counterfactuals as an 
initial response. For the first counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test for 
independence indicated that there was a significant association between autonomy 
and initial counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 40) = 4.88, p = .03, with a 
medium effect size (phi = .40).  Percentages of controllable and uncontrollable initial 
counterfactual responses are provided in Table 5 below. High autonomy participants 
generated controllable counterfactuals as an initial response more so than low 
autonomy participants. 
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Table 5 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Autonomy Participants in Experiment 2 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    72%   28%  
 
Low    52%   48% 
 
 
Performance improvement 
We computed a unitary dependent variable of score improvement (score in anagram 
Trial 2 – score in anagram Trial 1). Greater performance improvement was observed 
in the counterfactual group (M = 5.43, SD = 7.77) than in the no-counterfactual 
group (M = 1.11, SD = 6.50), t (78) = 3.38, p = .001. The eta squared statistic (.13) 
indicated a large effect size. 
  A between groups ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of 
initial counterfactual controllability and autonomy on performance improvement. 
There was a marginally significant main effect on performance improvement 
depending on whether the initial counterfactual was controllable (M = 7.25, SD = 
8.23) or uncontrollable (M = 1.177, SD = 4.40), F(3, 36) = 2.30, p = .06 (one-tailed). 
The main effect for autonomy did not reach statistical significance, F(3, 36) = .74, p 
= .39, nor did the interaction effect between initial counterfactual controllability and 
autonomy, F(3, 36) = 2.60, p = .11. 
 
Control ratings: The mean score for ‘control ahead of the next trial’ was 4.12 (SD = 
1.85). There was a medium, positive correlation between the total number of 
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controllable counterfactuals generated and ratings for ‘control ahead of the next 
trial’, r = .40, n = 40, p = .01, indicating that the higher the number of controllable 
counterfactuals generated, the higher control perceptions. 
  A between groups ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of 
initial counterfactual controllability and individual differences in autonomy on 
ratings of ‘control ahead of the next trial’. Although control perceptions were 
slightly higher when initial counterfactuals were controllable (M = 4.93, SD = 1.76) 
than when uncontrollable (M = 4.00, SD = 1.95), this main effect was not 
statistically significant, F(3, 36) = .48, p = .49. The interaction effect between 
autonomy and initial counterfactual controllability was also not statistically 
significant, F(1, 36) = .84, p = .36, nor was the main effect of autonomy, F(1, 156) = 
.06, p = .80. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 partially replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and showed that 
autonomy plays a role in counterfactual thinking and particularly in the generation of 
controllable counterfactuals when people actually engage with a task. Unlike 
Experiment 1, we did not find a relationship between autonomy and counterfactual 
activation overall in this experiment but we did replicate the correlation between 
autonomy and the number of controllable counterfactuals generated. Similar to 
Experiment 1 we also found that those high in autonomy were more likely to 
generate a controllable initial counterfactual than those low in autonomy. Given that 
the association between autonomy and counterfactual activation overall was small in 
Experiment 1 and not replicated here it may be the case that autonomy has more of a 
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role to play in counterfactual focus than counterfactual activation. However, we will 
investigate this matter further in the next experiment.  
  The results of this experiment also extended the findings of 
Experiment 1 by demonstrating the performance improvement effects of 
counterfactual thinking in general and of controllable counterfactual thinking in 
particular. Overall the findings showed that the counterfactual group improved more 
than the control group and that those who generated controllable initial 
counterfactuals tended to improve more than those who generated uncontrollable 
initial counterfactuals. Interestingly autonomy did not directly affect performance 
improvement scores, nor did it directly interact with controllable counterfactual 
thinking scores to improve performance. Although autonomy has a role to play in 
controllable counterfactual thinking, it seems that it is the process of counterfactual 
thinking, and perhaps specifically controllable counterfactual thinking, that is 
important in performance improvement. 
  In terms of control perceptions ahead of the second anagram task, we 
found that generating controllable counterfactuals was associated with higher control 
perceptions. This finding is in line with Markman and Weary (1998) who 
demonstrated that controllable counterfactual mutations rather than uncontrollable 
counterfactual mutations increase control perceptions on repeated tasks. Although 
participants in Experiment 2 were not explicitly aware of an upcoming second 
anagram task during counterfactual generation, they were aware that the experiment 
was not over at this stage and may have anticipated future trials. The influence of 
event repeatability on the findings of Experiment 2 would need to be examined more 
closely using a more explicit experimental manipulation.  
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  Experiment 2 demonstrated that after generating controllable 
counterfactuals, high and low autonomy participants did not differ in terms of 
control perceptions ahead of the second anagram task. This finding has implications 
for research by Nasco and Marsh (1999). In their month-long study of counterfactual 
thoughts in college students, Nasco and Marsh aimed to identify mediators of 
observed performance improvement in academic performance. They suggest that 
future research might investigate the role of individual difference factors in 
influencing control perceptions after counterfactual thinking. Findings from 
Experiment 2 suggest that while autonomy may influence counterfactual focus, it 
may not influence control perceptions. Rather, control perceptions seem to be more 
directly influenced by counterfactual controllability. 
  In the next experiment we examine the role of controllable 
counterfactual thinking in performance improvement in more depth. 
 
3.4 Experiment 3: Does the method of counterfactual elicitation 
influence functionality? 
In the previous two experiments high autonomy participants demonstrated a 
tendency to generate controllable counterfactuals. Experiment 3 has three main aims. 
The first is to replicate the association observed between autonomy and controllable 
initial counterfactual thinking found in Experiments 1 and 2 and also investigate if 
there is an association with counterfactual activation. The second aim is to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 2 regarding the performance improvement role of 
counterfactual thinking. The final aim is to examine whether being directed to 
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generate controllable counterfactuals leads to observable performance improvement 
for both high and low autonomy individuals.  
  All participants attempted an anagram task and were then assigned to 
one of three experimental conditions. Participants were either directly asked to 
generate controllable counterfactuals, asked to generate counterfactuals in a less 
directed way as in the previous experiments, or asked to complete a filler task. 
Finally, participants attempted a second anagram task and completed a self-report 
measure of autonomy. Instructing participants to generate controllable 
counterfactuals meant that we could investigate more specifically the effect of these 
types of counterfactuals on performance improvement. It also allowed us to examine 
how both high and low autonomy participants performed after generating 
controllable counterfactuals.  
  Regarding autonomy, we predicted that there would be an association 
between autonomy and counterfactual controllability in the undirected counterfactual 
generation condition. Regarding performance improvement, we predicted that 
participants in both of the counterfactual conditions would improve their 
performance significantly more than those in the control condition. However, if was 
difficult to predict if, or how, the two counterfactual groups might differ from each 
other. It could be the case that those in the directed controllable counterfactual group 
would see greater performance improvement than those the undirected 
counterfactual group because all of their counterfactuals would focus on controllable 
aspects of behaviour. On the other hand, the undirected counterfactual group could 
see greater performance improvement because all of their thoughts would focus on 
aspects of behaviour that spontaneously came to mind rather than being directed to 
only think about controllable things. Finally, it may be the case that generating any 
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type of counterfactual, directed or undirected, would improve performance and there 
would be no difference between the groups.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 60 undergraduate students (39 women and 21 men) 
with an average age of 20.33 years (SD = 4.22). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three experimental conditions: undirected counterfactual 
generation (n = 20), directed controllable counterfactual generation (n = 20), or a 
control group (n = 20). 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: experimental task (undirected counterfactuals versus 
directed controllable counterfactuals versus control) and autonomy (high versus 
low). 
 
Materials: Participants were presented with two anagram tasks identical to those 
used in Experiment 2 (see Appendix F). The order in which each set appeared was 
randomized. After attempting the first set of anagrams, participants were provided 
with the correct answers. As in Experiment 2, false performance feedback was 
provided to manipulate perceived outcome valence; participants were led to believe 
they performed below average. A manipulation check (see Appendix G) was 
included in the form of a Likert-scale type rating of the degree of satisfaction they 
had with regard their performance in the first set of anagrams. 
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 Participants subsequently engaged in a thinking exercise. Participants 
in the undirected counterfactual generation group generated counterfactuals after 
being encouraged to consider how their score could have been different. Participants 
in the directed controllable counterfactual generation group generated 
counterfactuals after being encouraged to consider things they could have done 
differently and that they had full control over. Participants assigned the control group 
engaged with a grammatical correction task identical to the one used in Experiment 2 
(see Appendix H).  
  After the counterfactual generation/filler task was completed, 
participants were informed for the first time that they would be attempting a second 
set of anagrams. It was decided that participants not be informed earlier of this 
second set of anagrams so that counterfactual thoughts generated between tasks 
focused explicitly on past events. Following completion of the second set of 
anagrams, participants were again informed of the correct answers so that they could 
calculate a score for the trial. No false information about normative scores was 
provided after the second trial. 
  Finally, participants filled out the self-report measure of autonomy 
(Bekker & van Assen, 2006) as described in Experiment 1 (see Appendix C). 
According to Bekker and van Assen (2006), the autonomy measure has good internal 
consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of .82. In the current 
experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .77. 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the study was interested in how 
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people think while problem solving. All participants were assured confidentiality and 
told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An information sheet (see 
Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data collection. Individuals 
who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a consent form (see 
Appendix E). Participants were given booklets containing all experimental materials 
and were asked not to open or flick through it until instructed. A full debriefing was 
given to all participants post testing. 
 
Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as described previously. Inter-rater agreement between the two 
trained coders was high (95.6%). Agreement ranged from 94% for coding 
controllable versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 97% for coding whether the 
thought was a counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
Omitted data: Data from 1 participant was discarded due to failure to follow 
instructions adequately. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores on the autonomy scale (Bekker & van Assen, 
2006) could range between 30 and 210. In this sample the mean score total for 
autonomy was 131.4 (SD = 12.71), ranging from 93 to 169. Using a median split, 32 
participants were categorized as high autonomy while 28 were categorized as low 
 ~ 81 ~ 
 
autonomy. The mean score for the high autonomy group was 142.2 (SD = 6.8) and 
the mean score for the low autonomy group was 119.3 (SD = 7.1). 
 
Number and type of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 96 counterfactual thoughts. Participants recorded a mean of 2.40 (SD = .96) 
counterfactual items each, ranging from 1 to 5 items. All participants in the 
counterfactual groups generated at least one counterfactual statement, resulting in 40 
opening/initial counterfactuals. Descriptive statistics for each counterfactual 
categorization are shown below (Table 6). As Table 6 shows, nearly all participants 
generated upward additive counterfactuals and this was the case for both initial 
counterfactuals (i.e., the first counterfactual listed) as well as for the number of 
counterfactuals overall. All counterfactuals were controllable in the directed 
controllable counterfactual condition. In the undirected counterfactual condition, 
participants generated more controllable than uncontrollable counterfactuals for 
initial responses, but only slightly more controllable than uncontrollable 
counterfactuals overall. 
 
Table 6 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 3 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=40) Overall (N=96) 
Upward versus Downward 95% vs 5% 94% vs 6% 
Additive versus Subtractive   86% vs 14% 91% vs 9% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable a   70% vs 30%   53% vs 47% 
a. Descriptive statistics reported here refer to the undirected counterfactual group; all counterfactuals in the 
directed controllable condition were controllable. 
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Satisfaction ratings: As expected, participants generally felt dissatisfied with their 
performance in the first trial of anagram problems. On a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(not satisfied at all) to 7 (very satisfied), participants recorded an average satisfaction 
score of 1.55 (SD = .79). This meant that performance on the anagram task resulted 
in consistently low satisfaction ratings. 
 
Counterfactual activation 
In the undirected counterfactual thinking group, there was no correlation between 
autonomy score and the overall number of counterfactuals generated, r = .08, n = 
20, p = .50. There was also no correlation between autonomy score and the overall 
number of controllable counterfactuals generated, r = .14, n = 20, p = .54. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
We compared high and low autonomy participants for initial counterfactual 
controllability; counterfactual direction and structure were largely upward and 
additive as an initial response and so were not included in these statistical analyses. 
We sought replication of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 that high autonomy 
was associated with the use of controllable counterfactuals as an initial response. In 
the undirected counterfactual thinking group, for the first counterfactual generated, a 
2x2 Chi-square test for independence indicated that there was a significant 
association between autonomy and initial counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 20) 
= 3.43, p = .03 (one-tailed), with a medium effect size (phi = .41).  Percentages of 
controllable and uncontrollable initial counterfactual responses are provided in Table 
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7 below. High autonomy participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an 
initial response more so than low autonomy participants. 
 
Table 7 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Autonomy Participants in the Undirected Counterfactual Group in 
Experiment 3 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    77%   23%  
 
Low    36%   64% 
 
 
Performance improvement 
Overall, anagram solution scores increased significantly from Trial 1 (M = 6.15, SD 
= 5.45) to Trial 2 (M = 9.82, SD = 6.35), t (59) = 5.99, p < .001. The mean increase 
in anagram solution scores was 3.66 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 
2.42 to 4.91. The eta squared statistic (.40) indicated a large effect size. 
  We computed a unitary dependent variable of score improvement 
(score in anagram Trial 2 – score in anagram Trial 1). To investigate the effect of 
autonomy and controllable counterfactual thinking on performance improvement we 
conducted a 2 way between groups ANOVA. In order to compare the findings to the 
results of Experiment 2 we initially only used data from the undirected 
counterfactual group as all participants in the directed group generated controllable 
counterfactuals. There was a marginally significant main effect on performance 
improvement depending on whether the initial counterfactual was controllable (M = 
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6.82, SD = 5.11) or uncontrollable (M = 2.22, SD = 1.48), F(3, 16) = 3.70, p = .07. 
The main effect for autonomy did not reach statistical significance, F(3, 16) = 1.11, 
p = .31, nor did the interaction effect between initial counterfactual controllability 
and autonomy, F(3, 16) = .31, p = .58. This finding replicates the finding of 
Experiment 2. 
  We investigated if there was a difference between the three 
experimental groups in performance improvement. A one-way ANOVA indicated 
that there was a difference in improvement scores for the three experimental groups, 
F(2, 57) = 7.01, p = .002. Tukey post hoc comparisons indicated that participants in 
the directed controllable counterfactual condition (M = 5.55, SD = 5.39) and the 
undirected counterfactual condition (M = 4.75, SD = 4.49) improved significantly 
more than participants in the filler condition (M = .70, SD = 2.92). There was no 
significant difference between the directed controllable counterfactual condition and 
the undirected counterfactual condition. 
  Although the difference was not statistically significant, participants 
in the undirected counterfactual condition demonstrated score improvements slightly 
lower than participants in the directed controllable counterfactual condition. 
However, participants in the undirected counterfactual condition were free to 
generate both controllable and uncontrollable counterfactuals if they so wished. We 
compared the performance improvement scores of participants in the undirected 
counterfactual generation condition whose initial counterfactual mutation was 
controllable, with performance improvement scores of participants in the directed 
controllable counterfactual generation condition. An independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the performance improvement of these two groups. Although 
performance improvement scores were slighter higher for participants in the 
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undirected counterfactual generation condition (M = 6.82, SD = 5.11) than for 
participants in the directed controllable condition (M = 5.55, SD = 5.39), the 
difference was not statistically significant, t (29) = .64, p = .53. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 and showed that 
autonomy plays a role in counterfactual thinking and particularly in the generation of 
controllable initial counterfactuals. Similar to Experiment 2, we did not find a 
relationship between autonomy and overall counterfactual activation.  
  As predicted the findings showed that both of the counterfactual 
groups improved more than the control group. As in the previous experiment, 
autonomy did not directly affect performance improvement scores, nor did it directly 
interact with controllable counterfactual thinking scores to improve performance. 
Those who generated controllable initial counterfactuals improved more than those 
who generated uncontrollable initial counterfactuals, although there was no 
difference in performance improvement between those who spontaneously generated 
controllable counterfactual thoughts and those who were directed to focus on 
controllable counterfactual thoughts. These findings support research suggesting that 
counterfactual thinking may facilitate performance improvement (e.g., Nasco & 
Marsh, 1999) and that counterfactuals which focus on antecedents a person has 
control over may be particularly adaptive (e.g., Morris & Moore, 2000).  
  Participants in the undirected counterfactual group whose initial 
counterfactuals were controllable demonstrated higher mean performance 
improvement scores than participants in the controllable counterfactual group. Future 
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research might examine in more detail whether controllable counterfactuals that are 
self-initiated are more functional than those generated through prompting. Somewhat 
similar findings emerged from research by Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, and Gleicher 
(2004) who found that positive attitude changes persisted over time when 
participants self-generated counterfactuals but not when participants were explicitly 
directed to consider specific counterfactuals. All counterfactuals generated in 
Experiment 3 were to some degree prompted in that all participants were asked to 
generate counterfactuals. However, given that the undirected counterfactual 
condition was sufficient to demonstrate functionality and it involved less artificial 
counterfactual generation than the directed controllable counterfactual condition, it 
may be that simply instructing participants to consider how things could have been 
different rather than what they alone could do differently, is sufficient to observe the 
performance improving effects of counterfactuals.  
  
3.5 General Discussion 
The findings reported in the three experiments above suggest that individual 
differences in autonomy may influence what individuals tend to counterfactually 
mutate. Like Leach and Patall (2013), our findings suggest that the association 
between autonomy and counterfactual thinking is important. The functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1994; Epstude & Roese, 2008; 2011) proposes that 
certain types of counterfactual are more likely to facilitate behaviour regulation and 
subsequent performance improvement.  These experiments suggest that certain 
individuals are more likely than others to engage in functional types of 
counterfactual thinking such as generating controllable mutations. 
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  In Experiment 1, we observed a small relationship between autonomy 
scores and the total number of counterfactuals generated overall as well as the 
number of controllable counterfactuals generated. Experiments 2 and 3 however, 
failed to replicate the finding for the total number of counterfactuals although there 
was an association between autonomy and the number of controllable 
counterfactuals in Experiment 2. This result may have been due to the smaller 
sample sizes used in Experiments 2 and 3. These divergent findings mean it is 
unclear whether individual differences in autonomy are associated with 
counterfactual activation. Further research may be required to determine the precise 
nature of any potential association.  
  It may be the case that other individual difference factors influence 
counterfactual activation. For example, Davis (1991) found that scores on a 
dispositional rumination scale were moderately related to the frequency of 
counterfactual thinking. Research by Bacon et al. (2013) found that higher levels of 
fantasy proneness were correlated with higher levels of spontaneous counterfactual 
thinking. Also, depressed individuals have been shown to generate more 
counterfactuals than nondepressed individuals (Markman & Weary, 1998). Other 
research however, suggests that individual differences may not be strongly related to 
counterfactual activation. Kasimatis and Wells (1995) anticipated that individuals 
with a greater desire for control would be more likely to engage in counterfactual 
thinking, but this was not the case.  Their studies also showed no relationship 
between counterfactual thinking and the need for cognition, rumination, or other 
coping strategies. Our findings suggest that further research is needed. 
  In Experiment 1, significant findings regarding individual differences 
in autonomy only emerged when participants engaged with a real task as opposed to 
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considering hypothetical scenarios. This finding informed Experiments 2 and 3 
which used real tasks as opposed to hypothetical scenarios. While it may not always 
be feasible to use ‘real world’ experimental methodology, results of Experiments 1, 2 
and 3 indicate that when individual differences are the focus of research, tangible 
problems may be preferable to vignette methodologies. A key difference between  
the experiments reported here which found evidence that self-regulatory individual 
differences may influence counterfactual focus, and past studies that found no 
association between self-regulatory individual differences and counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., Kasimatis & Sterling, 1994; Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Murphy, 2005) 
is that  these experiments utilized an actual problem that participants engaged with. 
While some previous studies have found consistency among hypothetical and real-
appearing decision paradigms (e.g., McElroy & Dowd, 2007), our findings are more 
in line with Girotto et al. (2007) who found that post decisional counterfactual 
thinking can differ significantly depending on the method of counterfactual 
elicitation. 
 The cognitive task used in Experiments 2 and 3 resulted in a higher 
percentage of controllable counterfactuals than with the task used in Experiment 1. 
This may have been due to the higher complexity and inherent strategy of the 
experimental task in Experiments 2 and 3. Regardless of this change in accessible 
controllable antecedents, Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that the influence of 
counterfactual controllability on functionality may be observed in a laboratory 
setting using a cognitive task that leads to failure. A concern we had in Experiments 
2 and 3 was that the task used to prompt counterfactual thinking was not overtly 
personally salient to participants and thus may not activate performance 
improvement motives to the same extent as studies in applied settings (e.g., Morris 
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& Moore, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999). However, the consistently low satisfaction 
scores recorded by participants indicated that they were at least somewhat engaged 
with the tasks. 
 Experiments 1, 2 and 3 provide evidence that individual differences in 
autonomy are associated with counterfactual controllability. This suggests that 
autonomy may potentially be important in terms of counterfactual functionality. 
Previous research has linked individual differences to counterfactual focus. Roese 
and Olson (1993a) found that individuals with low self-esteem were more likely to 
undo their own actions following a failure, while those with higher self-esteem were 
more likely to report undoing their own actions after a success.  Markman and 
Weary (1998) found that depressed participants generated more controllable 
counterfactuals than nondepressed participants. Our findings support research by 
Haynes et al. (2007) which suggests that self-regulatory individual differences can 
influence counterfactual functionality. While Haynes et al. demonstrated that 
uncertainty orientation may influence counterfactual direction after a temporally 
recent negative outcome, Experiments 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate that autonomy may 
influence whether counterfactuals focus on antecedents that fall within the domain of 
personal control.  
  It is important to make the distinction here between controllable and 
self-referent counterfactuals. The associations observed in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
relate to counterfactuals that focus not just on the self – which also includes 
immutable features of the self (e.g., “If only I were smarter…”) – but to antecedents 
that could realistically be altered in future. Thus, these findings may hold 
implications for the functionality of counterfactual thinking, emphasizing the 
importance of individual difference factors.  
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   Both Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated the performance improving 
effect of counterfactual thinking. While all participants typically improved at the 
anagram task from Trial 1 to Trial 2, performance improvement was largest when the 
trials were separated by a counterfactual thinking exercise. These findings support 
previous research such as Roese (1994) and Markman et al. (2008). Moreover, we 
found evidence in both Experiments 2 and 3 that generating controllable 
counterfactuals as an initial response facilitated performance improvement more so 
than just generating counterfactuals. This finding is in line with research by Morris 
and Moore (2000) which suggested that controllable counterfactuals may be 
particularly adaptive. 
  Experiment 3 suggests that controllable counterfactual thoughts are 
functional and lead to performance improvement regardless of whether they are 
directed or undirected. However, in daily life when people generate spontaneous 
counterfactual thoughts after failure these thoughts can be controllable or 
uncontrollable. While this experiment demonstrates the functionality of controllable 
counterfactual thoughts, subsequent experiments will not direct people to engage in 
controllable counterfactual thinking in order that the counterfactual thoughts 
generated are more natural and also that there is greater variability in the types of 
counterfactual thoughts generated so that they can be considered in light of various 
self-regulatory personality traits.  
   In Experiment 2, after generating controllable counterfactuals we 
observed no difference between high and low autonomy participants in terms of 
control perceptions. In Experiments 2 and 3, after generating controllable 
counterfactuals we observed no difference between high and low autonomy 
participants in terms of performance improvement. Again however, we emphasise 
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that this finding should not be over generalized. Other individual difference factors 
may influence control perceptions and performance improvement once 
counterfactuals have been generated. Factors such as depression may be significant 
in determining the degree to which control perceptions are influenced once 
counterfactuals have been generated (Markman & Miller, 2006). Other self-
regulatory individual differences may also be important. Our findings are important 
in that they emphasize that individual differences in autonomy influence whether 
controllable counterfactuals are generated at all. 
   In terms of other individual differences that may be implicated by the 
findings of this chapter, further research might examine alternative constructs used to 
describe autonomy. For instance, we suggest that the construct of autonomy as 
outlined in self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985a) may also be important to 
counterfactual functionality. Indeed, a related subscale of self-determination was 
used in the research by Leach and Patall (2013), suggesting that self-determination 
may be relevant. Part of the broader theoretical framework of self-determination, 
general causality orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985b) describes individual differences 
in people’s tendencies to regulate behaviour in various ways. There are three types of 
causality orientations: autonomous, controlled, and impersonal. Of these, 
autonomous orientation is of the highest salience to the present research. A person 
high in autonomy orientation typically displays greater self-initiation, and takes 
greater responsibility for personal behaviour. The general causality orientation 
autonomy subscale (Deci & Ryan, 1985b) may be used to assess individual 
differences in autonomous orientation. This orientation is understood to be a 
relatively enduring aspect of personality. Investigating this individual difference in 
relation to counterfactual functionality would be one of assessing the degree to 
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which findings from this chapter could be generalized to other constructs of 
autonomy.  
  One possible mechanism by which autonomy may influence 
counterfactual thinking relates to self-motives. Counterfactual thinking is widely 
reported to occur most often following negative outcomes (e.g., Sanna & Turley-
Ames, 1996). Particularly when a negative outcome is self-implicating, there may be 
a resulting need to protect the self from criticism. However, a high level of autonomy 
may make people cognizant of the fact that their sense of self-worth is not 
exclusively determined by the evaluative implications of an immediate task or 
problem. As a result, people may become more open-minded and willing to engage 
in self-implicating adaptive behavioural plans. Essentially, autonomy describes the 
degree to which an individual is self-motivated, carries a sense of free-will and self-
initiation in their behaviour, and is unconcerned by external ego-involvements (e.g., 
Bekker & van Assen, 2006; Bekker, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Given these 
characteristics, for individuals with high autonomy, it may be that the implications of 
negative feedback from external sources do not result in attempts to re-evaluate the 
self. When counterfactuals may be considered without self-implication, functional 
types may be more likely. However, whether this mechanism is responsible for 
counterfactual functionality in high autonomy individuals or some other mechanism 
is operating needs to be investigated empirically. 
Conclusion: The experiments in this chapter have provided the first direct 
investigation of the role of autonomy in counterfactual thinking and particularly in 
the generation of controllable counterfactual thoughts. The findings from all three 
experiments indicated that individuals high in autonomy have a tendency to generate 
more controllable initial counterfactual thoughts after engaging in a task compared to 
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those low in autonomy. As Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated, these controllable 
counterfactual thoughts are particularly useful in performance improvement. 
  If the ability to consider counterfactuals without self-implication is 
particularly important in terms of functionality, investigation into other self-
regulatory individual differences relevant to these self-motives may be important. 
One such individual difference factor is that of action/state orientation (Kuhl,1992). 
This individual difference factor has been highlighted by Epstude and Roese (2011) 
as being potentially important and in need of empirical investigation and we 
investigate it in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Action/state orientation 
4.1 General introduction 
Why do some people engage in painful rumination rather than simply enjoying the 
activity they are currently pursuing? How do some people shrug off negative 
outcomes as if they never happened? These questions are central to the area of self-
regulation. Action/state orientation (Kuhl, 1994) describes differences between 
people in terms of how they typically self-regulate after negative outcomes. 
Action/state orientation describes the capacity to regulate emotions, thoughts, and 
behaviours in order to fulfill intentions an individual may form (Kuhl, 1981). 
According to Kuhl (2000), individuals are predisposed to either an action-orientation 
or a state-oreintation and this orientation is a stable personality trait over time. 
Action-oriented individuals are adept at regulating thoughts and feelings of 
inadequacy or frustration, allowing them to effectively plan and focus on a specific 
goal. State-oriented individuals however, are less capable of putting aside disruptions 
to focus on a task and are less adept at modifying states such as anxiety and dejection 
(Kuhl, 1994). 
  There are a number of reasons for focusing on action/state orientation 
in relation to counterfactual thinking. Firstly, because action/state orientation and 
autonomy are conceptually similar and closely related (Kuhl, 1994) turning attention 
to action/state orientation may reveal that the findings of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 are 
applicable to a broader range of self-regulatory individual diference factors. Another 
reason for focusing on action/state orientation specifically is that very little research 
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has been conducted on this variable in relation to counterfactual thinking, despite its 
potential importance to counterfactual thinking being suggested by previous 
researchers. Epstude and Roese (2011) as well as Markman and Weary (1998) have 
suggested that it may be a particularly important individual difference factor and one 
in need of empirical research.  
 
4.1.1 Action/state orientation 
Action/state orientation describes an individual difference in terms of how people 
typically self-regulate in response to demanding situations or negative events. Kuhl 
and colleagues (e.g., Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994)  have catalogued typical 
features associated with both action-orientation and state-orientation. An action-
orientation predisposes individuals to actively solve problems and spend relatively 
more cognitive resources on tasks. Action-oriented individuals are also more adept 
than state-oriented individuals at focusing attention when a desired goal has been 
identified. For these reasons, action-oriented persons are generally better equipped to 
outperform state-oriented persons on goal centered tasks. State-oriented persons 
often fixate on negative aspects of an event and may find it relatively more difficult 
to regulate negative affect after some perceived failure. In terms of adaptive 
functioning, this negative affect serves to diminish cognitive resources and impedes 
sound decision making and task completion. One of the main differences then 
between the two orientations lies in how they determine affective reactions to 
negative situations. Action-oriented persons are relatively better at overcoming 
negative experiences and regulating affective reactions. However, it is important to 
 ~ 96 ~ 
 
note that this does not necessarily mean action-oriented individuals feel less 
negatively about unpleasant events. 
    The effects of action/state orientation have been demonstarted 
empirically in applied settings. One study that examined action/state orientation in a 
real world setting was that of Heckhausen and Strang (1988) which examined 
individual differences in semiprofessional basketball players. Their research found 
that state-orientated individuals reacted more negativly to stressful playing 
conditions than action-orientated individuals. The negative reaction was marked by 
an increase in physiological stress and a decrease in athletic performance. Action-
oriented players experienced neither physiological stress nor deterioration in 
performance when playing under similar levels of stress.  
  Other research by Kuhl (1981) has shown that state-oriented 
individuals show decreased performance on some cognitive tasks when they 
experience failure. In one experiment, participants attempted a series of cognitive 
problems. The problems involved pattern recognition (see Hiroto & Seligman, 1975, 
p. 318), logical reasoning, and object discrimination. During the first trial, some 
participants were assigned to a failure condition in which they engaged with a 
problem and were told they had failed, regardless of the responses they provided. A 
control condition was used in which participants engaged with a problem but were 
given no negative feedback. Results revealed that participants exposed to failure 
feedback showed increased or decreased performance compared to the control 
condition. These performance effects could be explained on the basis of individual 
differences in action/state orientation. Action-oriented individuals tended to increase 
performance after receiving failure feedback while state-oriented individuals tended 
to decrease performance after receiving failure feedback. 
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   More recent research has examined the role of action/state orientation 
in terms of how it influences the consistency of adaptive behaviour over longer time 
frames. Research by Wanberg, Zhu, and Hooft (2010) examined action/state 
orientation in relation to job searching behaviour. According to the researchers, 
when individuals seek jobs they frequently feel their progress has been stifled. 
Typically, their confidence and mood can deteriorate as the process plays out. In one 
study, participants who were currently seeking jobs completed a survey every week 
day across three weeks. They were asked to rate their progress, effort, affect and 
confidence at the end of each day. Results indicated that for state-oriented 
individuals a decline in positive affect on one day tended to curb effort devoted to 
job searching the following day. However, for action-oriented individuals, a decline 
in affect one day tended to enhance job searching efforts the following day. 
According to Wanberg et al. (2010), action-oriented individuals are particularly 
likely to mobilize effort and determination after their mood has been dented.  
 In terms of measuring individual differences in action/state 
orientation, scales have been developed by Kuhl (1994) and Diefendorff et al. 
(2000). The scale developed by Kuhl measures two subscales of action/state 
orientation: disengagement and initiative. Disengagement describes the capacity to 
effortlessly and immediately disengage from a perceived sense of threat. Initiative 
describes the capacity to easily foster the emotional and cognitive responses needed 
to execute intentions despite challenging demands. These two subscale scores are 
combined to form an overall score of action/state orientation (e.g., Jostmann, Koole, 
van der Wulp, & Fockenberg, 2005). Action/state orientation describes an individual 
difference that has action-orientation and state-orientation on opposing ends of a 
continuum. A study by Kuhl (1994) which used self-report measures of action/state 
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orientation suggests that up to 50% of the normal non-clinical population in Western 
societies may be predisposed towards a state-orientation. The measure developed by 
Diefendorff et al. (2000), which was developed from the Kuhl (1994) scale, also 
includes subscales of disengagement and initiative. However, Diefendorff et al. 
emphasize the importance of persistence in goal striving and thus include an 
additional subscale: volatility. Volatility describes the tendency to focus on an 
additional goal while pursuing an original goal. 
  In the Diefendorff et al. (2000) measure, as in the Kuhl (1994) 
measure, both the disengagement and initiative subscales as treated as single 
construct. The volatility subscale is treated as a second construct, theoretically 
related to action/state orientation. Reasons for this approach include the fact that 
correlations between the disengagement and initiative subscales are typically high, 
while their correlations with volatility are often close to zero. Theoretically, this 
approach is congruent with the concept that the ability to demonstrate an action-
orientation during self-regulation (e.g., the ability to disengage for setbacks or to 
initiate behavioural plans) may be independent of the ability to maintain such an 
action-orientation for prolonged periods of time (e.g., persistence in goal striving). 
  In the present research, individual differences in action/state 
orientation are assessed using the measure of action\state orientation developed by 
Diefendorff et al. (2000). Thus, action/state orientation is considered a composite of 
both the disengagement and initiative subscales. Volatility is treated as a separate 
construct, albeit theoretically related to action/state orientation. 
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4.1.2 Action/state orientation and counterfactual thinking 
The findings from a number of studies suggest that action/state orientation may have 
a role to play in counterfactual thinking. In a study examining action/state orientation 
and regret, McElroy and Dowd (2007) asked participants to recall a negative life 
event about a situation in which the person had engaged in either action or inaction. 
State-oriented individuals reported consistent levels of regret regardless of whether 
the event was action or inaction related. In contrast, action-oriented individuals 
experienced more regret for situations that recalled inaction than situations involving 
action. The findings of this study indicate that regret is influenced by innate 
action/state orientation. Some research suggests that state-oriented individuals are 
more likely than action-oriented individuals to focus on self-related attributions 
when experiencing negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). McElroy and Dowd 
(2007) state that their findings suggest state-oriented individuals are unable to 
regulate the tendency to place blame on their self. 
 Further, the cognitive process of rumination has been associated with 
action/state orientation. Rumination is conceptually similar to counterfactual 
thinking. Although cognitive undoing may not necessarily take place during 
rumination, both processes involve reflecting on past events. Kuhl (1994) 
conceptualizes rumination as a mode of thought that reflects a state-orientation. In 
this sense rumination is viewed as dysfunctional; focus on the causes and 
consequences of internal and external states becomes an end in itself rather than 
facilitating positive behavioural action plans. Given that two studies by Davis (1991) 
reported that scores on a dispositional rumination scale were moderately related to 
the frequency of counterfactual thinking, it is possible that state-orientation may also 
be important in counterfactual thinking. It may be the case that state-oriented 
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individuals may be more likely than action-oriented individuals to engage in 
counterfactual thinking, particularly about negative outcomes. 
  State-orientation has also previously been characterized as a 
preoccupation with the simulation of alternative plans and by persistent analysis of 
how and why past endeavours resulted in either success or failure (Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2002). This persistent analysis may work against the formulation of 
behavioural plans. Action-orientation however, is characterized by more functional 
action planning. An action-orientation has been associated with self-monitoring – the 
ability to regulate and alter one’s own behaviour in order to adapt to a given situation 
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). 
  It may also be the case that the extent to which an individual 
continues to generate counterfactual thoughts after a negative outcome is associated 
with Kuhl’s action/state orientation. There is evidence which suggests that this trait 
may be particularly important in relation to cognitive coping strategies. A study by 
El Leithy et al. (2006), which examined temporal changes in counterfactual 
generation, found that active reappraisal and reality testing in response to negative 
thoughts (a feature of Kuhl’s action-orientation) was associated with greater ease in 
generating counterfactual thoughts in the aftermath of a traumatic event but fewer 
counterfactual thoughts over longer time intervals. Conversely, the researchers noted 
that cognitive coping strategies such as interrupting unpleasant emotional states by 
focusing on other negative thoughts or “thought stopping” (characteristics consistent 
with Kuhl’s state-orientation) did not facilitate recovery and may be associated with 
continued, persistent counterfactual thinking (El Leithy et al., 2006). Thus, any 
potential association between action/state orientation and counterfactual thinking 
may be mediated by time or perhaps the degree of negative affect experienced. 
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  In terms of the precise nature of any potential association between 
counterfactual thinking and action/state orientation, research suggests that 
counterfactual controllability may be important. Markman and Weary (1998) 
investigated the control concerns typically found in depressed individuals, thought to 
typically utilize a state-orientation, and potential associations to counterfactual 
content. Their research was one of the first to document individual differences in 
counterfactual thinking as a function of depression. Over the course of two studies, 
they examined the role of depressives chronic control beliefs on counterfactual 
thinking. They hypothesized that depressed individuals would be more likely than 
non-depressed individuals to generate controllable counterfactuals about a negative 
life event because of a desire to minimize control losses and to possibly expand 
control perceptions over future action. Analysis revealed that depressed participants 
generated more controllable counterfactuals than nondepressed participants. The 
research by Markman and Weary (1998) suggests that the chronic control concerns 
of depressives are an important determinant of counterfactual focus. 
  What the research described above indicates is that while there has 
been very little direct study of the relationship between counterfactual thinking and 
action/state orientation, the indirect findings warrant further investigation. It seems 
likely from previous research that action/state orientation may be an important 
individual difference in counterfactual thinking and, more specifically, may 
influence counterfactual functionality. 
  In terms of observing the potential adaptiveness of an action-
orientation, another interesting line of research has focused on experimentally 
inducing either action-orientation or state-orientation in participants and observing 
the effects on performance and cognition (Kuhl, 1981; Van Putten, Zeelenberg, & 
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Van Dijk, 2009; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). State-orientation has previously been 
associated with depression (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). However, an action-
orientation may seemingly be cultivated in persons who have been shown to 
typically generate less functional depressive thoughts about past events. Watkins and 
Baracaia (2002) successfully managed to temporarily induce an action-orientation 
and improved problem solving in a sample of depressed and recovering depressive 
patients. These patients had originally displayed a propensity toward a state-
orientation. The study involved three experimental groups (currently depressed, 
recovered depressed, and never depressed) in three conditions (no questions, state-
oriented questions, and action-focused questions). State-oriented questions included: 
"What am I doing wrong?"; "What caused this problem?"; "Why can't I do better?” 
and "What is the reason behind all this?" These questions represented questions that 
might typically occur naturally in the minds of people who tend to ruminate. Action-
focused questions included: "How am I deciding on a way to solve this problem?" 
and "How am I deciding what do to next?" These represented questions that might 
typically occur naturally in the minds of people with innate action-orientation. 
Results indicated that manipulation of action/state orientation influenced success in 
problem solving. 
  Similarly, to manipulate action/state orientation, Van Putten et al. 
(2009) had participants read and imagine a scenario in which a travel agency had 
offered a trip to Rome for only $100 – half the usual price. However, when the 
protagonist eventually decided to purchase a ticket, the offer had expired. Some 
participants were instructed to describe how they might act to improve the situation. 
This instruction was intended to induce an action-orientation. Other participants 
were asked to list the thoughts and feelings this situation might elicit. This 
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instruction was designed to promote a state-orientation. Subsequently, all 
participants completed a measure of action/state orientation. Results indicated that 
after an action-orientation rather than state-orientation was induced, participants did 
indeed report an elevated level of action-orientation. The effects of these 
experimental inductions are likely short lived however, given that action/state 
orientation is an enduring personality trait thought to be consistent over time (Kuhl, 
2000). 
  Given that previous research has shown it is possible to 
experimentally induce an action-orientation or a state-orientation, this type of 
approach might be useful in observing more directly the influence of these regulatory 
orientations on counterfactual thinking. In the next section we present the findings of 
two experiments looking at the role of action/state orientation in counterfactual 
thinking. Experiment 4 investigates whether or not action/state orientation influences 
counterfactual thinking. Experiment 5 experimentally induces an action-orientation 
or a state-orientation and considers the effects for counterfactual thinking. 
 
4.2 Experiment 4: Does action/state orientation play a role in      
counterfactual thinking? 
Building on the previous chapter, which demonstrated that individual differences in 
autonomy may be important in terms of counterfactual controlability, Experiment 4 
sought to extend these findings. Our primary aim was to investigate whether another 
self regulatory individual difference – action/state orientation – might influence 
counterfactual thinking after a negative outcome.  
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    Similar to the previous experiments, participants twice attempted a 
series of difficult cognitive tasks (e.g., Anagrams). Counterfactual thoughts were 
generated after attempting each cognitive task. Individual differences in action/state 
orientation were measured. Based on the findings in the previous experiments we 
expected that performance on the task would improve across trials and more so for 
individuals that generated controllable than uncontrollable initial counterfactuals. 
  Our first hypothesis was that an action-orientation would lend itself to 
similar patterns of counterfactual thinking to those observed in the high autonomy 
participants. We anticipated that action-oriented individuals would generate more 
controllable counterfactuals than state-oriented individuals after failure in the initial 
cognitive task. We also hypothesized that this association would become more 
readily observed in the second counterfactual generation task given that participants 
will have experienced a second undesirable outcome. Thus, we investigated whether  
persistant failure influences any findings for indiviual differences in action/state 
orientation and counterfactual thinking. 
   Consideration was given to the role of volatility – an aspect of 
action/state orientation describing the tendency to focus on an additional goal while 
pursuing an original goal (Diefendorff et al., 2000). We expected that individuals 
high in volatility would disengage from goals more quickly once difficulties arose, 
and thus may be less likely to generate counterfactual thoughts than those low in 
volatility. Thus, we anticipated that participants high in volatility would generate 
fewer overall numbers of counterfactual thoughts. Given some research indicates 
that individuals low in volatility are better at finding a way around obstacles than 
people high in volatility (Marguc, Forster, & Van Kleef, 2011) it may be the case 
that individuals low in volatility may generate more functional types of 
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counterfactual thought (controllable) that facilitate performance improvement and 
learning. We also examined this hypothesis. 
 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 116 undergraduate students (80 women and 36 men) 
with an average age of 24.94 years (SD = 11.76). 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
one independent variable: action-orientation versus state-orientation. 
 
Materials: Participants were familiarized with four different types of cognitive 
puzzles (see Appendix J). Using multiple puzzles meant there was greater strategy 
involved in the experimental task and thus potentially more antecedents that could be 
counterfactually undone. The puzzles included: alphabetical anagrams (anagrams 
whose solutions are in consecutive alphabetical order), anagrams (typically shorter 
than the alphabetical anagrams but without a first letter clue), word circles 
(participants had to figure out the missing letter to complete an eight-letter word 
reading either clockwise or anticlockwise), and word wheels (participants had to find 
the 9 letter word that was scrambled in various segments of a wheel diagram. The 
word starts with the letter located at the centre of the wheel).  
  After familiarizing themselves with the different types of puzzles, 
participants were informed that they would be attempting similar tasks throughout 
the experiment (see Appendix K). The order in which these tasks were presented to 
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participants was randomized. Participants were not told how many times they would 
be attempting the tasks throughout the experiment. They were told that the object of 
the task was to get the highest possible score by solving as many puzzles as they 
could. They were free to try any puzzle they wished. They could stick at one type of 
puzzle or they could attempt multiple puzzles. Before attempting the puzzles, 
participants were given approximately 1 minute to decide on a strategy that would 
give them the best chance of maximizing their score. Participants were then given 
approximately 6 minutes to attempt an initial set of puzzles. A manipulation check 
(see Appendix L) was included in the form of a Likert-scale type rating; participants 
were asked to rate the degree of satisfaction they had with regard their performance 
in the first set of puzzles on a scale ranging from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 (very 
satisfied). Subsequently, participants generated counterfactual thoughts regarding 
how the puzzle task could have been different. 
   Next, participants were informed for the first time that they would be 
attempting another set of puzzles similar to those they had already tried (they were 
unaware of the upcoming trial during counterfactual generation). As in Trial 1, 
participants were given 6 minutes to engage with the puzzles. Again, they rated their 
satisfaction with their performance. A second counterfactual generation task was 
then initiated.  
  Finally, participants filled out the self-report measure of action\state 
orientation and volatility developed by Diefendorff et al. (2000) (see Appendix M). 
The measure has three subscales. The preoccupation and hesitation subscales are 
combined to give a score for action\state orientation. The volatility subscale is 
analyzed separately to give a volatility score. In total, the measure includes 36 forced 
choice items. Items in the preoccupation subscale include: “When several things go 
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wrong on the same day” (“I usually don’t know how to deal with it” versus “I just 
keep on going as though nothing has happened”); “When I am in competition and 
have lost every time” (“I can soon put losing out of my mind” versus “The thought 
that I lost keeps running through my mind”). Items in the hesitation subscale include: 
“When I have work to do at home” (“It is often hard for me to get the work done” 
versus “I usually get it done right away”); “When I know I must finish something 
soon” (“I have to push myself to get started” versus “I find it easy to get it done and 
over with”). Items in the volatility subscale include: “When I read something I find 
interesting” (“I sometimes want to put the article down and do something else” 
versus “I will sit and read the article for a long time”); “When I’m on vacation and 
having a good time” (“After a while, I really feel like doing something different” 
versus “I don’t even think about doing anything else until the end of the vacation”). 
According to Diefendorff et al. (2000) the action\state orientation measure has good 
internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of .74. In the current 
experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .71. According to Diefendorff  et al. 
(2000) the volatility measure also has good internal consistency, with a Cronbach 
alpha coefficient reported of .78. In the current experiment, the Cronbach alpha 
coefficient was .72. 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the study was interested in how 
people think while problem solving. All participants were assured confidentiality and 
told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An information sheet (see 
Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data collection. Individuals 
who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a consent form (see 
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Appendix E) and completed the booklet containing the experimental materials. All 
participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
 
Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as in previous experiments. Inter-rater agreement between the 
two trained coders was high (91.3%). Agreement ranged from 89% for coding 
controllable versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 95% for coding whether the 
thought was a counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
 
4.2.2 Results 
Omitted data: In general, participants had little difficulty understanding instructions. 
Participants seemed to understand the concepts involved in the various word puzzles; 
only 4 participants asked for clarification about the objective of a specific puzzle. No 
one puzzle seemed to cause confusion however. Data from 3 participants were 
discarded due to failure to follow instructions adequately. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores for action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 
2000) could range between 0 and 24. In this sample the mean score total for 
action/state orientation was 11.37 (SD = 4.09), ranging from 1 to 23. Participants 
were categorized as action-oriented or state-oriented using a median split as has been 
done in previous research (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Wanberg, Zhu, & Hooft, 
2010). Using this categorization, 57 participants were categorized as action-oriented 
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and 59 were categorized as state-oriented. The mean score for action-orientation was 
14.61 (SD = 2.05) and the mean score for state-orientation was 8.24 (SD = 2.96).  
  Scores for volatility (Diefendorff et al., 2000) could range between 0 
and 12. In this sample the mean score total for volatility was 8.65 (SD = 1.93), 
ranging from 4 to 12. Participants were categorized as volatile or non-volatile using a 
median split. Using this categorization, 66 participants were categorized as volatile 
and 50 were categorized as non-volatile. The mean score for volatile participants was 
7.46 (SD = 1.50) and the mean score for non-volatile participants was 10.51 (SD = 
1.96). 
 
Number and types of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 241 counterfactual thoughts in Trial 1 and 258 in Trial 2. Participants 
recorded a mean of 2.08 (SD = .77) counterfactual items each in Trial 1, ranging 
from 1 to 4 items. Participants recorded a mean of 2.22 (SD = .90) counterfactual 
items in Trial 2, ranging from 1 to 5 items. This difference was not statistically 
significant, t(116) = -.92, p = .35. In both trials, all participants generated at least one 
counterfactual statement, resulting in 116 opening/initial counterfactuals. Descriptive 
statistics for each counterfactual categorization in both Trial 1 and Trial 2 are shown 
below in Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Trial 1 of Experiment 4 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=116) Overall (N=241) 
Upward versus Downward  100% vs 0% 94% vs 6% 
Additive versus Subtractive 93% vs 7%  89% vs 11% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable  40% vs 60%  66% vs 34% 
 
Table 9 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Trial 2 of Experiment 4 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=116) Overall (N=258) 
Upward versus Downward 99% vs 1% 96% vs 4% 
Additive versus Subtractive 91% vs 9%  90% vs 10% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable   35% vs 65%  53% vs 47% 
 
 
Satisfaction ratings: As expected, participants generally felt dissatisfied with their 
performance in Trial 1. It was anticipated that due to the difficult nature of the tasks 
(as observed in a small pilot study), participants satisfaction scores would remain 
consistently low throughout the experiment. A paired-samples t-test was conducted 
to evaluate whether participants satisfaction scores varied across trials. There was 
only a marginally significant increase in satisfaction scores from Trial 1 (M = 1.14, 
SD = .37) to Trial 2 (M = 1.23, SD = .53), t (116) = -1.73, p = .09. This meant that 
throughout the experimental procedure, participants’ satisfaction scores remained 
relatively low and constant.  
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Counterfactual activation 
We checked for statistically significant correlations between the individual 
difference factors and counterfactual frequency in both trials. There was no 
correlation between action/state orientation score and counterfactual frequency in 
Trial 1, r = .09, n = 116, p = .35, or Trial 2, r = .02, n = 116, p = .82. There was 
also no correlation between volatility and counterfactual frequency in Trial 1, r = 
.05, n = 116, p = .54, or Trial 2, r = - .14, n = 116, p = .13. 
   Similarly there was no correlations between action/state orientation 
score and the overall number of controllable counterfactuals generated in Trial 1, r = 
.03, n = 116, p = .73, or  Trial 2, r = .15, n = 116, p = .11. There was also no 
correlation between volatility and the overall number of controllable counterfactuals 
generated in Trial 1, r = .05, n = 116, p = .60, or Trial 2, r = -.14, n = 116, p = .13. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
For both trials, we compared action-oriented and state-oriented individuals for initial 
counterfactual controllability; counterfactual direction and structure were largely 
upward and additive as an initial response and so were not included in these 
statistical analyses. Firstly, we investigated whether an action-orientation was 
associated with the use of controllable counterfactuals as an initial response. For the 
first counterfactual generated in Trial 1, a 2x2 Chi-square test for independence 
indicated that there was no association between action/state orientation and initial 
counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 116) = .116, p = .73. Descriptive statistics 
are provided in Table 10.  
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Table 10 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Action-oriented and State-oriented Participants in Trial 1 of Experiment 4 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Action-orientation  42%   58%  
 
State-orientation  37%   63% 
 
 
 
  However, for the first counterfactual generated in Trial 2, a 2x2 Chi-
square test for independence indicated that there was an association between 
action/state orientation and initial counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 116) = 
5.21, p = .02, with a small effect size (phi = .23). Descriptive statistics are provided 
in Table 11. For action-oriented individuals, initial counterfactual controllability 
increased slightly across trials: 42% to 46%. For state-oriented individuals, initial 
counterfactual controllability decreased across trials: 37% to 24%. This finding 
suggests that action-oriented individuals seem more likely to generate controllable 
counterfactuals than state-oriented individuals when faced with persistent negative 
outcomes. 
 
Table 11 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Action-oriented and State-oriented Participants in Trial 2 of Experiment 4 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Action-orientation  46%   54%  
 
State-orientation  24%   76% 
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   Finally, we examined volatility. There was no association between 
volatility and initial counterfactual controllability in Trial 1, χ2 (1, n = 116) = 1.07, p 
= .30, or in Trial 2, χ2 (1, n = 116) = 1.43, p = .23. 
 
Performance improvement 
As expected, performance scores increased significantly from Trial 1 (M = 5.55, SD 
= 3.80) to Trial 2 (M = 6.64, SD = 3.60), t(115) = 4.51, p < .001. The eta squared 
statistic (.15) indicated a large effect size. 
  We computed a unitary dependent variable of score improvement 
(score in puzzle Trial 2 – score in puzzle Trial 1). A between groups ANOVA was 
conducted to explore the impact of initial counterfactual controllability and 
action/state orientation on performance improvement. There was a significant main 
effect on performance improvement depending on whether the initial counterfactual 
was controllable (M = 2.09, SD = 2.67) or uncontrollable (M = .43, SD = 2.33), F(3, 
112) = 12.20, p < .001, replicating the findings of Experiments 2 ans 3. The effect 
size was small (partial eta squared = .01). Similar to the findings reported for 
autonomy, the main effect for action/state orientation was not statistically significant, 
F(3, 112) = .04, p = .84, nor was the interaction effect between initial counterfactual 
controllability and action/state orientation, F(3, 112) = .11, p = .74. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 examined individual differences in action/state orientation 
(Diefendorff et al., 2000). Action-oriented individuals are hypothesized to perceive 
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failure as less threatening to self-representations than are state-oriented individuals. 
Participants attempted cognitive tasks (e.g., anagrams) and subsequently generated 
counterfactual thoughts in two consecutive trials. Action/state orientation was not 
associated with counterfactual activation. It was anticipated that volatility, the 
tendency to focus on an additional goal while pursuing an original goal, would have 
implications for counterfactual activation. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
volatility would be associated with the generation of fewer counterfactual thoughts 
but this hypothesis was not supported. Experiment 4 suggests that action/state 
orientation and volatility are not associated with counterfactual activation. 
  We found no significant association between action/state orientation 
and controllable counterfactual focus in Trial 1. However, in Trial 2, we did observe 
a significant association between action/state orientation and initial counterfactual 
controllability. Compared to state-oriented participants, action-oriented participants 
generated more controllable counterfactuals as an initial response in Trial 2. 
Participants’ satisfaction with their performance was uniformly low throughout the 
experiment. This suggests that in order to observe individual differences in the 
functionality of counterfactual thinking, the degree of ‘failure’ participants engage 
with may be an important factor.  
  We also examined whether there would be a significant difference 
between high and low volatility participants in terms of counterfactual 
controllability. Previous research indicates that people low in volatility are better at 
finding solutions to obstacles than people who are high in volatility (Marguc, 
Förster, & Van Kleef, 2011). However, volatility was not associated with 
controllable counterfactual thinking. 
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  One possible explanation for why action/state orientation did not 
influence counterfactual controllability in Trial 1 may have been that the outcome of 
the cognitive puzzle task used was initially perceived as unthreatening. However, 
affect scores were consistently low throughout the experiment. Another explanation 
might be that having participants engage with a strategy formation task, as they did 
before Trial 1, may have bolstered control perceptions for all participants. This may 
have eradicated the variance in counterfactual thinking patterns attributable to 
individual difference factors. Regardless of this fact, the study found some evidence 
that action/state orientation influences counterfactual focus after a negative outcome. 
Findings from Experiment 4 suggest that persistent negative outcomes influence 
action-oriented and state-oriented individuals differently. Our findings are in line 
with research by McElroy and Dowd (2007) who observed a dysfunctional capacity 
to regulate negative emotion in state-oriented individuals. 
  Experiment 4 indicates that action/state orientation may be important 
in terms of the generation of functional types of counterfactual thinking. To that end, 
Experiment 5 experimentally induces an action-orientation or state-orientation and 
observes potential effects on counterfactual thinking and interactions with individual 
differences in action/state orientation. 
 
4.3 Experiment 5: Does inducing an action or state orientation influence 
counterfactual functionality? 
Following from Experiment 4, which indicated that individual differences in 
action/state orientation may be important in terms of counterfactual controllability, 
Experiment 5 sought to examine the matter further. As in Experiment 4, we 
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investigated whether action/state orientation might influence counterfactual 
controllability after a negative outcome. Experiment 5  builds on Experiment 4 in 
that it provides an additional test of the hypothesis that action/state orientation 
influences counterfactual thinking. Experiment 5 also permits investigation into the 
effects of experimentally manipulating action/state orientation and any potential 
interaction that may exist with innate individual differences in action/state 
orientation. 
  We anticipated that experimentally inducing an action-orientation 
would lead to more controllable counterfactual thinking than would inducing a state-
orientation. We were unsure as to whether or not individual differences in 
action/state orientation would directly influence counterfactual thinking, given that 
two task failures were required to observe variance attributable to this individual 
difference in Experiment 4. We did however anticipate that the experimental 
manipulation of action/state orientation would not influence naturally action-oriented 
and naturally state-oriented individuals in the same way. We anticipated that 
participants with a natural action-orientation would uniformly generate relatively 
high numbers of controllable counterfactual thoughts. Conversely, we anticipated 
that naturally state-oriented participants would generate comparable numbers of 
controllable counterfactuals only in the action-orientation inducing condition. 
 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 80 undergraduate students (62 women and 18 men) 
with an average age of 20.96 years (SD = 3.72). Participants were randomly 
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assigned to an action-orientation (n = 40) or a state-orientation (n = 40) induced 
condition. 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: Induced action/state orientation (action-orientation versus 
state-orientation) and innate action/state orientation (action-orientation versus state-
orientation). 
 
Materials: To experimentally manipulate an action/state orientation, a procedure 
similar to that used by Van Putten et al. (2009) was used. All participants read the 
following vignette: 
 
“You adore Rome! Shortly you will have a whole week without lectures and 
you would very much like to visit Rome. A friend tells you that a local travel 
agency offers a completely organized three-day trip to Rome. You can book 
the trip this week for €100 instead of the usual €199. This includes flights 
and two nights with breakfast at a four star hotel in the centre of Rome. He 
also tells you that you have to hurry before it is too late and the trip is sold 
out. During the week after you have spoken to your friend, you pass by the 
travel agency several times and think about booking the trip. However, you 
do not do so. When you finally want to book the trip it is sold out. You are 
too late.” 
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  The vignette was changed slightly from that used by Van Putten et al. 
(2009); the offer included air flights instead of travel on a high speed train. 
Participants read the vignette about a missed opportunity and either ruminated about 
how they might feel (state-orientation) or considered what they could do to improve 
the situation (action-orientation). This constituted the experimental manipulation of 
action/state orientation. 
    Next, participants were familiarized with four different types of 
cognitive puzzles identical to those used in Experiment 4 (see Appendix J). As they 
familiarized themselves with the different types of puzzles, participants were 
informed that they would be attempting a similar set of tasks in a few moments. 
These tasks were identical to those used in Experiment 4 (see Appendix K). Unlike 
Experiment 4 however, participants only attempted one trial of puzzles. Also, 
participants did not engage in developing a strategy before attempting the puzzles as 
they did in Experiment 4. Participants were given 6 minutes to attempt the set of 
puzzles. After this task, participants indicated their level of satisfaction with their 
performance in the puzzles on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 
(very satisfied) (see Appendix L). Participants next generated counterfactual 
thoughts regarding how the puzzle task could have been different. They were free to 
generate as many as they wished. 
  Finally, participants filled out the self-report measure of action-state 
orientation developed by Diefendorff et al. (2000) (see Appendix M). According to 
Diefendorff et al. (2000) the measure has good internal consistency, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient reported of .74. In the current experiment, the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .70. 
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Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the experiment was interested in 
how people think while problem solving. All participants were assured 
confidentiality and told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An 
information sheet (see Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data 
collection. Individuals who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a 
consent form (see Appendix E) and given the booklet containing the experimental 
materials. Participants were debriefed about the nature of the experiment after 
completing the action/state orientation manipulation, the puzzles and the 
counterfactual generation exercise. This debriefing lasted approximately 3 minutes 
so that a significant period of time could separate the induction of an action-
orientation or state-orientation from the individual difference measure. The aim of 
this was to reduce any potential effects of the experimental manipulation on the 
measure of innate action\state orientation. Participants were also made aware that 
their responses in the individual difference measure should reflect their typical 
feelings and behaviour and not how they were currently feeling. 
 
Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as in previous experiments. Inter-rater agreement between the 
two trained coders was high (94.9%). Agreement ranged from 92% for coding 
controllable versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 96% for coding whether the 
thought was a counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
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4.3.2 Results 
Omitted data: In general, participants had little difficulty understanding instructions. 
Participants seemed to understand the concepts involved in the various word puzzles; 
only 1 participant asked for clarification about the objective of a specific puzzle. 
Data from 2 participants were discarded due to failure to follow instructions 
adequately. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores for action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 
2000) could range between 0 and 24. In this sample the mean score total for 
action/state orientation was 13.85 (SD = 4.01), ranging from 3 to 20. Participants 
were categorized as action-oriented or state-oriented using a median split as has been 
done in previous research (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Wanberg et al., 2010). 
Using this categorization, 40 participants were categorized as action-oriented and 40 
were categorized as state-oriented. The mean score for action-orientation was 17.22 
(SD = 1.23) and the mean score for state-orientation was 10.48 (SD = 2.78).  
 
Number and types of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 197 counterfactual thoughts. Participants recorded a mean of 2.46 (SD = .88) 
counterfactual items each. All participants generated at least one counterfactual 
statement, resulting in 80 opening/initial counterfactuals. Descriptive statistics for 
each counterfactual categorization are shown below (Table 12).  
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Table 12 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 5 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=80) Overall (N=197) 
Upward versus Downward  100% vs 0% 96% vs 4% 
Additive versus Subtractive 91% vs 9%  92% vs 8% 
Controllable versus Uncontrollable  39% vs 61%  50% vs 50% 
 
Satisfaction ratings: Participants satisfaction ratings with their performance in the 
puzzle task was low (M = 1.60, SD = .61). 
 
Potential impact of inducing an action-orientation or state-orientation on 
completion of the questionnaire measuring individual differences in action/state 
orientation: We were conscious that inducing an action-orientation or a state-
orientation in participants could impact scores on the action/state orientation 
questionnaire. We attempted to minimise the possibility of this by leaving as much 
time as possible between the induction and the questionnaire and we also checked 
the distribution of naturally action-oriented and state-oriented individuals in each of 
the conditions. We anticipated that if the experimental manipulation of action/state 
orientation had an influence on the individual difference measure, then there would 
be more naturally action-oriented individuals in the action-oriented induced 
condition and more naturally state-oriented individuals in the state-oriented induced 
condition. This was not the case, χ2 (1, n = 80) = .05, p = .82. Participants in both 
experimental conditions were equally action-oriented and state-oriented. In the 
action-oriented induced condition, 48% of participants were naturally state-oriented 
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and 52% were naturally action-oriented. In the state-oriented induced condition, 53% 
of participants were naturally state-oriented and 47% were naturally action-oriented. 
 
Counterfactual activation 
There was no correlation between action/state orientation score and counterfactual 
frequency, r = .09, n = 80, p = .38. There was a marginally significant association 
between action/state orientation score and the overall number of controllable 
counterfactuals generated, r = .19, n = 80, p = .08, with action-orientation associated 
with higher numbers of controllable counterfactuals. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
We compared naturally action-oriented and state-oriented participants for initial 
counterfactual controllability; counterfactual direction and structure were 
predominantly upward and additive as an initial response and so were not included in 
these statistical analyses. For the first counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test 
for independence indicated that there was a significant association between 
action/state orientation and counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 80) = 7.58, p = 
.006, with a medium effect size (phi = -.33). Descriptive statistics are provided in 
Table 13. Action-oriented participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an 
initial response more readily than state-oriented individuals. 
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Table 13 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Naturally Action-oriented and Naturally State-oriented Participants in 
Experiment 5 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Action-orientation  55%   45%  
 
State-orientation  23%   77% 
 
 
    We compared the induced action-oriented and state-oriented 
conditions for initial counterfactual controllability. Although action-oriented induced 
participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an initial response more readily 
than state-oriented induced participants, the association did not reach statistical 
significance, χ2 (1, n = 80) = .84, p = .36. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 
14. 
 
Table 14 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Induced Action-oriented and Induced State-oriented Participants in Experiment 5 
 
 
     Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Induced Action-orientation  45%   55%  
 
Induced State-orientation  32%   68% 
 
  We then compared the initial counterfactual controllability of 
naturally action and state-oriented participants taking into consideration the 
experimental manipulation; data were divided in terms of innate orientation (action-
orientation vs. state-orientation). For innately action-oriented participants, we 
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observed a significant association between induced action/state orientation and 
counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 40) = 2.63, p = .05, with a small effect size 
(phi = .25). Individuals induced into an action-orientation generated controllable 
counterfactuals as an initial response more readily than individuals induced into a 
state-orientation. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 15. 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Naturally Action-oriented Individuals in the Induced Action-orientation 
Condition and the Induced State-orientation Condition in Experiment 5 
 
     Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Induced action-orientation  67%   33%  
 
Induced state-orientation  42%   58% 
 
  No association was observed for innately state-oriented participants, 
χ2 (1, n = 40) = .43, p = .84. Percentages of controllable initial counterfactual 
responses are provided in table 16 below. 
 
 
Table 16 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by Naturally State-oriented Individuals in the Induced Action-orientation Condition 
and the Induced State-orientation Condition in Experiment 5 
 
     Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
Induced action-orientation  21%   79%  
 
Induced state-orientation  24%   76% 
   
 ~ 125 ~ 
 
  We had anticipated that participants with a natural action-orientation 
would uniformly generate relatively high numbers of controllable counterfactual 
thoughts and that naturally state-oriented participants would generate comparable 
numbers of controllable counterfactuals only in the action-orientation inducing 
condition. However, we found that for naturally action-oriented participants, more 
controllable counterfactuals were generated in the action-oriented induced condition 
than in the state-oriented induced condition. For naturally state-oriented participants; 
inducing an action-orientation did not significantly increase initial counterfactual 
controllability. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 5 
Participants read a vignette about a missed opportunity and either ruminated about 
how they might feel (state-orientation) or considered what they could do to improve 
the situation (action-orientation). Participants attempted a series of puzzles (identical 
to Experiment 4). They then generated counterfactuals. Subsequently, participants 
filled out an individual difference measure of action/state orientation. Results 
suggested that individual differences in action/state orientation may be important in 
terms of counterfactual controllability. Action-oriented participants generated 
controllable counterfactuals as an initial response more readily than state-oriented 
individuals. In addition, Experiment 5 demonstrates that the results of experimental 
manipulations of action/state orientation on counterfactual controllability are best 
interpreted when individual difference factors are considered; experimentally 
inducing an action-orientation influenced naturally action-oriented and state-oriented 
participants differently in terms of initial counterfactual controllability. 
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  One concern of Experiment 5 was the potential influence of the 
action/state inducing manipulation on the self-report measure of individual 
differences in action/state orientation. There may be no ideal way of positioning 
individual difference measures in an experiment of this type. However, both the 
experimental manipulation of action/state orientation and the measures of individual 
difference were separated by a considerable length of time during which the puzzles 
were attempted, counterfactual thoughts were generated, and a debriefing was given. 
Thus, the influence of the manipulation was more likely to influence counterfactual 
generation rather than the individual difference measure. Also, participants were 
made aware that the answers they gave in the individual difference measure were to 
reflect ways in which they typically think, and not how they were currently feeling. 
  Overall the findings from this experiment support those of 
Experiment 4, suggesting that individuals differences in action/state orientation may 
be important in terms of counterfactual controllability. In observing the influence of 
action/state orientation on counterfactual thinking, utilizing an individual difference 
perspective may be particularly useful. 
 
4.4 General Discussion 
Building on results from Chapter 3 which indicated that individual differences in 
autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) may be important in terms of counterfactual 
controllability, Chapter 4 examined individual differences in action/state orientation 
(Diefendorff et al., 2000). We anticipated that individuals with an action-orientation 
would demonstrate a tendency to generate controllable counterfactuals. Some 
evidence for this hypothesis was found in both Experiments 4 and 5. In Experiment 
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4, we found a significant association between counterfactual controllability and 
action-orientation in a second counterfactual listing exercise. In Experiment 5, we 
also found a significant association between counterfactual controllability and 
action-orientation. This suggests that action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 
2000) may influence counterfactual focus. 
   Results from Experiments 4 and 5 add to existing research on 
action/state orientation and thoughts about the past. McElroy and Dowd (2007) 
found evidence that regret may be influenced by innate action/state orientation. They 
found that action-oriented individuals experienced more regret for situations that 
recalled inaction than situations involving action. In contrast, state-oriented 
individuals reported consistent levels of regret regardless of whether the event was 
action or inaction related. Given that additive counterfactuals typically focus on 
things a person could have done (action), this might suggest that action-oriented 
individuals would be more likely to generate additive counterfactuals than 
subtractive counterfactuals. The experimental tasks used in Experiments 4 and 5 
resulted in a high percentage of additive counterfactuals. Thus, it was difficult to 
investigate any association between action-orientation and additive counterfactual 
thinking. Future research might investigate this possible association using alternative 
counterfactual elicitation tasks. Experiments 4 and 5 add to research by McElroy and 
Dowd (2007) by demonstrating that the influence of action/state orientation on past-
related cognitions applies to counterfactual thinking as well as regret. 
   In Experiment 4, neither action/state orientation nor volatility was 
associated with counterfactual activation. In Experiment 5, we again found no 
association between action/state orientation and counterfactual activation. Davis 
(1991) found that scores on a dispositional rumination scale were moderately related 
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to counterfactual activation. Given that Kuhl (1994) conceptualizes rumination as a 
mode of thought that reflects a state-orientation we might have anticipated an 
association between state-orientation and the overall number of counterfactuals 
participants generated. It is possible however that significant findings might emerge 
when utilizing an experimental task that is more self-salient, as the research by Davis 
(1991) involved participants considering their most significant life events. 
  Given that we observed an association between innate action-
orientation and initial counterfactual controllability, and that controllable 
counterfactuals are thought to be particularly adaptive (e.g., Morris & Moore, 2000), 
it seems plausible that an action-orientation may facilitate functional action planning. 
Our findings are in line with research by Watkins and Baracaia (2002) who found 
that individuals with an action-orientation were characterized by more functional 
action planning than individuals with a state-orientation. Our findings build on those 
of Watkins and Baracaia (2002) by suggesting that one way action-oriented 
individuals may formulate functional action plans is by focusing on controllable 
antecedents of past events. Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 2 and 
3 that focusing on controllable rather than uncontrollable counterfactuals leads to 
greater performance improvement.  
   In Experiment 4, we included a temporal factor in that participants 
experienced failure on more than one occasion. We found no change in 
counterfactual frequency across experimental trials for action/state orientation or 
volatility. Research by El Leithy et al. (2006) found that action-orientated 
individuals were less likely than state-oriented individuals to generate counterfactual 
mutations long after a negative event had transpired. Thus, any potential association 
between action/state orientation and counterfactual thinking may be mediated by 
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time or perhaps the degree of negative affect experienced. Our findings should not be 
interpreted as a refutation of the findings of El Leithy et al. given that the time 
between counterfactual generation exercises in both studies is not comparable. What 
is of significance is that we found that the association between action-orientation and 
controllable counterfactuals was stronger in the second counterfactual listing 
exercise. This suggests that any potential association between action/state orientation 
and counterfactual thinking may indeed be mediated by time or the degree of 
negative affect experienced. 
   However, another explantion may also serve to identify why 
significant findngs emerged in the second counterfactual listing exercise. Experiment 
5 was different to Experiment 4 in that it only utilized one counterfactual listing 
exercise. While we observed a significant association between counterfactual 
controllability and action-orientation using only one counterfactual listing exercise in 
Experiment 5, a second counterfactual listing exercise was needed in Experiment 4 
to observe this association. This difference might be attributable to the strategy 
formation task utilized in Experiment 4. This task may have subtly influenced 
controllaility given that it involved focusing on the puzzles participants were about 
to engage with. 
 Results from the experiments reported in this chapter also hold 
implications for studies on counterfactual thinking and depression, given that state-
orientation is typically associated with depression (Kuhl, 1981). Our findings 
suggest that state-oriented individuals are less likely than action-oriented individuals 
to generate controllable counterfactuals after failure. This is in line with previous 
research which suggests that depressed individuals tend to focus on uncontrollable 
aspects of events and typically lay blame for negative outcomes on external sources 
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(e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1982). However, Markman and Weary (1998) found that 
depressed individuals generated more controllable counterfactuals than nondepressed 
participants. A possible reason for these divergent findings was offered by Markman 
and Weary (1998) who point to the distinction between causal attributions and 
counterfactual mutations. Although they recognize that counterfactuals play a role in 
determining causal ascriptions (Wells & Gavanski, 1989), they point out that both 
processes are not identical. During causal ascription, depressed individuals may rely 
on negative self-representations to come to the conclusion that an unchangeable 
feature of the self was the cause. Undoing on the other hand, may involve a 
somewhat less self-implicating analysis of problem-solving strategies. Thus, the 
problem-solving nature of the undoing process may give depressed individuals a 
greater chance to increase control perceptions ahead of future challenges than might 
causal attribution processes. This might explain why depressed individuals tend to 
favour controllability during counterfactual undoing and not during instances of 
causal ascription.  
  Like Markman and Weary (1998), Experiments 4 and 5 focused on 
counterfactual undoing rather than causal ascription. However, our findings suggest 
that state-oriented individuals are less likely than action-oriented individuals to 
generate controllable counterfactuals after failure. There may however be no 
contradiction in these findings. The sample used in the present research was not 
screened for depression as was the case in the Markman and Weary studies. This 
may well be an important distinction. While individuals with depression are thought 
to typically demonstrate state-orientation, having a consistent regulatory orientation 
towards state-orientation does not necessarily go hand in hand with depression. 
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  Markman and Weary (1998) suggest that counterfactual thinking 
offers a less self-implicating way of focusing on controllable antecedents than causal 
attribution. Our research suggests that individual difference factors may be important 
in determining perceptions of self-implication during counterfactual thinking. In 
other words, counterfactual thinking may indeed provide a way of determining 
causality with reduced self-implication, but individual difference factors mitigate this 
effect. The importance of considering individual difference factors was demonstrated 
in Experiment 5. Inducing action-orientation increased initial controllable 
counterfactuals only for naturally action-oriented participant. While we did not 
directly measure participants’ perceptions of self-implication, we suggest that the 
divergent motivational goals typically held by action-oriented and state-oriented 
individuals indicate that self-implication may be important in terms of counterfactual 
controllability. Action-oriented individuals have been identified as being highly 
capable of perceiving failure as unthreatening to self-representations (Kuhl,1992). 
Thus, when self-implication is low, more controllable counterfactuals may be 
utilized. 
  Alternatively, action-oriented and state-oriented individuals may 
differ in terms of controllable counterfactual thinking due to divergent control needs. 
Markman and Weary (1998) suggest the operation of a compensatory mechanism 
whereby depressed individuals attempt to compensate for their general perception of 
control loss by increasing their control perceptions about specific instances via 
counterfactual thinking. It may be that because action-orientation is a volitional style 
characterized by self-determined, autonomous goal-striving, particularly under 
stressful circumstances (Kuhl, 1994), these individuals may have a reduced need to 
control outcomes. Thus, somewhat counter intuitively, these individuals may 
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demonstrate a propensity towards counterfactual controllability precisely because 
they have little need to seek or maintain control. While the need for control in 
depressed individuals may lead to controllable counterfactuals designed to 
strengthen control perceptions, an underlying absence of chronic control needs may 
facilitate the use controllable counterfactuals in individuals who score high in action-
orientation. 
Conclusion: The two experiments in this chapter provide an initial investigation into 
the role of individual differences in action/state orientation in counterfactual 
thinking. The findings from both experiments indicated that action-oriented 
individuals have a tendency to generate more controllable initial counterfactual 
thoughts after experiencing a less than ideal outcome compared to state-oriented 
individuals. The degree of failure encountered may be important in observing this 
association. We also found evidence that action-oriented and state-oriented 
individuals reacted differently to experimental manipulations to temporarily induce 
an action or state-orientation. 
  Experiments 4 and 5 add some additional support to the argument that 
self-regulatory individual differences influence the functionality of counterfactual 
thoughts. Further research is required to determine precisely why action-oriented 
individuals may utilize controllable counterfactuals more readily than state-oriented 
individuals after failure. If self-implication is a major factor, this invites the study of 
another self-regulatory individual difference: cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). This individual difference factor distinguishes 
individuals in terms of how they cope with self-threats and is the main focus of 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five 
Self-affirmation 
5.1 General introduction 
Like autonomy and action/state orientation, cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
describes an individual difference in self-motives. It distinguishes individuals in 
terms of how they cope with self-threats. Self-affirmation theory (Sherman, Nelson, 
& Steele, 2000; Steele, 1988; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002) proposes that 
people are motivated to reduce the psychological discomfort of self-threats and may 
do so by utilizing self-restoring methods that affirm some important aspect of the 
self that is unrelated to the threatened domain. The tendency to engage in this type of 
internal self-restoring image generation is thought to manifest differently from 
person to person. Chapter 5 examines individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) and counterfactual thinking. If 
reducing self-implication facilitates the use of controllable counterfactuals, we would 
anticipate that individuals who typically self-affirm might demonstrate an inclination 
towards controllable counterfactuals. 
   Epstude and Roese (2011) have suggested that self-affirmation may 
be particularly important in terms of counterfactual thinking. They suggest that 
because self-affirmation may help to terminate rumination after failure, 
counterfactual thoughts may also change or decrease as a result of self-affirmation. 
They state that the mechanisms for the effect of self-affirmation on counterfactual 
thinking might include changes in positive affect or changes in goal-related 
cognitions. Further, Epstude and Roese suggest that the extent to which a goal is 
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self-defining and how strongly individuals are committed to a goal may moderate the 
effect of self-affirmation on counterfactual thinking. We address some of these 
questions in the present chapter. 
 
5.1.1 Cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
In modern society, people experience innumerable challenges and self-threats. On a 
daily basis, people may encounter difficulties such as negative feedback in the work 
environment, frustrated goals, illness, challenges to deeply held beliefs, romantic 
rejection, social slights, and so on. According to Sherman and Cohen (2006) in 
adapting to the inevitable challenges of everyday life, it is important for people to 
sustain a healthy self-image. 
   According to self-affirmation theory (Sherman et al. 2000; Steele, 
1988; Steele et al., 2002), people are motivated to maintain a positive global self-
image. When the self is threatened, an individual will typically experience an 
accompanying degree of psychological discomfort. Self-affirming may help to 
reduce this sense of self-threat. For example, after failing a mathematics exam, a 
student may tell themselves they are “really more of an artistic person”. Thus, by 
reminding themselves that they do something else well, they provide themselves 
with a positive self-image. Self-affirmation theory addresses global self-perception. 
According to the theory, people do not need to feel competent or positive in every 
life domain. Rather, all that is generally required is for a person to foster an overall 
sense of proficiency or worthiness (Steele, 1988).  
   What it means to feel worthy or appropriate can vary across culture 
(Heine, 2005). Aspects such as being intelligent, logical, independent, capable of 
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relating to others, and being sociable may all be important. Self-threats may take 
many forms, but according to Leary and Baumeister (2000) they will always involve 
real or perceived failures to meet socially significant standards. Thus, people are 
typically very vigilant to events and signals that question their self-worth, in both 
their own eyes and in other peoples. In response to self-threats, people may become 
defensive. Sherman and Cohen (2002) identify a number of defensive biases to self-
threat which include dismissing, denying, or avoiding the threat. Although these 
defensive biases may preserve self-worth, the rejection of the perceived threatening 
information can make it less likely that the person will learn from what may 
potentially be useful and adaptive information.  
   A number of studies have demonstrated that self-affirmation reduces 
the incidence of defensive reactions (e.g., Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Correll, 
Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). In one study by Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, and 
Dijksterhuis (1999) participants prioritized various life domains such as religion, 
economics, and social life, in terms of importance. They then engaged with an 
apparent ability test and were given false feedback regarding their performance. 
Some participants completed a self-affirmation exercise in which they answered a 
questionnaire assessing the extent to which their highest rated life domain was 
important to them. Analysis revealed that self-affirming led to less negative and less 
defensive reactions to the negative feedback regarding performance in the ability 
test. 
   Sherman et al. (2000) examined defensive biases to potentially 
threatening health information in relation to breast-cancer prevention. All 
participants were females who were coffee drinkers or non-coffee drinkers. A self-
affirmation manipulation was utilized; half of the participants completed a scale that 
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enabled them to assert the personal importance of a central value (e.g., their religious 
or political values), while half completed a filler task. Participants reviewed a 
fabricated scientific article which suggested that coffee consumption may be linked 
to breast cancer. A recommendation of the article was to reduce coffee consumption 
in order to lower the risk of breast cancer. In the no-affirmation control condition, 
coffee drinkers were more critical of the article and more resistant to the 
recommendation than were non-coffee drinkers. However, in the affirmation 
condition, coffee drinkers were more open to the message of the article than any 
other group. According to the researchers, because the motivation to self-protect was 
satisfied with the self-affirmation activity, people who would otherwise have felt 
threatened by the health message became more willing to consider adaptive 
behaviour change. 
   Other research has also demonstrated that self-affirmation may 
facilitate de-biasing (e.g., Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, & Carvallo, 2001; Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998). Research has also demonstrated that this de-biasing effect of self-
affirmation has implications for actual behaviour and not only behavioural 
intentions. In a study by Sherman et al. (2000), sexually active undergraduate 
students watched an AIDS educational video which highlighted the risks associated 
with unprotected sex. Half of the participants engaged in self-affirmation prior to 
watching the video while the others did not. Non-affirmed participants maintained 
their perceived risk from pre-test levels. Affirmed participants however, increased 
their perceived risk from pre-test levels. Not only did the affirmation manipulation 
influence perceptions of risk, but participants’ behaviour was influenced. While 25% 
of non-affirmed participants purchased condoms after viewing the video, 50% of 
affirmed participants did so. Affirmed participants were also more likely to take an 
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AIDS educational brochure (78% did so) than were non-affirmed participants (54% 
did so). Taken together, these lines of research suggest that self-affirming may 
enable people to deal with threatening events, situations or information without 
resorting to defensive biases. Self-affirmation may permit people to react to 
potentially negative information in a more open-minded way.  
  Research has also demonstrated the adaptiveness of self-affirmation 
in applied settings. Self-affirmation has been shown to enhance performance. In a 
study by Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master (2006), participants, all of whom were 
African American students, were asked to write about either an important or 
unimportant value they held. This affirmation manipulation was conducted at the 
beginning of the school term. The academic performance of all participants was 
assessed at the end of term. Results indicated that participants who described an 
important value they held (e.g., honesty, self-discipline etc.), representing the self-
affirmation condition, went on to achieve higher grades than those who did not self-
affirm. According to the researchers, the stereotype that African American students 
perform poorly in academic pursuits causes feelings of anxiety in these learners. 
Particularly after these students perform poorly in an initial assessment, heightened 
anxiety was thought to be particularly dysfunctional. According to Cohen et al. 
(2006) the benefit of self-affirming then is to reduce levels of anxiety experienced 
after failure. This in turn may facilitate performance improvement. Relatively recent 
work by Dutcher (2010) also provided evidence suggesting that self-affirmation may 
facilitate performance improvement. Participants either engaged in a self-affirmation 
writing task or a filler task before attempting an intelligence test. Results indicated 
that self-affirming improved performance on the intelligence test. 
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   Other than experimentally manipulating self-restoring information, 
people may also spontaneously self-generate positive self-images that may be used 
when the self is threatened. The tendency to engage in this type of internal self-
restoring image generation is thought to manifest differently from person to person. 
Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012) developed a scale measuring cognitive self-
affirmation inclination. They define this as an individual difference in the way of 
coping with self-threats. Cognitive self-affirmation inclination varies between 
individuals and is thought to be relatively stable over time. People categorized as 
high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination are thought to habitually use positive 
self-images as a largely automatic response to restore and maintain a positive self-
image. Within the personality trait hierarchy, cognitive self-affirmation inclination is 
considered to be a lower level trait (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010). 
   The scale developed by Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012) measures 
people’s tendency to utilize or think of positive self-images. In capturing the 
maintenance of a person’s self-integrity (Tesser & Cornell, 1991), the scale includes 
items such as, ‘I realize that besides all the “stupid” things I do, I also do some 
things very well.’ More general items are also included in the scale, referring to a 
person’s capacity to think of positive self-images perhaps even in the absence of 
threatening information. An example of such an item would be, ‘I notice that I do 
some things very well.’ Despite the inclusion of more general items, Pietersma and 
Dijkstra emphasize that responses to the scale items capture thought processes that 
are typically triggered when people encounter self-threats. 
   While the scale has only recently been developed, findings from 
Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012) indicate that the scale is both stable and reliable. In an 
initial experiment which examined smoking behaviour, the researchers anticipated 
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that because self-affirmed people tend to be more open minded regarding threatening 
information (Sherman & Cohen, 2002) individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination should also demonstrate less defensiveness and more open mindedness 
regarding threatening information. In terms of their own smoking behaviour, 
individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination reported more negative 
emotions than individuals low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination, suggesting 
less defensiveness. The test-retest reliability of cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
was also investigated in an experiment which involved measuring participants for the 
variable on two occasions, typically separated by about one to two weeks. The test-
retest analysis indicated that there was a strong correlation between the first and 
second measurement. Another important experiment in the research by Pietersma 
and Dijkstra (2012) found that for participants low in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination, an external self-affirmation manipulation resulted in similar levels of 
open mindedness to those observed in participants high in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination. For participants high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination, they found 
no effects from the self-affirmation inclination in terms of open mindedness. 
Pietersma and Dijkstra suggest that this was due to the high level of spontaneous 
self-affirmation these individuals engage in. 
  Cognitive self-affirmation inclination and self-esteem are 
conceptually similar constructs. According to Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012) both 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination and self-esteem originate from the same 
source; both stem from memories containing information about actual self-
representations. However, given that previous counterfactual thinking research has 
focused on self-esteem (Roese 1993a, Sanna et al. 1998)  it is important to point out 
the distinction between cognitive self-affirmation inclination and self-esteem. While 
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they may share the same source, the way in which they manifest during cognition is 
different. Self-esteem can be thought of as a general self-evaluation based on the 
cumulative value of all self-images that are stored in people’s memory (Carver & 
Connor-Smith, 2010). Thus, self-esteem may be thought of as a general conclusion 
about the self. Cognitive self-affirmation inclination is somewhat different in that it 
refers to the actual use of these specific self-images. Unlike self-esteem which may 
be important to cognition in a wide range of situations, cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination is thought to be particularly important when the use of positive self-
images is required such as when self-integrity is threatened (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 
2012). 
 
5.1.2 Cognitive self-affirmation inclination and counterfactual 
thinking 
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no empirical research examining the 
influence of cognitive self-affirmation inclination on counterfactual thinking. One 
possibility is that individuals who score high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
may facilitate more functional types of counterfactual thought due to a reduction in 
perceived self-threat after negative outcomes. These individuals may feel less 
threatened by a negative outcome and thus be less likely to utilize the defensive 
strategies such as blame, dismissal, or denial outlined by Sherman and Cohen 
(2002). Cognitive self-affirmation inclination may make people cognizant of the fact 
that their sense of self-worth is not exclusively determined by the evaluative 
implications of an immediate task/problem. As a result, people may become more 
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open-minded and willing to engage in adaptive behavioural plans (Sherman et al. 
2000). 
  On first inspection, the idea that cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
may be related to functional types of counterfactual thought, may seem contradictory 
to existing research. Self-esteem – an individuals’ perception of their own self-worth 
(Sanna, 2000) – is a conceptually similar construct to cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination, and has not previously been associated with adaptive or functional types 
of counterfactual thought. On the contrary, Roese and Olson (1993) examined the 
relationship between self-esteem and counterfactual thinking and found that 
individuals with low self-esteem were more likely to undo their own actions 
following a failure, while those with higher self-esteem were more likely to report 
undoing their own actions after a success. Thus, it may be argued that high self-
esteem, rather than being adaptive in terms of counterfactual thought, may facilitate 
a defensive bias. However, Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) proposes a self-
restoring activity that actually reduces or eliminates the need for such defensive 
reactions. Thus, the idea that individual differences in cognitive self-affirmation may 
facilitate the use of more functional types of counterfactual thinking seems plausible. 
  Although no research has directly examined cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and counterfactual thinking, indirect evidence suggests there may be an 
association. It is important to emphasize that this line of research examined 
experimental manipulations of self-affirmation and not cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination. Tesser (2000) demonstrated that both self-affirmation and downward 
social comparison – the cognitive process of comparing ones own standing in life 
against another who is less fortunate – serve similar affect-repairing functions and 
that engaging in one strategy reduced the use of another. The parallels between 
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downward counterfactual thinking and downward social comparison have previously 
been highlighted by researchers (see Markman et al., 1993) and it seems likely that 
both may serve self-enhancement motives. Given that self-affirmation may serve 
self-enhancement strategies, when people self-affirm after a negative event there 
may be less need for mood repairing counterfactuals (e.g., Sanna, Turley-Ames, & 
Meier, 1999) and thus potentially the possibility that more functional types may be 
generated. 
    We hypothesize that cognitive self-affirmation inclination may 
facilitate more functional types of counterfactual thinking. Given that past research 
(Cohen et al., 2006; Dutcher, 2010) found a performance improving influence for 
self-affirmation, it is plausible that cognitive self-affirmation inclination may 
facilitate the use of controllable or upward counterfactual thinking. Of course, this 
may not be the case. Any potential controllable or upward counterfactuals 
attributable to cognitive self-affirmation inclination may not facilitate performance 
improvement. After all, self-affirming sends resources away from the threatened 
domain, and thus, may not ultimately be facilitative. 
   If the capacity to generate potentially adaptive counterfactual 
thoughts after a negative event is dependent on the degree to which counterfactuals 
are perceived as self-defining, we would anticipate that individuals who score high 
for cognitive self-affirmation inclination might demonstrate an inclination towards 
more functional types of counterfactual thinking. Experiment 6 aims to investigate 
whether there is any association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination and 
counterfactual controllability. Experiment 6 also utilizes a self-affirmation 
manipulation to directly investigate whether the influence of self-affirming on 
counterfactual thinking facilitates performance improvement.   
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5.2 Experiment 6: Does cognitive self-affirmation inclination influence 
counterfactual functionality? 
Because so little is currently known about the potential influence of cognitive self-
affirmation inclination on counterfactual thinking, Experiment 6 investigates any 
potential association. This experiment had three main aims. The first aim was to 
establish if cognitive self-affirmation inclination would influence the number and 
types of counterfactual thoughts generated. The second aim was to investigate if 
encouraging participants to self-affirm would influence the number and types of 
counterfactual thoughts generated. The final aim was to investigate any performance 
improvement effects as a result of self-affirmation and counterfactual thinking.  
  All participants performed an anagram task similar to that used in 
previous experiments. They were then randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions in which they were prompted to think in a counterfactual or 
self-affirming manner, or to engage with both or neither types of thought. Finally, 
they performed a second anagram task and completed the cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination scale. 
  Given that individuals may stop ruminating about a goal via self-
affirmation (Steele, 1988), it may be the case that participants who score high in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination may generate fewer counterfactual thoughts 
than those who score low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination. We predicted that 
those high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination would more readily generate 
functional counterfactuals than those low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination. 
Similarly we predicted that those encouraged to self-affirm would also more readily 
generate functional counterfactuals than those who were not. We expected that 
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performance improvement would be influenced by both cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and by encouraging self-affirmation.      
 
5.2.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 160 undergraduate students (134 women and 26 
men) with an average age of 22.29 years (SD = 9.69). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a self-affirmation/counterfactual thinking condition (n = 40), a self-
affirmation/no counterfactual thinking condition (n = 40), a no-
affirmation/counterfactual thinking condition (n = 40), or a no-affirmation/no 
counterfactual thinking condition (n = 40). 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: experimental group (4 levels) and cognitive self-
affirmation inclination (high versus low). 
 
Materials: The anagram tasks used in Experiments 2 and 3 were utilized as the 
experimental task (see Appendix F). Participants were told they would be attempting 
anagrams. They were not explicitly told how many trials there would be. To start the 
experiment, participants attempted the initial set of anagrams. Following completion 
of the anagrams, correct answers were provided to participants. Participants listened 
as the answers were read aloud before totalling their own correct answers to 
calculate a task score. As in earlier experiments, participants were provided with 
false information about the normative performance of all participants who had 
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previously completed the anagram task. This feedback also meant that participants 
might potentially feel dissatisfied with their score. A manipulation check was 
included in the form of a Likert-scale type rating; participants were asked to rate the 
degree of satisfaction they had regarding their performance in the first set of 
anagrams on a scale ranging from 1-7 (see Appendix G). 
   Next, participants engaged with two types of thinking task. The 
thinking tasks each participant engaged with were determined by the experimental 
group in which they were allocated. Participants in the self-
affirmation/counterfactual thinking group engaged in a self-affirming exercise before 
generating counterfactuals about their performance in the first set of anagrams. To 
self-affirm, these participants were shown a list of 11 characteristics/values (e.g., 
social skills, creativity, relationships), were asked to rank them in order of personal 
importance, and write about a time in their lives when their top ranked value had 
proved meaningful (see Appendix N). The counterfactual generation task came 
directly after the self-affirmation task. Participants were asked to consider ways in 
which their performance in the anagram task could have turned out differently. 
Participants could list as many counterfactuals as they wished. 
  Participants in the self-affirmation/no counterfactual thinking group 
engaged in an identical self-affirming exercise to that described above (see Appendix 
N) before completing a filler task (grammatical correction task) (see Appendix H). 
Participants in the no-affirmation/counterfactual thinking group initially completed 
the filler task before engaging with the counterfactual generation task. Participants in 
the no-affirmation/no counterfactual thinking group completed two consecutive filler 
tasks, one identical to the grammatical correction task mentioned above (see 
Appendix H) and another similar grammatical correction task (see Appendix O). 
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   Subsequently, participants attempted the second set of anagrams. 
Following completion of the second set of anagrams, participants were again 
informed of the correct answers so that they could calculate a score for the trial. No 
false information about normative scores was provided after the second trial.  
  Finally, participants completed self-report measures of cognitive self-
affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) (see Appendix P). The measure 
used is a six item Likert scale (with 1 indicating never and 5 indicating very often). 
Examples of statements included in the scale are: ‘When I feel bad about myself, I 
think about all the things that I can be proud of’; ‘When I have done something 
wrong that makes me feel dissatisfied with myself, I tell myself that I do not do 
everything wrong’. According to Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012), the measure has 
good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of .83. In the 
current experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .71. 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the experiment was interested in 
how people think while problem solving. All participants were assured 
confidentiality and told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An 
information sheet (see Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data 
collection. Individuals who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a 
consent form (see Appendix E). Participants were given booklets containing all 
experimental materials and were asked not to open or flick through it until instructed. 
A full debriefing was given to all participants post testing. 
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Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as described in previous experiments. Inter-rater agreement 
between the two trained coders was high (96.3%). Agreement ranged from 92% for 
coding controllable versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 99% for coding whether 
the thought was a counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
 
5.2.2 Results 
Omitted data: In general, participants had little difficulty understanding instructions. 
Data from 4 participants were discarded due to failure to follow instructions 
adequately. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores for cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) could range between 5 and 30. In this sample the mean 
score was 17.58 (SD = 3.22), ranging from 7 to 25. Participants were categorized as 
high or low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination using a median split. Using this 
categorization, 80 participants were categorized as low and 80 were categorized as 
high. The mean score for individuals low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
was 14.48 (SD = 1.75) and the mean score for individuals high in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination was 20.27 (SD = 1.79). 
 
Number and types of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 190 counterfactual thoughts. Participants recorded a mean of 2.38 (SD = 
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1.26) counterfactual items each, ranging from 1 to 5 items. All participants who 
generated counterfactuals listed at least one counterfactual statement, resulting in 80 
opening/initial counterfactuals. As anticipated, due to the design of the experimental 
task, the majority of counterfactuals generated were upward in nature. Descriptive 
statistics for each counterfactual categorization are shown below (Table 17). 
Participants generated slightly more controllable than uncontrollable counterfactuals 
for initial responses, but slightly more uncontrollable than controllable 
counterfactuals overall. 
 
Table 17 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 6 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=80) Overall (N=190) 
Upward/Downward 100% vs 0% 97% vs 3% 
Additive/Subtractive 94% vs 6% 93% vs 7% 
Controllable/Uncontrollable 53% vs 47% 45% vs 55% 
 
 
Satisfaction ratings: Participants satisfaction ratings with their performance in the 
first anagram task were low (M = 1.85, SD = 1.18). 
 
Counterfactual activation 
There was no correlation between cognitive self-affirmation inclination score and 
counterfactual frequency, r = .07, n = 80, p = .51. There was also no significant 
correlation between cognitive self-affirmation inclination score and the overall 
number of controllable counterfactuals generated, r = .04, n = 80, p = .74. 
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Focus of initial counterfactuals 
A primary aim of this experiment was to examine if cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination would influence the types of counterfactual thoughts generated. In order 
to investigate any association between the two variables only the group that 
generated counterfactual thoughts (without also being encouraged to self-affirm) 
were included in this analysis. We compared participants that were high and low in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination for initial counterfactual controllability; 
direction and structure were predominantly upward and additive as an initial 
response.  
  For the first counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test for 
independence indicated that there was an association between cognitive self-
affirmation inclination and counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 40) = 2.78, p = 
.04 (one-tailed), with a small effect size (phi = -.32). As Table 18 below shows, 
individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination, compared to those low in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination, more readily generated an initial 
counterfactual thought that was controllable (52% versus 20%). Next we investigate 
if encouraging self-affirmation affects the rate of controllable initial counterfactual 
thoughts generated. 
Table 18 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Cognitive Self-affirmation Inclination Participants in the no-
affirmation Condition in Experiment 6 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    52%   48%  
 
Low    20%   80% 
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  We compared the initial counterfactual controllability of individuals 
high and low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination that generated counterfactuals 
after completing the self-affirmation exercise. Unlike the findings reported above, in 
this condition no association was observed between cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and initial counterfactual controllability, χ2 (1, n = 40) = .28, p = .59. As 
Table 19 below shows, participants tended to generate controllable rather than 
uncontrollable initial counterfactual thoughts regardless of whether they were high or 
low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination.  
 
Table 19 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Cognitive Self-affirmation Inclination Participants in the Self-
affirming Condition in Experiment 6 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    72%   28%  
 
Low    59%   41% 
   
  This finding suggests that the effect of the experimental manipulation 
of self-affirmation may be stronger than the effect of cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination. However, comparing the figures in Tables 17 and 18 it seems that being 
encouraged to self-affirm produced a greater increase in the number of controllable 
initial counterfactuals for individuals low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(from 20% to 59%) than in individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(from 52% to 72%). 
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Performance improvement 
To investigate the role of cognitive self-affirmation inclination, the self-affirmation 
manipulation, and counterfactual thinking on performance improvement, all four 
experimental groups were included in this analysis. Overall, anagram solution scores 
increased significantly from Trial 1 (M = 8.20, SD = 6.98) to Trial 2 (M = 11.24, SD 
= 7.68), t (160) = 5.89, p < .001. The mean increase in anagram solution scores was 
3.08 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 2.02 to 4.05. The eta squared 
statistic (.20) indicated a large effect size.  
   We computed a unitary dependent variable of score improvement 
(score in Trial 2 – score in Trial 1). We conducted a three-way ANOVA to examine 
the main effects and interactions of counterfactual thinking (completed or not), self-
affirmation (completed or not) and cognitive self-affirmation inclination (high versus 
low) as they relate to performance improvement. The three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(3, 152) = .53, p = .46. There was a main effect for counterfactual 
thinking, F(3, 152) = 7.57, p = .01. The effect size was small (eta squared = .05). 
Performance improvement was higher for participants who generated counterfactuals 
(M = 4.58, SD = 6.23) than for participants who generated no counterfactuals (M = 
1.50, SD = 6.48), as Table 20 below shows.  
  There was no main effect of cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(high versus low) on performance improvement score, F(3, 152) = .95, p = .33, and it 
did not interact with either counterfactual thinking (completed or not), F(3, 152) = 
.70, p = .40, or self-affirmation (completed or not), F(3, 152) = .38, p = .55. 
Similarly, there was no main effect of encouraging self-affirmation (completed or 
 ~ 152 ~ 
 
not), F(3, 152) = .20, p = .66, and it did not interact with counterfactual thinking 
(completed or not), F(3, 152) = .53, p = .46.  
  
Table 20 
Mean Performance Improvement Score for Each of the Experimental Conditions in 
Experiment 6 
 
 Counterfactual 
only 
Counterfactual 
& Self-
affirmation 
Self-
affirmation 
only 
Control Mean 
High CSAI 5.48 5.17 1.57 1.61 3.61 
 
Low CSAI 2.20 4.68 1.31 1.59 2.46 
 
Mean 4.25 4.90 1.40 1.60  
Note. CSAI = Cognitive self-affirmation inclination. 
 
 
5.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 6 
The findings of Experiment 6 suggest that cognitive self-affirmation inclination is 
not associated with the number of counterfactual thoughts generated overall, nor 
with the number of controllable counterfactuals generated. However, the results 
indicate that there is an association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
and counterfactual focus. Individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
more readily generated a controllable initial counterfactual than individuals low in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination. However, when individuals were encouraged 
to self-affirm there was no difference between individuals high and low in cognitive 
self-affirmation inclination in the tendency to generate a controllable initial 
counterfactual. This finding suggests that the association between individual 
differences in cognitive self-affirmation inclination and counterfactual controllability 
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may be important but that natural inclinations to self-affirm can be overridden with 
specific instructions to self-affirm. 
   We found that counterfactual thinking facilitated performance 
improvement from Trial 1 to Trial 2. This result also argues in favour of the 
functionality of counterfactual thoughts (e.g., Markman & McMullen, 2003; Roese, 
1994). We found no main effect for self-affirmation manipulations or cognitive self-
affirmation inclination on performance improvement. This finding seemingly 
contradicts those of Dutcher (2010) who observed that self-affirmation facilitated 
performance. However, mean improvement scores across the experimental 
conditions indicated that a combination of experimental self-affirmation and 
counterfactual thinking proved particularly adaptive in terms of performance 
improvement for those that do not have a natural inclination to self-affirm. This 
suggests that while self-affirmation does not directly influence performance 
improvement, it increases the likelihood that counterfactual thinking may be 
adaptive. 
  Overall this experiment demonstrated that cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination may be important in terms of counterfactual controllability and that 
counterfactuals that stem from self-affirming may be particularly adaptive. In the 
next experiment we investigate the potential effect of cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and experimental manipulations of self-affirmation on counterfactual 
thinking about a real world meaningful event in participants’ lives. 
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5.3 Experiment 7: Does cognitive self-affirmation inclination influence 
counterfactual thinking about a personally salient life event? 
The previous experiment established that both cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
and encouraging self-affirming thoughts play a role in the generation of functional 
counterfactual thoughts. However, Experiment 6 and the other experiments in this 
thesis have all focused on counterfactual thinking after a negative outcome in a 
cognitive task. The aim of Experiment 7 was to examine counterfactual thinking 
about a real life event and to investigate the role played in counterfactual thinking by 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination and experimental manipulations of self-
affirmation.  
  Previous research indicates that stressful life events are threatening to 
ones sense of self (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, recalling 
stressful life events from ones past has also been found to influence perceptions of 
self-threat (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). In the experiment reported below, 
participants were asked to think about a real life event that they were unhappy with 
and write down the details of it. Half of the participants self-affirmed about 
something that was important to them, while the other half did not engage in self-
affirmation. All participants then generated counterfactual thoughts and completed 
the cognitive self-affirmation inclination scale.  
  We expected that people who score high for cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination may be less likely to exhibit self-enhancement biases. Instead of 
generating affect-driven counterfactuals (e.g., uncontrollable) in response to the 
negative event recall, those who score high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
may demonstrate more adaptive, functional types of counterfactual thought (e.g., 
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controllable). We anticipated that this effect might be moderated by the experimental 
self-affirmation manipulation.        
 
5.3.1 Method 
Participants: Participants were 80 undergraduate students (67 women and 13 men) 
with an average age of 20.39 years (SD = 2.16). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a self-affirmation (n = 40) or a no-affirmation (n = 40) condition. 
 
Design: The experimental design was essentially a between participants design with 
two independent variables: experimental task (self-affirmation versus no-
affirmation) and cognitive self-affirmation inclination (high versus low). 
 
Materials: Participants were asked to recall something personally important from 
their past (e.g., an important goal) that they had attempted unsuccessfully, resulting 
in feelings of disappointment or dissatisfaction. They were asked to write a brief 
paragraph about the experience, and rate the degree to which the domain of the 
experience (e.g., relationships, college) defined who they were as a person on a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating ‘not at all’ and 5 indicating ‘very 
much’. Participants also rated their current level of commitment to being successful 
in that domain on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating ‘not at all’ and 
5 indicating ‘very much’ (see Appendix Q).  
  Participants were randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation or a 
no-affirmation condition. As in Experiment 6, participants were shown a list of 11 
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characteristics/values (e.g., social skills, creativity, relationships) and asked to rank 
them in order of personal importance (see Appendix N). Subsequently, participants 
were asked to write about one of the values they had ranked. In the self-affirmation 
condition, participants wrote about why their first-ranked value or characteristic was 
important to them and described a time in their lives when it had proved meaningful. 
In the no-affirmation condition, participants wrote about why their seventh most 
important value or characteristic might be important to the typical college student. 
Participants were instructed to write as much or as little as they liked. This task 
constituted the experimental manipulation of self-affirmation. In Experiment 6 we 
felt it was important that the difference between the self-affirmation condition and 
the no-affirmation condition was more pronounced due to the use of numerous 
cognitive tasks. The methodology used in Experiment 6 assured that participants in 
the no-affirmation group did not even rank values in term of importance, making the 
distinction between the self-affirmation and no-affirmation groups more robust. The 
reason for using the self-affirmation manipulation chosen for Experiment 7 was that 
similar experimental manipulations of self-affirmation have been used in past 
research (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997; Steele, 1988). Thus, using this manipulation 
meant that any potential finding could be discussed and compared more readily in 
relation to existing research. 
  Participants were then asked to think back to the negative events from 
their past that they wrote about earlier. Participants were instructed to generate 
counterfactuals regarding how the negative event could have been different. 
Participants were asked to list as many thoughts as they wished. 
  Finally, participants filled out a measure of cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) as described in Experiment 6 (see Appendix 
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P). According to Pietersma and Dijkstra (2012), the measure has good internal 
consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of .83. In the current 
experiment, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .73. 
 
Procedure: Participants were approached to take part in the experiment immediately 
following college lectures. They were informed that the experiment was interested in 
how people think while problem solving. All participants were assured 
confidentiality and told that their responses would be completely anonymous. An 
information sheet (see Appendix D) was administered before proceeding with data 
collection. Individuals who were interested in taking part in the experiment signed a 
consent form (see Appendix E) and were given a booklet containing the 
experimental materials. A full debriefing was given to all participants post testing. 
 
Coding of counterfactual statements: Counterfactuals were coded using the process 
and categorizations as described in previous experiments. Inter-rater agreement 
between the two trained coders was high (97.8%). Agreement ranged from 91% for 
coding controllable versus uncontrollable counterfactuals, to 98% for coding whether 
the thought was a counterfactual. Disagreements were resolved by the experimenter. 
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5.3.2 Results 
Omitted data: In general, participants had little difficulty understanding instructions. 
Data from 2 participants were discarded due to failure to follow instructions 
adequately. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Individual difference measure: Scores for cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
(Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2010) could range between 5 and 30. In this sample the mean 
score was 18.09 (SD = 1.26), ranging from 9 to 30. Participants were categorized as 
high or low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination using a median split. Using this 
categorization, 40 participants were categorized as low and 40 were categorized as 
high. The mean score for low cognitive self-affirmation inclination was 15.15 (SD = 
2.31) and the mean score for high cognitive self-affirmation inclination was 21.03 
(SD = 2.51). 
 
Number and types of counterfactuals generated: Overall, participants generated 
exactly 164 counterfactual thoughts. Participants recorded a mean of 2.05 (SD = 
1.26) counterfactual items each, ranging from 1 to 5 items. All participants generated 
at least one counterfactual statement, resulting in 80 opening/initial counterfactuals. 
As anticipated, due to the design of the experimental task, the majority of 
counterfactuals generated were upward in nature. However, unlike in previous 
experiments where the generation of downward counterfactuals was uniformly very 
low, a relatively higher number of downward counterfactuals were generated. 
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Descriptive statistics for each counterfactual categorization are shown below (Table 
21). Participants generated slightly more controllable than uncontrollable 
counterfactuals for both initial responses and overall. 
 
 
Table 21 
Percentages of Initial and Overall Counterfactuals Coded for Direction, Structure, 
and Controllability in Experiment 7 
 
Type of counterfactual Initial (N=80) Overall (N=164) 
Upward/Downward 84% vs 16% 79% vs 21% 
Additive/Subtractive 93% vs 7% 86% vs 14% 
Controllable/Uncontrollable 59% vs 41% 58% vs 42% 
 
 
Negative event description: All participants wrote about an incident from their past 
that resulted in feelings of disappointment or dissatisfaction. Given that the sample 
used in the experiment constituted undergraduate college students, many of the 
incidents referred to academic pursuits (53.8%). Other areas referred to were: sports 
(13.8%), relationships (12.5%), personal finances (11.3%), and miscellaneous 
(8.8%).  
   Participants rated the extent to which the area involving the 
disappointment defined who they are as a person on a Likert scale ranging from 1-5 
(end-points 1 indicating not at all and 5 indicating very much). Participants recorded 
a mean score of 3.77 (SD = 1.20) for this variable. Participants also rated the extent 
to which they were currently committed to achieving success in this area on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1-5, as above. Participants recorded a mean score of 4.30 (SD = 
1.01) for this variable. This indicates that participants followed instruction well and 
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reported on negative events that were personally important and that they were still 
committed to achieving success in. 
 
Counterfactual activation 
There was no significant correlation between cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
score and counterfactual frequency, r = .13, n = 80, p = .42. There was also no 
significant correlation between cognitive self-affirmation inclination score and the 
overall number of controllable counterfactuals generated, r = .05, n = 80, p = .64. 
 
Focus of initial counterfactuals 
In order to investigate the association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
and controllable initial counterfactual thinking we first analysed the data from the 
group that generated counterfactual thoughts without self-affirming. For the first 
counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test for independence indicated that there 
was an association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination and counterfactual 
controllability, χ2 (1, n = 40) = 4.94, p = .03, with a medium effect size (phi = -.40). 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 22. Participants who were high in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination had a tendency to more readily generate a 
controllable initial counterfactual than participants low in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination (72% versus 32%). 
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Table 22 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Cognitive Self-affirmation Inclination Participants in the No-
affirmation Condition in Experiment 7 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    72%   28%  
 
Low    32%   68% 
 
  However, when participants were encouraged to self-affirm there was 
no association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination and controllable 
counterfactual thinking, χ2 (1, n = 40) = 2.54, p = .12. This finding replicates the 
result of Experiment 6. As Table 23 indicates, the self-affirmation inducement 
worked in that the majority of participants, regardless of cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination, generated controllable counterfactuals. Comparing across Tables 22 and 
23 it seems that participants who scored high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
consistently generated relatively high percentages of initial controllable 
counterfactuals in both the self-affirming and no-affirming conditions (72% and 
65%). Participants who scored low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination however, 
only generated comparatively high percentages of initial controllable counterfactuals 
in the self-affirming condition but not in the no-affirming condition (83% and 32%).  
Table 23 
Percentages of Initial Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals Generated 
by High and Low Cognitive Self-affirmation Inclination Participants in the Self-
affirming Condition in Experiment 7 
 
 
    Controllable  Uncontrollable 
 
High    65%   35%  
 
Low    83%   17% 
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 For the first counterfactual generated, a 2x2 Chi-square test for 
independence indicated that the association between cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and counterfactual direction was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, n = 80) 
= .001, p = .98. We compared the self-affirmation and no-affirmation conditions for 
initial counterfactual direction. The association was marginally significant, χ2 (1, n = 
80) = 3.30, p = .07, with upward counterfactuals being generated more readily as an 
initial response by self-affirming participants (92%) than by no-affirming 
participants (75%). 
  We then compared the initial counterfactual direction of participants 
high and low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination taking into consideration the 
experimental manipulation; data were divided in terms of experimental manipulation 
(self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation). No association was observed in the self-
affirming condition, χ2 (1, n = 40) = .17, p = .67, or the no-affirming condition, χ2 (1, 
n = 40) = .13, p = .71. This suggests that individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination do not seem to be associated with counterfactual direction. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 7 
We found no evidence to suggest that cognitive self-affirmation inclination is 
associated with counterfactual activation overall or with controllable counterfactual 
activation. We found some evidence of an association between cognitive self-
affirmation inclination and counterfactual controllability. In the condition where 
participants did not self-affirm, individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination generated more controllable initial counterfactuals than individuals low in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination. This suggests that cognitive self-affirmation 
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inclination may be important in terms of counterfactual controllability particularly in 
the absence of other factors than may encourage self-affirming.  Participants who 
scored high for cognitive self-affirmation inclination consistently generated 
controllable counterfactuals in both experimental conditions, while participants who 
scored low for cognitive self-affirmation inclination only generated comparable 
percentages of initial controllable counterfactuals in the self-affirming condition.  
   Some differences emerged between the findings in this experiment 
and in Experiment 6 which may have been due to slight differences in the tasks. For 
example, this experiment asked participants to generate counterfactuals after 
recalling a personally meaningful event in the past whereas Experiment 6 asked 
participants to generate counterfactuals immediately following failure in a cognitive 
task. Also, in Experiment 6 participants in the no-affirming group completed a 
grammatical correction exercise whereas in this experiment they completed an 
exercise similar to the self-affirming group but about a non-important value for 
another individual. While the no-affirming group task used in this experiment was 
similar to that used in previous self-affirmation research  (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 
1997; Steele, 1988) it could be the case that some self-affirmation took place, even in 
the no-affirmation group.  
  The different tasks used may account for the different rates of 
controllable initial counterfactuals in the no-affirming and self-affirming groups in 
both experiments. For example, in this experiment individuals high in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination did not generate more controllable initial counterfactuals in 
the self-affirming than no-affirming group as they did in Experiment 6. This seems 
to be due to a higher base rate of controllable initial counterfactuals in the no-
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affirming group perhaps rather than the self-affirmation manipulation having no 
effect. 
  The focus on real life failure versus failure in a laboratory task may 
account for the different rates of upward counterfactuals in the two experiments. 
According to White and Lehman (2005) improvement motives are more salient than 
self-enhancement motives in goal related tasks. Because this experiment involved 
less emphasis on improvement motives than in some of the previous experiments, 
downward counterfactuals may have been move likely. This was indeed the case; 
more downward counterfactuals were generated in Experiment 7 than in any of the 
earlier experiments. Because of the higher generation of downward counterfactuals 
in Experiment 7, we were able to examine whether findings from previous 
experiments of the present research regarding counterfactual controllability and 
individual difference factors also extended to counterfactual direction. However, we 
found little evidence for this.  
 
5.4 General Discussion 
Overall, results from Experiments 6 and 7 suggest that drawing from positive self-
images unrelated to a threatened domain facilitates the use of controllable 
counterfactuals. To observe this effect, considering individual differences in the 
tendency to self-affirm as well as experimental manipulations of self-affirmation 
may be useful.  
   In both experiments, we observed that individual differences in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination had no association with the overall number of 
counterfactuals or the overall number of controllable counterfactuals generated. This 
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suggests that cognitive self-affirmation inclination is not associated with the 
tendency to generate counterfactuals about recent negative events or more 
temporally distant events. A study by Koole et al. (1999) in which participants 
received negative feedback after self-affirming indicated that a self-affirmation 
manipulation reduced levels of rumination. However, this rumination reducing effect 
of self-affirmation was not found in research by Dutcher (2010). Our findings are 
perhaps more in line with the findings of Dutcher (2010). However, it is difficult to 
make clear comparisons between these three studies given that all three utilized 
varying measures of rumination. Koole et al. (1999) used an implicit measure of 
rumination while the measure used by Dutcher (2010) was relatively explicit in that 
it asked participants directly about the degree to which a recent failure was still 
replaying in their mind. Our findings are worthy of comparison to these studies 
given that both counterfactual thinking and rumination involve considering past 
events. However, it should be noted that while counterfactual thoughts always 
involve comparing a past outcome to some alternative, rumination does not 
necessarily involve consideration of an alternative outcome. Rumination refers to a 
tendency to have persistent, recyclic, depressive thoughts, and is a relatively 
common response to negative moods (Rippere, 1977). Rumination may involve no 
undoing of past events. 
  Epstude & Roese (2011) suggested that self-affirmation may reduce 
counterfactual thinking. They point out that because self-affirmation has been shown 
to terminate rumination after failure (Koole et al., 1999), counterfactual thoughts 
may also decrease due to self-affirming. Our findings go against their suggestion. 
However, further research utilizing alternative methodologies would be needed to 
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establish firmly the precise relationship between counterfactual activation and self-
affirmation. 
  In Experiment 6, individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination more readily generated a controllable initial counterfactual than 
individuals low in self-affirmation inclination. However, when individuals were 
encouraged to self-affirm there was no difference between individuals high and low 
in cognitive self-affirmation inclination in the tendency to generate a controllable 
initial counterfactual. Similarly, in Experiment 7 we found that in the condition 
where participants did not self-affirm, individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination generated more controllable initial counterfactuals than individuals low in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination. Considered together, these findings suggest 
that cognitive self-affirmation inclination may be associated with counterfactual 
controllability and that natural inclinations to self-affirm can be overridden with 
experimental manipulations of self-affirmation. 
  Even when not encouraged to self-affirm, participants high in self-
affirmation inclination demonstrated relatively high levels of controllable 
counterfactual thought. One potential reason for this may be that cognitive self-
affirmation is a largely automatic response to negative outcomes for these 
individuals. When participants high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination were not 
encouraged to self-affirm, they may still have engaged in some degree of self-
affirmation. As expected, participants low in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
did not show any inclination toward more controllable – and potentially self-
threatening – counterfactuals when not encouraged to self-affirm. When encouraged 
to self-affirm however, these participants displayed counterfactual thinking patterns 
comparable to participants high in self-affirmation inclination. Thus, it could be 
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argued that the important difference between high and low individuals in cognitive 
self-affirmation inclination in terms of counterfactual thinking is not the degree or 
type of self-affirmation engaged with, but rather whether self-affirmation is initiated 
at all.  
  While Experiment 7 found no strong evidence that cognitive self-
affirmation inclination influences counterfactual direction, this finding should not be 
over-generalized. It may be that other self-regulatory individual differences are 
related to counterfactual direction. It may also be important to consider whether 
counterfactuals are generated when goal-related motives are salient or affect-driven 
motives are salient. 
   These findings for cognitive self-affirmation inclination and 
counterfactual thinking are interesting when considered in relation to a conceptually 
similar construct: self-esteem. Roese and Olson (1993a) examined the relationship 
between self-esteem and counterfactual thinking and found that individuals with low 
self-esteem were more likely than individuals with high self-esteem to undo their 
own actions following a failure. This suggests that rather than being adaptive in 
terms of counterfactual thought, high self-esteem may facilitate a defensive bias. Our 
findings suggest that individuals high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination may 
typically engage in a self-restoring activity that actually reduces or eliminates the 
need for such defensive reactions. Thus, individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination may facilitate the use of more functional types of 
counterfactual thinking. 
   Our findings are in line with research by Tesser (2000) who 
demonstrated that engaging with self-affirmation reduced the use of downward 
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social comparison. According to Tesser, engaging with self-affirmation meant that 
downward social comparisons became less necessary to enhance affect. Likewise, 
we found that engaging with self-affirmation facilitated the use of more potentially 
threatening controllable counterfactuals. Unlike the research by Tesser (2000), our 
findings implicate individual differences in the tendency to self-affirm and not only 
experimental manipulations of self-affirmation. 
  Epstude and Roese (2011) proposed that the extent to which a goal is 
self-defining and how strongly individuals are committed to a goal may moderate the 
effect of self-affirmation on counterfactual thinking. While Experiment 7 involved 
participants recalling personally salient negative experiences from their own lives, 
Experiment 6 involved failure in a cognitive task that was unlikely perceived as self-
defining by participants. Given some significant findings emerged from both 
experiments, it may be that it is the degree of dissatisfaction experienced after a 
failure, rather than how overtly personally salient an experience is, which moderates 
the effect of self-affirmation on counterfactual thinking. Also, the fact that 
participants in Experiment 6 knew they would be attempting a cognitive task meant 
that goal related cognitions may have been more prominent than they were in 
Experiment 7. Thus, even without the personal attachment to the negative outcomes 
recalled in Experiment 7, participants in Experiment 6 may still have been highly 
engaged with the problem. 
  Experiment 6 addressed whether the counterfactuals generated after 
self-affirming were adaptive in terms of performance improvement. We found that 
self-affirming alone seemed to have no benefit in terms of performance 
improvement. Previous research by Cohen et al. (2006) and Dutcher (2010) suggests 
that self-affirmation may facilitate performance. Perhaps one explanation for this 
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incongruity is that in the Dutcher study, after participants self-affirmed, they 
engaged with the experimental task almost immediately. In Experiment 6 however, 
the time between the self-affirmation manipulation and the experimental task was 
separated by a filler task. It may be that to observe the performance improving 
effects of self-affirmation in isolation, the time between the self-affirmation 
manipulation and the experimental task must be given consideration. While we 
found that self-affirmation did not influence performance improvement, analysis of 
mean scores of each experimental condition suggested that a combination of self-
affirmation and counterfactual thinking actually resulted in higher performance 
improvement scores than when counterfactuals were generated alone. Our findings 
suggest that while self-affirming may not directly influence performance 
improvement, when it is coupled with counterfactual thinking, performance 
improvement may be enhanced. 
  While individual differences in cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
were associated with counterfactual controllability, individual differences in 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination did not mediate the association between 
counterfactual thinking and performance improvement. This suggests that individual 
differences in cognitive self-affirmation inclination are more important in 
determining whether functional types of counterfactual thinking are engaged with 
rather than the degree to which such thoughts are adaptive once generated. 
Conclusion: Epstude and Roese (2011) suggested that self-affirmation might be 
important in terms of counterfactual thinking. The experiments in this chapter offer 
an initial attempt to understand any potential association. We utilized both an 
individual difference perspective as well as experimental manipulations of self-
affirmation. Experiments 6 and 7 suggest that individual differences in cognitive 
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self-affirmation inclination as well as experimental manipulations of self-affirmation 
may be important in terms of counterfactual controllability. Given that self-
affirmation may be used to bolster self-representations after a negative outcome, 
these experiments suggest that self-motives may be important in terms of 
counterfactual functionality.  
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Chapter Six 
General Discussion 
This research investigated whether self-regulatory individual differences that 
describe variation in the capacity to view the self as unthreatened during negative 
situations may be particularly important in terms of counterfactual functionality. We 
examined a number of potentially important individual difference variables which 
have not been investigated before in counterfactual thinking research. Namely, we 
examined the constructs of autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), action/state 
orientation (Diefendorff et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1994), and cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012; Steele, 1988). Over the course of seven 
experiments, we found evidence that these individual differences may have a role to 
play in counterfactual thinking. In this chapter, we summarise these findings, discuss 
their implications for counterfactual thinking research, theories and in applied 
settings, and suggest possible avenues for future research. 
 
6.1 Summary of main findings 
The association between self-regulatory individual difference factors and 
counterfactual frequency was investigated in all experiments. In Experiment 1, we 
tested the hypothesis that high autonomy participants would generate a significantly 
higher number of counterfactual thoughts than low autonomy participants following 
failure in a mental multiplication task. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested the 
hypothesis that high autonomy participants would generate significantly higher 
numbers of overall counterfactual thoughts than low autonomy participants after 
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failure in an anagram task. In Experiment 4, we examined the individual differences 
of action/state orientation and volatility in terms of the overall number of 
counterfactual thoughts generated after attempting a difficult series of cognitive 
puzzles. Experiment 5 also examined action/state orientation in terms of 
counterfactual activation effects. Finally, in Experiments 6 and 7 we examined 
whether individual differences in cognitive self-affirmation inclination might 
influence the overall number of counterfactual thoughts generated. In all these 
experiments, we found little or no evidence to indicate that self-regulatory individual 
differences are important in the number of counterfactual thoughts generated. Rather, 
these individual differences seem to be important in the types of counterfactuals that 
people generate rather than the number of counterfactuals generated.   
  The degree and type of counterfactuals participants generated in these 
experiments were consistent with patterns observed in other research (Girotto et al., 
2007; Morris & Moore, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Summerville & Roese, 2008). 
The degree of counterfactual thinking participants engaged in was relatively 
consistent throughout all seven experiments. Due to the failure inducing element of 
the experiments, we anticipated that the majority of counterfactuals would be upward 
in nature. Upward counterfactuals consistently constituted the majority of responses, 
with downward counterfactuals only occurring to any significant degree when 
participants recalled negative events from their own personal lives. Even then, 
upward counterfactuals constituted the majority of responses. Other research also 
suggests that downward counterfactuals are generated spontaneously only rarely. For 
example, Roese and Olson (1997) found that when participants recalled recent life 
events and freely generated counterfactuals, more than 90% of responses were 
upward rather than downward. 
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  Similarly high levels of upward counterfactual thinking have been 
observed in studies by Nasco and Marsh (1999) and Summerville and Roese (2008). 
The Nasco and Marsh study involved an outcome where the definition of 
success/failure (academic grade on a continuous scale) was somewhat more 
subjective than many of the tasks used in the current research, where negative 
outcomes were typically more explicit. Thus, even when people have ample 
opportunity to engage in downward counterfactual thinking, they often tend to focus 
on outcomes that could potentially facilitate improvement. For this reason, we 
suggest that the high percentage of upward counterfactuals generated in these 
experiments is not problematic. Although participants were generally induced to fail, 
they could still have generated downward counterfactuals. 
  Additive counterfactuals were consistently generated in higher 
quantities than subtractive counterfactuals. Generally, the amount of additive 
counterfactuals generated was comparable to that observed in the study by Nasco 
and Marsh (1999); additive counterfactuals were far more likely than subtractive 
counterfactuals. This finding was not unexpected given that the experimental tasks 
used in the present research uniformly involved the consideration of failure. This 
failure may have encouraged participants to seek solutions. According to Roese and 
Olson (1993b) when undoing failure, a new antecedent action is frequently 
introduced. This suggests that additive counterfactuals may be useful in identifying 
adaptive strategies that facilitate problem solving attempts. This was demonstrated in 
research by Roese (1994) who found that inducing participants to focus on regrets of 
inaction rather than regrets of action facilitated greater performance improvement. 
Because improvement motives were salient in the present experiments, the high 
percentage of additive counterfactuals generated was unsurprising. 
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  In terms of counterfactual controllability, we generally observed 
similar levels to those of Morris and Moore (2000). In their overall sample, about a 
third of counterfactuals were self-referent. We recognize however, that self-referent 
counterfactuals are not always controllable. The various experimental tasks used 
undoubtedly influenced counterfactual controllability. In Experiment 1, which of all 
the experimental tasks offered participants the fewest controllable antecedents, we 
observed relatively low percentages of controllable counterfactuals. Controllable 
counterfactuals increased in subsequent experiments which utilized tasks involving 
higher levels of strategy and participant decision making. Counterfactual 
controllability was also relatively high when participants considered negative events 
from their own life.   
  Perhaps the most important finding to emerge from the present 
research is that regarding counterfactual controllability. Controllable counterfactuals 
may be perceived as more threatening than uncontrollable counterfactuals due to the 
fact that they potentially imply negligence (Morris & Moore, 2000). Thus, we 
hypothesized that self-regulatory individual differences important to self-motives 
may be important. Specifically, we investigated self-regulatory individual 
differences that describe variation in the capacity to view the self as unthreatened 
during negative situations. In  Chapter 3, we examined whether individual 
differences in autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) might be related to functional 
types of counterfactual thinking.  
  In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that the means of eliciting 
counterfactual responses from participants might be important in observing any 
potential association. Thus, participants generated counterfactuals after actually 
attempting a task or after reading about attempting the task. Results of Experiment 1 
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indicated that individual differences in autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), the 
capacity to be driven by self-directed motives while placing less emphasis on 
external ego involvements, was associated with the generation of higher percentages 
of initial controllable counterfactuals after failure in a mental multiplication task. 
This association was observed only when counterfactuals were generated after the 
experimental task was actually attempted as opposed to imagined. This result 
extends the findings of Girotto et al (2007). In Experiments 2 and 3, we also found 
that autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) was associated with more controllable 
initial counterfactuals after perceived failure in an anagram task. These findings 
provided replication of the finding in Experiment 1. They also suggested that the 
association between autonomy and initial counterfactual controllability could be 
observed utilizing different experimental tasks. Results from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
are in line with research from Haynes et al. (2007) which demonstrated that self-
regulatory individual differences were important in terms of the kinds of 
counterfactual thinking people generate. 
 In Chapter 4, we examined whether action/state orientation might also 
influence counterfactual controllability after a negative outcome. We anticipated that 
action-orientation would lend itself to similar patterns of counterfactual thinking to 
those observed in the high autonomy participants of Experiments 1, 2 and 3. This 
was because action-oriented individuals have been identified as being higly capable 
of perceiving failure as unthreatening to self-representations (Kuhl,1992). Because 
the individual difference of action/state orientation is thought to be particularly 
important in terms of how people deal with persistent setbacks, we included two 
failure inducing cognitive task trials rather than one in Experiment 4. We found no 
significant association between action/state orientation and initial controllable 
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counterfactual generation in Trial 1. However, in Trial 2, we did observe a 
significant association between action-orientation and initial counterfactual 
controllability. Compared to state-oriented participants, action-oriented participants 
generated more controllable counterfactuals as an initial response in Trial 2. 
  This finding suggests that action-oriented individuals seem more 
likely to generate controllable counterfactuals than state-oriented individuals when 
faced with persistent negative outcomes. As well as providing support to the research 
of McElroy & Dowd (2007) who found evidence that regret may be influenced by 
innate action/state orientation, this finding is in line with research by El Leithy et al. 
(2006) who found that temporal factors influence both action-oriented and state-
oriented individuals differently. 
  While the effect of this self-regulatory individual difference was not 
as immediately apparent as that of autonomy in that it was not observable after 
failure in an initial cognitive task, Experiment 4 also provided some evidence 
suggesting that self-regulatory individual differences may be important in terms of 
counterfactual controllability. We thought that the presence of a strategy formation 
task in Experiment 4 may have reduced the potential effects of action/state 
orientation on counterfactual thinking in Trial 1. Thus, in Experiment 5 we again 
compared action-oriented and state-oriented individuals in terms of initial 
counterfactual controllability, this time using only one failure inducing task and no 
strategy formation task. Results suggested that individual differences in action/state 
orientation were important in terms of counterfactual controllability. Action-oriented 
participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an initial response more readily 
than state-oriented individuals. This association between individual differences in 
action/state orientation and initial counterfactual controllability was observed when 
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participants were experimentally induced with an action-orientation but not when 
participants were experimentally induced with a state-orientation. This shows the 
importance of interactions between individual difference measures and experimental 
manipulations and is consistent with the findings of Haynes et al. (2007). 
  In Chapter 5, we examined the influence of cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination on counterfactual controllability. The main reason for investigating this 
individual difference was that self-affirmation is thought to make people cognizant 
of the fact that their sense of self-worth is not exclusively determined by the 
evaluative implications of a negative outcome. Because self-affirmation theory 
(Steele, 1988) proposes a self-restoring activity that reduces or eliminates the need 
for defensive reactions, we anticipated that individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation may facilitate the use of more functional types of counterfactual 
thinking. We found that the association between cognitive self-affirmation 
inclination and counterfactual controllability was statistically significant in the 
absence of experimentally inducing self-affirmation. This finding is in line with 
previous research which demonstrated that self-affirmation may be important in 
terms of the consideration of past events (Koole et al., 1999). 
 Experiment 7 also examined the influence of cognitive self-
affirmation inclination on counterfactual controllability. Again we utilized an 
experimental manipulation of self-affirmation. Examining the no-affirmation 
condition in isolation, the association between cognitive self-affirmation inclination 
and counterfactual controllability was significant. Participants who scored high for 
cognitive self-affirmation inclination consistently generated controllable 
counterfactuals across both experimental conditions. Participants who scored low for 
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cognitive self-affirmation inclination only generated similar percentages of initial 
controllable counterfactuals after engaging in experimental self-affirmation.  
  When considered together, results from Experiments 1 to 7 indicate 
that self-regulatory individual difference factors have implications for counterfactual 
controllability. Associations were observed between counterfactual controllability 
and the individual difference factors of autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), 
action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1994), and cognitive self-
affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012; Steele, 1988) after considering 
failure in a variety of different cognitive tasks and self-salient scenarios. 
  Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 6 also investigated the potential performance 
improving effects of counterfactual thinking and whether or not individual difference 
factors mediated these effects. In general, these experiments indicated that 
counterfactual thinking was adaptive in terms of performance improvement, a 
finding in line with previous research (Markman et al., 1993; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; 
Roese, 1994). These experiments also demonstrated that controllable counterfactuals 
were particularly adaptive (Morris & Moore, 2000). In terms of individual 
differences mediating the functionality of counterfactual thinking, these experiments 
all indicated that self-regulatory individual differences may be more important in 
terms of whether functional types of counterfactual thoughts are generated in the first 
place rather than whether they are functional once generated. 
  In observing the importance of self-regulatory individual difference 
factors in relation to counterfactual thinking, incorporating experimental 
manipulations related to the individual difference variable being examined proved 
informative. Such experimental manipulations were utilized in Experiments 5, 6, and 
 ~ 179 ~ 
 
7. In Experiment 5, we experimentally manipulated whether participants adopted an 
action-orientation or a state-orientation regarding a missed opportunity they 
considered. In Experiments 6 and 7, we experimentally manipulated whether 
participants self-affirmed or not. It may have been expected that in observing the 
effects of action/state orientation and self-affirmation on counterfactual thinking, 
these experimental manipulations would prove to be more effective than comparing 
participants in terms of the related individual difference factors. However, this was 
not universally the case.  
  In Experiment 5, there was a significant association between 
individual differences in action/state orientation and counterfactual controllability. 
Naturally action-oriented participants generated controllable counterfactuals as an 
initial response more readily than state-oriented individuals. For induced action/state 
orientation, although action-oriented induced participants generated controllable 
counterfactuals as an initial response more readily than state-oriented induced 
participants, the association did not reach statistical significance.  
  For self-affirmation, while individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination significantly influenced counterfactual controllability, we 
found some evidence to suggest that experimentally inducing self-affirmation 
negated the effects of cognitive self-affirmation inclination. In Experiment 6, 
although participants high in cognitive self-affirmation inclination generated 
controllable counterfactuals as an initial response more readily than participants low 
in cognitive self-affirmation inclination, the association was only statistically 
significant in the absence of experimentally induced self-affirmation. Similar 
findings emerged in Experiment 7. Considered together, these results suggest that 
utilizing both an individual difference approach as well as related experimental 
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manipulations may be useful in studies of counterfactual thinking. It has been argued 
for some time that the relationship between individual difference factors and 
behaviour or cognition may be moderated by aspects of context or environment (e.g., 
Chatman, 1991; Stagner, 1977; Weiss & Adler, 1984). In other words, the degree 
with which personality characteristics may be used to predict behaviour or cognition 
is dependent on external environmental factors. The importance of such interaction 
effects was apparent is our findings. 
  The seeming importance of interaction effects between experimental 
manipulations and individual difference factors found in the present research is 
similar to findings from Haynes et al. (2007). Haynes et al. also demonstrated an 
association between a self-regulatory individual difference factor and functional 
counterfactual thinking by considering interaction effects between the trait and 
experimental manipulations. In an investigation of the effects of temporal framing on 
counterfactual thinking, their research demonstrated that individuals who are 
uncertainty–oriented are more likely than individuals who are certainty-oriented to 
generate upward counterfactual thoughts after an experimental manipulation of 
psychological recency. Temporal framing influenced counterfactual direction, but an 
individual differences perspective was necessary to observe this effect. Thus, a stable 
dispositional variable was shown to affect the dynamics of people’s counterfactual 
thoughts. Haynes et al. suggest that their findings document the fruitfulness of an 
individual differences perspective in studies on comparative thought. Our findings 
lend support to this claim. 
  In the next section we consider the implications of our findings for 
counterfactual thinking research, for theories of counterfactual thinking and in 
applied settings. 
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6.2 Implications 
 
Counterfactual thinking research 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the method of eliciting counterfactual responses 
from participants was important. We observed that the influence of self-regulatory 
individual differences on counterfactual thinking was only significant when 
participants actually experienced failure first hand as opposed to vicariously 
imagining failure. This finding shaped the methodological approach used in all 
subsequent experiments. Cognitive tasks that lead to perceived negative outcomes 
were utilized rather than hypothetical vignettes. Even in Experiment 7, when we 
examined counterfactuals of high personal salience, we utilized a methodology that 
involved recalling real negative events from participants past experiences as opposed 
to imagined hypothetical situations involving the self.  
   The reasons for the divergent findings that resulted from the two 
methods of eliciting counterfactuals remain to be precisely determined by future 
research. The present research simply indicates that this methodological factor is 
important when self-regulatory individual difference factors are being studied. 
However, there are a number of possible explanations. Girotto et al. (2007) found 
that actors and readers differ in their post decisional counterfactual thinking due to 
differing availability of problem-related information. Thus, it may have been that a 
demand characteristic associated with the use of vignettes caused participants to 
focus predominantly on more uncontrollable choice factors rather than on more 
controllable problem-specific antecedents. 
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  Girotto et al. also suggest that actors and readers may differ in post 
decisional counterfactual thinking because they are directed by different 
motivational goals. According to Girotto et al. (2007), actors may be more prone to 
avoid self-blame than readers. We did not find that actors and readers differed 
significantly in term of counterfactual controllability. However, we found that 
methodology was important in observing the influence of autonomy on 
counterfactual controllability. High and low autonomy participants only differed in 
terms of counterfactual controllability in the actor condition. We suggest that this 
may have been due to another demand characteristic associated with the use of 
vignettes: vignettes may emphasize more imaginative mental simulation rather than 
information processing mental simulation. 
  We suggest that in discerning the precise reasons for the divergent 
findings regarding methodology, examining the distinction between imaginative 
mental simulation and information processing mental simulation may be important. 
Whether a person experiences counterfactual alternatives in a visceral sense or on a 
more cognitive level has been highlighted in previous research. Markman and 
McMullen’s (2003) reflection and evaluation model (REM) of comparative thinking 
highlights this distinction. Two types of counterfactual processing are proposed in 
this model: reflection and evaluation. Reflection allows the person to experience the 
counterfactual as if it were real; they are effectively transported into a counterfactual 
world. Reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality. They 
typically involve visualizing or fantasizing about an alternative outcome (e.g., “I can 
see it clearly…). Evaluative counterfactual thinking involves switching attention 
between a real outcome (not being hit by a car) and a counterfactual outcome (I 
could have been hit by a car), leading to evaluative processing (I was really lucky 
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there). Evaluative counterfactuals focus on alternatives in addition to reality. The 
REM theory emphasizes that evaluative counterfactual thinking – as opposed to 
reflective counterfactual thinking – involves switching attention between a real 
outcome and a counterfactual outcome, leading to evaluative processing. Although 
both reflective and evaluative counterfactuals may be functional, evaluative 
counterfactual thinking is thought to be particularly important for planning and 
implementing behavioural change. 
  Research examining self-regulatory individual differences may be 
well served in examining the influence of experimentally manipulating reflective and 
evaluative counterfactual thinking. This has been done in previous research. In a 
study that examined counterfactual thinking and anagram performance, Markman et 
al. (2008) manipulated simulation mode. To foster evaluative counterfactual 
thinking, participants were asked to close their eyes and think about their actual 
performance on the anagrams compared to how they might have performed. To 
foster reflective counterfactual processing, participants were simply asked to close 
their eyes and imagine what might have been. Counterfactuals were subsequently 
categorized as being either evaluative or reflective along a 5-point rating scale 
ranging from -2 (mostly reflective) to +2 (mostly evaluative). An example of an 
evaluative counterfactual was, “I could have performed better than I did if I tried 
more and different combinations of letters.” An example of a reflective 
counterfactual was “I imagined that the letters were forming words right in front of 
my eyes.”  
  The REM theory emphasises the ‘cognitive switching’ usually 
associated with information processing styles of self-regulation. In studies where 
fictional vignettes are utilized to elicit counterfactual responses, reflective types of 
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counterfactual thinking may become more prominent as they allow participants a 
way of experiencing the hypothetical scenario on a more visceral level. In actual 
tasks that participants engage with, there may be a reduced need for reflective types 
of counterfactual thinking, allowing for more evaluative and potentially functional 
types of counterfactual thinking to be observed. Our thesis regarding the influence of 
individual differences in the capacity to perceive potentially threatening 
counterfactual alternatives as unthreatening to self-representations is based on the 
concept of evaluative information processing. Thus, utilizing a methodology that 
potentially reduces evaluative information-processing (hypothetical vignettes) may 
make it difficult to observe differences that exist in the domain of information-
processing. 
  More generally, our research suggests that utilizing experimental 
tasks that allow participants to experience failure first hand may be useful. A large 
amount of counterfactual thinking research has utilized vignettes in eliciting 
counterfactual responses (Byrne et al., 2000; Dixon & Byrne, 2011; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; McCloy & Byrne, 2000). One benefit of hypothetical vignettes is that 
they allow participants to consider highly important (e.g., Meyerslevy & 
Maheswaran, 1992) and realistic scenarios that are likely to elicit counterfactual 
responses. The cognitive tasks used in the present research were likely not perceived 
as overtly significant by participants. The tasks may also not resemble the kinds of 
failure that individuals encounter in daily life which might elicit counterfactual 
thinking. However, the tasks resulted in consistently low participant satisfaction 
ratings, suggesting that these less than ideal outcomes were adequate to engage 
participants. Our research suggests that counterfactual thinking studies may benefit 
from utilizing cognitive tasks such as those reported in this thesis.  
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    Our findings also suggest that when examining the influence of 
individual difference factors on counterfactual thinking, analysis that focuses on the 
initial counterfactual response may be particularly important. The advantage of 
focusing on the initial counterfactual generated is that it likely represents the 
counterfactual that typically comes to mind most easily for the individual. The 
importance of initial counterfactual focus has previously been addressed by Wells 
and Gavanski (1989). According to Wells and Gavanski, when assessing the cause of 
some prior event, certain alternatives come to mind more easily than others. They 
refer to these salient alternatives as default events which are highly available 
counterfactual mutations to the real event. Our research suggests that when 
investigating the potential association between individual difference factors and 
counterfactual focus, it may be particularly important to examine the initial or 
default counterfactual generated. This is in line with research by Wells, Taylor, and 
Turtle (1987) who found that when analyzing participants’ counterfactual responses 
to unusual events, counterfactuals that mutated an antecedent framed as unusual 
were more likely to be recorded first in response to a thought listing exercise. While 
the importance of considering the overall number of counterfactuals generated has 
been shown to be particularly important by past research (Bacon et al., 2013; Davis 
et al., 1995), we suggest that when investigating counterfactual focus, consideration 
of initial counterfactual responses may also be important. 
 
Theoretical implications 
The present research holds implications for norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986). The concept of norm theory states that counterfactual thinking is the 
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activation from memory of positive examples of how present similar situations 
should be handled. Thus, the primary purpose of counterfactual thinking is to 
facilitate homeostasis; atypical or unexpected outcomes elicit representations that are 
counterfactual and more in line with expectations. According to Kahneman and 
Miller, judgmental standards (norms) are constructed from both a priori beliefs and 
actual outcomes. Our findings hold implications for the role of a priori beliefs in 
counterfactual thinking, given that we examined self-motives using an individual 
difference approach. We found that individual difference factors describing self-
related beliefs regarding freedom from implication following negative outcomes 
influenced counterfactual controllability. This suggests that the information-
processing that takes place during counterfactual thinking when outcomes and norms 
are compared, considering variation between individuals in terms of a priori beliefs 
is important. Previous counterfactual research has indicated that beliefs regarding the 
self in domains such as self-esteem (Roese & Olson, 1993a) and efficacy (Sanna, 
1997) are important. These individual differences may influence judgemental norms 
directly due the self-inferences they hold. However, we propose that individual 
difference factors may also influence judgemental standards (norms) through wider 
judgements regarding self-implication following counterfactual comparison. It may 
be that while specific self-representations influence norms, wider metacognitive 
beliefs regarding what it means to succeed/fail or to consider alternatives may also 
be important. 
  However, our findings are perhaps more in line with contemporary 
theories on counterfactual thinking. Byrne (2005) outlined the cognitive principles 
that determine what people consider when thinking counterfactually. For Byrne, 
counterfactuals are constructed in a similar way to rational thoughts and may often 
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be very reasonable. Similarly, Markman and McMullen (2003) developed a 
reflection and evaluation model of comparative thought which emphasised the 
potential benefits that may be drawn from counterfactual thinking. Unlike earlier 
work which emphasized that counterfactual thinking may frequently be a hindrance 
to sound judgement (Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Wells & Gavanski, 1989), our research argues in favour of the 
general adaptiveness of counterfactual thinking, at least for certain individuals. 
  Results from the present research have specific implications for the 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008, 2011; 
Markman & McMullen, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1997; Roese, 1994, 1997). Much like 
the implications this research holds for norm theory, we suggest that placing greater 
emphasis on individual difference factors may serve to refine the functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking. 
  Empirical support for the functionality of counterfactual thinking was 
found in the present research. Specifically, the performance improving influence of 
counterfactual thinking was observed in all four experiments in which a performance 
improvement element was included. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants who 
generated counterfactuals improved performance in an anagram task more than 
participants in control groups.  This suggests that counterfactual thinking facilitates 
adaptive strategizing and performance improvement (e.g., Markman et al., 1993; 
Roese, 1994). In both experiments we found that those who generated controllable 
initial counterfactuals tended to improve more than those who generated 
uncontrollable initial counterfactuals. Similar findings were found in Experiment 4. 
These findings demonstrated that functionality could be observed in a laboratory 
type task and lends support to previous research suggesting controllable 
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counterfactuals may be particularly adaptive (e.g., Morris & Moore, 2000). In 
Experiment 6, we found that participants who generated counterfactuals improved 
performance on an anagram task and observed some evidence that counterfactuals 
stemming from self-affirmation may be functional.  
  Individual difference variables involved in these studies were 
autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 
2000) and cognitive self-affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). None 
of these individual difference factors mediated the performance improving influence 
of counterfactual thinking. Rather than suggesting that self-regulatory individual 
differences influence whether counterfactuals are functional, our findings suggest 
that self-regulatory individual differences may be important in terms of whether 
functional types of counterfactual thinking are generated in the first place. While 
there may be an association between certain individual differences and 
counterfactual controllability, the controllable counterfactuals generated by 
participants high in self-regulatory individual difference factors may be no more 
adaptive than the controllable counterfactuals generated by participants low in self-
regulatory individual difference factors. 
  These findings suggest that to fully understand the functionality of 
counterfactual thinking, individual difference factors should be considered. In 
extending the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, we suggest that 
recommendations from Hoyle (2006) be considered. Generally, research on self-
regulation (e.g., Bronson, 2000; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Snyder, 1974) has 
examined how it occurs in response to external sources of feedback from the 
environment and the processing of information about the self that comes from 
external sources. This line of research has been classified by Hoyle (2006) as 
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information processing approaches to self-regulation. For example, in objective self-
awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) self-relevant information is processed 
and compared to existing self-representations/standards, with the resulting evaluation 
having several implications for affective and behavioural responses. This type of 
information-processing model of self-regulation is not dissimilar to that proposed by 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) in their norm theory or in functional accounts of 
counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008, 2011; Markman & McMullen, 
2003; Roese & Olson, 1997; Roese, 1994, 1997), even if the information processing 
involved in counterfactual thinking also involves the comparison of internalized 
norms and imagined alternatives. Hoyle compares these information processing 
models of self-regulation to trait based accounts. For trait based theories, stable 
tendencies to self-regulate in specific ways are reflected in a person’s personality. 
  Like Hoyle (2006), who suggests that information-processing 
accounts and trait based theories should be integrated in order to better understand 
the processes that underlie self-regulation, we suggest that the functional theory 
should integrate individual difference factors in order to outline more accurately 
when and for whom counterfactual thinking may be adaptive. Although the 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking addresses important aspects of 
counterfactual thinking such as  what an actual instance of counterfactual thinking 
entails, the stimuli that initiate the process, and how the process is resolved, it offers 
little in the way of explaining the origins of this process and variation across people 
in the characteristic ways the process unfolds. Understanding the role of self-
regulatory individual differences, as this research makes an initial attempt to do, may 
address some gaps in the theory.  
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  Epstude and Roese (2008; 2011) propose both a content-specific and 
a content-neutral pathway as mechanisms by which counterfactual thoughts operate. 
The content-specific pathway refers to the information contained within 
counterfactual thoughts while the content-neutral pathway typically refers to changes 
in motivation or affect resulting from counterfactual thinking. In integrating the 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking with self-regulatory individual 
difference factors, a deeper understanding of how these two pathways relate to 
personality is necessary.  
  Although further research is needed to separate the nature of any 
association between self-regulatory individual differences and both pathways, our 
findings hold some implications. In terms of the content-specific pathway, we found 
evidence that individual difference factors influenced the informational makeup of 
counterfactual thoughts. Individuals who scored high in the self-regulatory 
individual differences measured more readily focused on antecedents that they had 
control over and that could potentially serve to inform future adaptation. It seems 
likely that these counterfactuals facilitated functionality given that we found that 
controllable counterfactuals were associated with increased performance 
improvement in Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 6. 
  In terms of the content-neutral pathway, Epstude and Roese (2008) 
suggest that self-inference may be particularly important. Higher order causal 
inference effects refer to the general self-concepts individuals come to hold 
following counterfactual thinking. For instance, if counterfactuals point out specific 
aspects of an outcome that could have averted a problem, broader self-inferences 
regarding efficacy, mastery, or overconfidence may be influenced. Epstude and 
Roese provide the example of a manager who might decide that she should have 
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fired a troublesome employee. The manager might consider counterfactuals about 
how things could have been better if she had fired that person. A counterfactual of 
this kind serves to remind the manager that the act of firing someone is a powerful 
option and of the power her potential actions hold. This may allow the manager to 
feel that she is in control of events, is aware of what is happening, and is capable of 
adapting to unforeseen events going forward. 
  Other research has postulated that individual difference factors may 
be important to content-neutral self-inferences of this type. In their month-long study 
of counterfactual thoughts in college students, Nasco and Marsh (1999) aimed to 
identify mediators of observed performance improvement in academic performance. 
They found that participants who generated more upward counterfactuals engaged in 
more action on their environment and perceived enhanced control over their 
environment. These heightened control perceptions were related to performance 
improvement. Nasco and March suggest that factors unexamined in their study such 
as individual differences may influence control perceptions after counterfactual 
thinking. We examined this hypothesis in Experiment 2. After generating 
counterfactuals and before attempting a second set of anagrams, participants reported 
their perceptions of ‘control ahead of the next trial’. We examined whether 
participants’ ratings of ‘control ahead of the next trial’ were influenced by engaging 
in counterfactual thinking and self-regulatory individual differences in autonomy. 
We found that after generating counterfactuals, high autonomy participants (Bekker 
& van Assen, 2006) did not report higher control perceptions than low autonomy 
participants. While we found that individual differences did not directly influence 
control perceptions after generating counterfactuals, we found they were indirectly 
related; individual differences were associated with counterfactual controllability 
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which was marginally associated with heightened control perceptions. It may be the 
case that the content-neutral pathway plays a part due to the fact that self-regulatory 
individual differences such as autonomy may facilitate a heightened pre-existing 
sense of control. 
  It may also be worth investigating whether self-regulatory individual 
differences have an impact in determining whether either the content-specific or the 
content-neutral pathway may be functional. For example, for the high autonomy 
participants in Experiment 2, given that they may already foster innately high control 
perceptions, might this mean that in order to benefit from counterfactual thinking, 
the pathway must be content-specific rather than content-neutral. Someone low in 
autonomy on the other hand, who doesn’t have a heightened pre-existing sense of 
control, may benefit from generating counterfactuals because it increases sense of 
control via the content-neutral pathway and/or because it informs behavioural 
intentions via the content-specific pathway. 
  It is also possible that other forms of self-inference effects, besides 
control perceptions, are important. Future studies could examine more directly 
whether individual differences might be important for self-inferences regarding 
aspects such as efficacy, openness, invulnerably, or positivity embracement. 
 
Counterfactual thinking in applied settings 
Some findings from the present research hold implications for how counterfactual 
thinking might be applied beneficially in real world settings. In this section we 
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discuss some previous studies on counterfactual thinking in applied settings and 
suggest how the findings of the present research may inform future studies. 
  Numerous studies in the area of counterfactual thinking and heuristics 
have been carried out in educational institutions and/or with research participants 
selected from student populations. Many of these studies have tended to focus, in 
some way, on academic assessment of participants (Gasper, Lozinski, & LeBeau, 
2009; McMullen & Markman, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994). Nasco 
and Marsh (1999) provided compelling evidence that the process of generating 
counterfactual thoughts regarding academic performance serves to inform 
behavioural intentions to change future preparative behaviour. This suggests that 
fostering this type of cognition in academic settings may prove beneficial. Our 
research, which also demonstrated counterfactual functionality in terms of 
performance improvement, supports this concept. Our research also suggests that in 
addition to generating counterfactuals about performance, the role of individual 
differences and encouraging particular cognitive styles should also be considered.   
  We found that individual differences in self-regulation facilitated the 
use of more functional types of counterfactual thinking. Assessing the performance 
of students has been described as one of the most important activities educators 
undertake (Trotter, 2006). However, the emphasis placed on letter grades has been 
identified as problematic in that it may serve to curb reflective cognitions aimed at 
addressing less than ideal performance (Boud, 2000; Craddock & Mathias, 2009; 
Knight, 2002). The role of self-direction in academic intervention programmes 
seems to be important. While earlier academic intervention programmes which 
focused on providing students with specific information regarding how best to 
prepare for examinations and study in general proved disappointing (Conway & 
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Ross, 1984; Gibbs, 1981), subsequent research has faired better by encouraging 
greater levels of student reflection (Etkina & Harper, 2002). We suggest that a 
possible shortcoming of traditional forms of academic feedback - widely portrayed 
in counterfactual thinking studies as the issuance of grades - is that they do little to 
increase the likelihood of self-directed future learning strategies. In academic 
settings, it may be useful to think of assessment as not just a reflection of what has 
been learned but as an opportunity to learn through reflection. We suggest that 
incorporating self-directed counterfactual cognitions regarding academic 
performance may prove beneficial. In addition, we demonstrated that inducing 
particular cognitive styles (e.g., to self-affirm) can encourage more functional 
counterfactual thinking and this could be incorporated also. 
   Another area which the present research may hold implications for is 
that of counselling, rehabilitation, and clinical depression. Counterfactual thinking 
research has previously examined these areas (Bingham, 2003; Davis et al., 1995; 
Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Markman & Miller, 2006; Markman & Weary, 1998). A 
general aim of applied studies is typically to foster more functional kinds of 
counterfactual thinking in individuals who may not otherwise be inclined to generate 
adaptive thoughts about past events. In the present research, while considering 
individual difference factors, we utilized experimental manipulations we felt might 
increase the likelihood that more functional types of counterfactual thinking might 
be generated. In Experiment 5, we examined the effects of experimentally 
manipulating action\state orientation and any potential interaction that may exist 
with innate individual differences in action/state orientation. We found that inducing 
an action-orientation resulted in higher percentages of initial controllable 
counterfactuals only for innately action-oriented individuals. Innately state-oriented 
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individuals did not appear to gain benefit from the experimental manipulation in 
terms of counterfactual functionality. Given the association with state-orientation 
and depression (Kuhl, 1981), our research suggests that interventions may not 
necessarily be best served by directly encouraging depressives to consider corrective 
action steps. 
   Instead, interventions may be better served utilizing approaches that 
encourage the consideration of positive self-aspects unrelated to an area currently 
perceived negatively. While considering individual differences in cognitive self-
affirmation inclination, Experiment 6 examined whether encouraging participants to 
self-affirm would influence the functionality of counterfactual thoughts generated. 
We found that the individual difference factor significantly influenced counterfactual 
controllability in the absence of inducing self-affirmation. When experimentally 
encouraged to self-affirm however, all participants tended to increase counterfactual 
controllability. In terms of encouraging more functional types of counterfactual 
thinking, this type of approach where individuals are encouraged to self-affirm may 
prove more useful in applied setting than directly encouraging the consideration of 
corrective action steps. 
   Exiting research on the use of counterfactual thinking in prisoner 
rehabilitation (Mandel & Dhami, 2005) suggests that encouraging the use of self-
focused counterfactuals can intensify attributions of self-blame and feelings of guilt. 
In correctional programmes, these attributions are thought to be more beneficial than 
attributions of shame, which were not found to be increased due to counterfactual 
thinking. Our findings are in line with this, suggesting that engaging with 
counterfactuals in a way where ones sense of self is not threatened may increase the 
likelihood that self-focused and adaptive counterfactuals may be generated. 
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6.3 Future research 
There are a number of avenues for future research arising from the experiments 
presented here. Additional research will be useful both in addressing some of the 
limitations of the experiments and in further exploring some of the findings. These 
possibilities are discussed below.  
  The generality of the findings from these experiments are limited due 
to the nonspontaneous manner in which counterfactuals were elicited. Many of the 
counterfactuals recorded by participants may not have occurred had they not been 
prompted to consider how things could have turned out differently. Future research 
might examine self-regulatory individual differences in relation to counterfactual 
thinking utilizing a more spontaneous means of counterfactual elicitation. However, 
given the laboratory based method of data collection used in the experiments, it is 
encouraging to have observed similar patterns of counterfactual thinking to those 
seen in previous studies noted for their ecologically validity (e.g., Morris & Moore, 
2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Summerville & Roese, 2008). 
  Future research on self-regulatory individual differences and 
counterfactual thinking might benefit from using a longitudinal approach. We found 
little evidence suggesting that self-regulatory individual difference factors influence 
counterfactual activation. However, it may be the case that to observe differences in 
terms of counterfactual activation, longitudinal studies that focus on highly salient 
negative outcomes may be more appropriate. It may be that short term laboratory 
experiments of the kind reported here do not offer the best means of observing the 
influence of self-regulatory individual difference factors on counterfactual 
activation. David et al. (1995) examined counterfactual frequency in parents shortly 
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after suffering bereavement and then again at a later stage of the grieving process. 
Nasco and Marsh (1999) examined academic performance improvement in students 
over a two month period. Longitudinal studies such as these may allow for negative 
outcomes to be processed more deeply and the effects of rumination to take hold 
more fully. On the contrary, in the laboratory type tasks utilized in the present 
research, counterfactual generation typically took place shortly after the negative 
outcome was encountered or considered. While the findings of the present research 
indicate that the overall number of counterfactual thoughts people engage in is not 
strongly influenced by self-regulatory individual difference factors, we suggest that 
additional research focusing on temporal factors may be useful. 
  Future research might also examine the association between self-
regulatory individual differences and counterfactual activation using less formal and 
structured means of counterfactual elicitation. Although no time restraints were 
explicitly stated during the counterfactual generation tasks, because of the formal 
nature of the experiments, participants may have felt more time conscious during 
counterfactual generation than in a more naturalistic setting. While this concern did 
not appear to influence the number of counterfactual generated, other methodologies 
may find activational effects where the present research did not. A freer form of 
thought listing exercise, where participants could write about their experiences of 
regret, may prove useful. 
  Longitudinal studies may also negate any potential for experimental 
tasks and individual difference measures to influence each other. In the present 
research, although efforts were made to reduce this potential bias and results 
indicated that experimental manipulations did not influence individual difference 
measures, longitudinal studies would offer a greater degree of control. In the present 
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research, individual difference measures and experimental manipulations could 
potentially have been impacted by the fact that participants had earlier generated 
counterfactual thoughts. Likewise, placing the individual difference measure before 
the counterfactual generation task may have influenced the nature of the 
counterfactuals generated. There may be no ideal way of positioning individual 
difference measures in experiments of this type. However, in general during 
experiments, both experimental manipulations and individual difference measure 
were separated by a reasonable length of time. Thus, any potential interaction may 
have been reduced. Also, participants were made aware that the answers they gave in 
the individual difference measures were to reflect ways in which they typically think, 
and not how they were currently feeling. 
  In the present research, we have demonstrated that a number of self-
regulatory individual difference variables influence counterfactual thinking. 
However, additional variables associated with varying self-motives may also be 
important and worthy of investigation. For instance, Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides 
(2010) outline a wide variety of individual difference factors thought to be important 
to self-enhancement and self-protection strategies. They identified four reliable 
factors associated with these strategies: defensiveness, positivity embracement, 
favourable construals, and self-affirming reflections. Defensiveness primarily 
describes individual differences in protecting the self from anticipated or actual self-
threat, including a mix of behavioural and cognitive inclinations. Positivity 
embracement describes an individual’s capacity to maximize anticipated or actual 
success. It describes an inclination towards self-enhancement and on obtaining and 
retaining positive feedback. Favourable construals describe individual differences in 
the capacity to construct flattering construals of the world with the goal of enhancing 
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self-perceptions. These strategies are oriented toward self-enhancement rather than 
self-protection and are associated with promotion focus and high self-esteem. Self-
affirming reflections describe individual differences in the tendency to self-affirm 
and are conceptually similar to the cognitive self-affirmation inclination measure 
used in the present research. These reflections are associated with high self-esteem 
and may be initiated by threat.  
   According to Hepper et al. (2010) there has been a critical omission in 
the self-enhancement and self-protection literature in that most studies have focused 
on only one strategy rather than assessing numerous strategies simultaneously. The 
present research too only examined the influence of self-affirmation of 
counterfactual thinking. Future research might consider more of these self-
enhancement strategies simultaneously to further inform their precise relationship to 
functional counterfactual thinking. The distinction between strategies thought to 
enhance as opposed to strategies thought to defend may also be considered. 
  Perhaps due to the high percentage of additive counterfactuals 
generated in the experiments of the present research, we found little evidence of a 
strong association between self-regulatory individual differences and counterfactual 
structure. Roese and Olson (1993a) found that self-esteem did not moderate people’s 
use of different structures. They suggest that structure may be a relatively unaffected 
by self-enhancing motives. Thus, rather than stating that individual differences do 
not influence counterfactual structure, it might be useful for future research to focus 
more directly on individual differences in cognitive processing styles. One 
potentially important variable might be that of action identification (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989). Action identification refers to the ways an action can be arrayed in a 
cognitive hierarchy. Low-level identities might specify how one acts while high-
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level identities might specify why one acts. People who consistently demonstrate a 
propensity for one type of action identity over another (high or low) may be 
characterised in terms of a broad personality dimension. High-level cognitive 
processing may require a more expansive mindset, while low-level cognitive 
processing may require a more reductive mindset. Thus, subtractive counterfactuals 
may be more likely for people who typically utilize low-level identities. This of 
course, remains to be demonstrated empirically by future research. 
  In terms of investigating the role of self-regulatory individual 
differences on counterfactual functionality, there are a number of additional factors 
that might be considered. For example, there is some consensus in the personality 
literature that the influence of personality traits on behaviour and cognition may be 
more easily observed when situational autonomy is high rather than low (e.g., 
Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1982; Stagner, 1977). Situational autonomy refers to 
how self-directed an individual’s behaviour is in a given situation or environment. 
Idiosyncratic behaviour may be more likely to manifest in situations where 
individuals have greater freedom to behave in self-directed ways. This factor may be 
worth considering in future studies of counterfactual thinking and self-regulatory 
individual differences. 
   Some personality research has investigated the influence of situational 
autonomy on individual differences in organizational settings. For example, Barrick 
and Mount (1993) developed a scale that measured the degree of situational 
autonomy employees felt their jobs entailed. Items measured the degree of discretion 
the employee had in selecting appropriate work behaviours, deciding the pace and 
order in which jobs were addressed, and how activities were coordinated with others. 
An important finding of their research was that the degree of situational autonomy 
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employees had in their jobs moderated the validity of findings relating personality 
traits to job performance. It may be the case that any potential influence of self-
regulatory individual differences on counterfactual thinking may be dependent on the 
degree of situational autonomy.  
   Previous research has examined counterfactual thinking in academic 
settings (e.g., Nasco & Marsh, 1999). Integrating findings from the field of 
educational psychology may also help enhance future counterfactual thinking studies 
of this kind. One way of examining the ecological validity of the findings of the 
present research would be to examine counterfactual generation in educational 
environments while assessing the degree of situational autonomy fostered by the 
learning environment. The dimensions on which the situational autonomy of a 
learning environment is determined have been well documented (e.g., Crabbe, 1993; 
Garcia & Pintrich, 1996; Niemiec & Ryan, 2009; Stefanou, Perencevich, DiCintio, 
& Turner, 2004). Classroom environments are thought to vary considerably in terms 
of autonomy related dimensions. Assessing variance in these factors may be 
important when investigating potential associations between self-regulatory 
individual differences and counterfactual thinking in applied settings. Methods of 
empirically measuring situational autonomy have already been identified by previous 
research (e.g., Breaugh, 1985).  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Utilizing a variety of cognitive tasks, individual difference measures, and 
experimental manipulations of cognitive styles, we found evidence suggesting that 
self-regulatory individual differences may be particularly important in terms of 
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counterfactual functionality. Specifically, we found evidence suggesting that 
individual differences in the constructs of autonomy (Bekker & van Assen, 2006), 
action/state orientation (Diefendorff et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1994), and cognitive self-
affirmation inclination (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012; Steele, 1988) may be important 
in terms of counterfactual controllability. 
  The timing of our research has coincided with a call for greater 
emphasis to be placed on individual difference factors in counterfactual thinking 
research. Epstude and Roese (2011) suggested that individual differences may be 
important, particularly in terms of functionality. Likewise, Murphy (2005) suggested 
that additional research was needed to understand the role of individual difference 
factors in how learning and preparation take place due to counterfactual thinking. 
Our research suggests that certain self-regulatory individual differences may be 
important in terms of counterfactual functionality.  However, more research is 
required, particularly in applied settings, to fully understand the role of these 
individual differences in counterfactual thinking.  
   To the best of our knowledge, no other research has examined the role 
of autonomy, action/state orientation and cognitive self-affirmation inclination in 
relation to counterfactual thinking. In most circumstances counterfactual thinking is 
functional and helps people to gain a sense of control over future and past events. 
The extent to which counterfactuals are functional however, may be determined by 
the degree to which individuals perceive themselves as being controlled by the 
outcome. Of course, if our research suggests anything, it is that this effect is likely 
only applicable to certain individuals and in certain situations. 
 
 ~ 203 ~ 
 
References 
 
Alloy, L., & Abramson, L. (1982). Learned helplessness, depression, and the illusion 
of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(6), 1114–1126.  
Bacon, A. M., Walsh, C. R., & Martin, L. (2013). Fantasy proneness and 
counterfactual thinking. Personality and Individual Differences, 54(4), 469–
473. 
Bandura, A., & Locke, E. A. (2003). Negative self-efficacy and goal effects 
revisited. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(1), 87–99. 
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1993). Autonomy as a moderator of the 
relationships between the Big Five personality dimensions and job 
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 111–118. 
Baumann, N., & Kuhl, J. (2003). Self-infiltration: confusing assigned tasks as self-
selected in memory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(4), 487–
497. 
Bekker, M. (1993). The development of an autonomy scale based on recent insights 
into gender identity. European Journal of Personality, 7(3), 177–194. 
Bekker, M., & van Assen, M. (2006). A short form of the autonomy scale: Properties 
of the autonomy-connectedness scale (ACS-30). Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 86(1), 51–60. 
Bingham, C. (2003). The content of future-directed thinking in parasuicide. 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Royal Holloway, University of London. 
Black, A., & Deci, E. (2000). The effects of instructors’ autonomy support and 
students’ autonomous motivation on learning organic chemistry: A self-
determination theory perspective. Science Education, 84(6), 740–756. 
 ~ 204 ~ 
 
Blanton, H., Pelham, B.W., DeHart, T., & Carvallo, M. (2001). Overconfidence as 
dissonance reduction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(5), 
373–385. 
Boninger, D., Gleicher, F., & Strathman, A. (1994). Counterfactual thinking - from 
what might have been to what may be. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67(2), 297–307. 
Boud, D. (2000). Sustainable assessment: rethinking assessment for the learning 
society. Studies in Continuing Education, 22(2), 151–167. 
Branscombe, N. R., Wohl, M. J. A., Owen, S., Allison, J. A., & N’gbala, A. (2003). 
Counterfactual thinking, blame assignment, and well-being in rape victims. 
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 25(4), 265–273. 
Breaugh, J. A. (1985). The measurement of work autonomy. Human Relations, 
38(6), 551–570. 
Bronson, M. B. (2000). Self-regulation in early childhood: nature and nurture. 
Guilford Press. 
Buck, M. L., & Miller, D. T. (1994). Reactions to incongruous negative life events. 
Social Justice Research, 7(1), 29–46. 
Burger, J. M. (1984). Desire for control, locus of control, and proneness to 
depression. Journal of Personality, 52(1), 71–89. 
Burger, J. M., & Cooper, H. M. (1979). The desirability of control. Motivation and 
Emotion, 3(4), 381–393. 
Burger, J. M., & Smith, N. G. (1985). Desire for control and gambling behavior 
among problem gamblers. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11(2), 
145–152. 
 ~ 205 ~ 
 
Byrne, R. M. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might 
have been. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(10), 426–431. 
Byrne, R. M. (2005). The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to 
reality. MIT Press. 
Byrne, R. M., & McEleney, A. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about actions and 
failures to act. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 26(5), 1318–1331. 
Byrne, R. M., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P. (2000). The 
temporality effect in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. 
Memory & Cognition, 28(2), 264–281. 
Carver, C. S., & Connor-Smith, J. (2010). Personality and coping. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 61(1), 679–704. 
Chatman, J. A. (1991). Matching people and organizations: selection and 
socialization in public accounting firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
36(3), 459. 
Cohen, G. L., Aronson, J., & Steele, C. M. (2000). When beliefs yield to evidence: 
reducing biased evaluation by affirming the self. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1151–1164. 
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N., & Master, A. (2006). Reducing the racial 
achievement gap: a social-psychological intervention. Science, 313(5791), 
1307–1310. 
Conway, M., & Ross, M. (1984). Getting what you want by revising what you had. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(4), 738–748. 
 ~ 206 ~ 
 
Coricelli, G., & Rustichini, A. (2010). Counterfactual thinking and emotions: regret 
and envy learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 365(1538), 241 –247. 
Correll, J., Spencer, S., & Zanna, M. (2004). An affirmed self and an open mind: 
self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40(3), 350–356. 
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Normal personality assessment in clinical 
practice: The NEO personality inventory. Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 5–
13. 
Crabbe, D. (1993). Fostering autonomy from within the classroom: the teacher’s 
responsibility. System, 21(4), 443–52. 
Craddock, D., & Mathias, H. (2009). Assessment options in higher education. 
Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education, 34(2), 127–140. 
Davidson, L., & Strauss, J. S. (1992). Sense of self in recovery from severe mental 
illness. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 65(2), 131–145. 
Davis, C. (1991). The undoing experience: Antecedents, consequences, and 
individual differences (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 
Davis, C., Lehman, D. R., Wortman, C. B., Silver, R. C., & Thompson, S. C. (1995). 
The undoing of traumatic life events. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 21(2), 109 –124. 
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (2008). Facilitating optimal motivation and psychological well-
being across life’s domains.Canadian Psychology, 49, 14-23.  
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (1985a). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human 
behavior. New York: Plenum Press. 
 ~ 207 ~ 
 
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (1985b). The general causality orientations scale: Self-
determination in personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 19(2), 109–
134. 
Diefendorff, J. M., Hall, R. J., Lord, R. G., & Strean, M. L. (2000). Action-state 
orientation: construct validity of a revised measure and its relationship to 
work-related variables. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(2), 250–263. 
Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: emergence of the five-factor model. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 41(1), 417–440. 
Dixon, J., & Byrne, R. M. (2011). ‘If only’ counterfactual thoughts about 
exceptional actions. Memory & Cognition, 39(7), 1317–1331. 
Dutcher, J. (2010). Improvong performance on a creativity task via self-affirmation 
(Thesis). Dietrich College, Pittsburgh, PA. 
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self awareness. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Egan, S. M., & Byrne, R. M. (2012). Inferences from counterfactual threats and 
promises. Experimental Psychology, 59(4), 227–235. 
Egan, S. M., Frosh, C. A., & Hancock, E. N. (2008). Thinking counterfactually – 
how controllability affects the ‘undoing’ of causes and enablers. In: B.C. 
Love, K. McRae & V.M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science 
Society, 1152-1157. 
El Leithy, S., Brown, G. P., & Robbins, I. (2006). Counterfactual thinking and 
posttraumatic stress reactions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(3), 
629–635. 
 ~ 208 ~ 
 
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(2), 168–192. 
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. (2011). When goal pursuit fails: the functions of 
counterfactual thought in intention formation. Social Psychology, 42(1), 19–
27. 
Erikson, E. (1974). Identity: youth and crisis. London: Faber & Faber. 
Etkina, E., & Harper, K. (2002). Weekly reports: student reflections on learning. An 
assessment tool based on student and teacher feedback. Journal of College 
Science Teaching, 31(7), 476–80. 
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: affirming the 
self through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
73, 31–44. 
Ferguson, N. (2000). Virtual history: alternatives and counterfactuals (New 
edition.). New York: Basic Books. 
Ferrante, D., Girotto, V., Stragà, M., & Walsh, C. R. (2013). Improving the past and 
the future: a temporal asymmetry in hypothetical thinking. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. General, 142(1), 23–27. 
Fox, N. A., Henderson, H. A., Marshall, P. J., Nichols, K. E., & Ghera, M. M. 
(2005). Behavioral inhibition: linking biology and behavior within a 
developmental framework. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 235–262. 
Galinsky, A., & Moskowitz, G. (2000). Counterfactuals as behavioral primes: 
priming the simulation heuristic and consideration of alternatives. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 36(4), 384–409. 
 ~ 209 ~ 
 
Garcia, T., & Pintrich, P. R. (1996). The effects of autonomy on motivation and 
performance in the college classroom. Contemporary Educational 
Psychology, 21(4), 477–486. 
Gasper, K., Lozinski, R., & LeBeau, L. (2009). If you plan, then you can: How 
reflection helps defensive pessimists pursue their goals. Motivation and 
Emotion, 33(2), 203–216. 
Gibbs, G. (1981). Teaching students to learn: a student-centred approach. Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press. 
Gilbert, D. T., Morewedge, C. K., Risen, J. L., & Wilson, T. D. (2004). Looking 
forward to looking backward. Psychological Science, 15(5), 346 –350. 
Gilhooly, K. J., & Johnson, C. E. (1978). Effects of solution word attributes on 
anagram difficulty: A regression analysis. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 30(1), 57-70 
Girotto, V., Ferrante, D., Pighin, S., & Gonzalez, M. (2007). Postdecisional 
counterfactual thinking by actors and readers. Psychological Science, 18(6), 
510–515. 
Girotto, V., Legrenzi, P., & Rizzo, A. (1991). Event controllability in counterfactual 
thinking. Acta Psychologica, 78(1-3), 111–133. 
Gleicher, F., Kost, K. A., Baker, S. M., Strathman, A. J., Richman, S. A., & 
Sherman, S. J. (1990). The role of counterfactual thinking in judgments of 
affect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16(2), 284 –295. 
Green, M., & Brock, T. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of 
public narratives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 701–
721. 
 ~ 210 ~ 
 
Grieve, F., Houston, D., Dupuis, S., & Eddy, D. (1999). Counterfactual production 
and achievement orientation in competitive athletic settings. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 29(10), 2177–2202. 
Haynes, G. A., Sorrentino, R. M., Olson, J. M., Szeto, A. C. H., Wirkki, J. S., & 
O’Connor, M. C. (2007). The effects of temporal framing on counterfactual 
thinking and self–appraisal: an individual differences perspective. Social 
Cognition, 25(3), 339–366. 
Heckhausen, H., & Strang, H. (1988). Efficiency under record performance 
demands: Exertion control--an individual difference variable? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 55(3), 489–498. 
Heine, S. J. (2005). Constructing good selves in Japan and North America. InCulture 
and social behavior: The tenth Ontario symposium, ed. RM Sorrentino, D. 
Cohen, JM Olson & MP Zanna (pp. 95-116). 
Hepper, E. G., Gramzow, R. H., & Sedikides, C. (2010). Individual differences in 
self-enhancement and self-protection strategies: An integrative analysis. 
Journal of Personality, 78(2), 781–814. 
Hiroto, D. S., & Seligman, M. E. (1975). Generality of learned helplessness in man. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(2), 311–327. 
Hirschfeld, R. M., Klerman, G. L., Gouch, H. G., Barrett, J., Korchin, S. J., & 
Chodoff, P. (1977). A measure of interpersonal dependency. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 41(6), 610-618. 
Hmel, B. A., & Pincus, A. L. (2002). The meaning of autonomy: On and beyond the 
interpersonal circumplex. Journal of Personality, 70(3), 277-310. 
Hoyle, R. H. (2006). Personality and self-regulation: trait and information-
processing perspectives. Journal of Personality, 74(6), 1507–1525. 
 ~ 211 ~ 
 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1989). Assumptive worlds and the stress of traumatic events: 
Applications of the schema construct. Social Cognition, 7(2), 113–136. 
Johnson, J. T. (1986). The knowledge of what might have been. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 12(1), 51 –62. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK: Erlbaum.  
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, 
pragmatics, and inference. Psychological review, 109(4), 646. 
Jostmann, N. B., Koole, S. L., van der Wulp, N. Y., & Fockenberg, D. A. (2005). Subliminal 
affect regulation. European Psychologist, 10(3), 209–217. 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. (1986). Norm theory - comparing reality to its 
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136–153. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. 
Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgements under uncertainty: heuristics and 
biases (pp. 201–208). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kasimatis, M., & Sterling, L. (1994, June). Further evidence for individual 
differences in counterfactual thinking. Poster presented at a meeting of the 
American Psychological Society, Washington, DC. 
Kasimatis, M., & Wells, G. (1995). Individual differences in counterfactual thinking. 
In N. Roese & J. Olsen (Eds.), The social psychology of counterfactual 
thinking (pp. 81–101). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Knight, P. (2002). Summative assessment in higher education: practices in disarray. 
Studies in Higher Education, 27(3), 275–286. 
Kochanska, G., Murray, K. T., & Harlan, E. T. (2000). Effortful control in early 
childhood: continuity and change, antecedents, and implications for social 
development. Developmental Psychology, 36(2), 220–232. 
 ~ 212 ~ 
 
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: the nature and validity 
of moral stages (1st ed.). San Francisco: Harper and Row. 
Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). The 
cessation of rumination through self-affirmation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 77(1), 111–125. 
Kray, L., Galinsky, A.D., & Markman, K. (2009). Counterfactual structure and 
learning from experience in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45(4), 979–982. 
Kray, L., & Galinsky, A. D. (2003). The debiasing effect of counterfactual mind-
sets: Increasing the search for disconfirmatory information in group 
decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91(1), 
69–81. 
Kray, L., George, L. G., Liljenquist, K. A., Galinsky, A. D., Tetlock, P. E., & Roese, 
N. (2010). From what might have been to what must have been: 
counterfactual thinking creates meaning. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 98(1), 106–118. 
Kuhl, J. (1981). Motivational and functional helplessness: the moderating effect of 
state versus action orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
40(1), 155–170. 
Kuhl, J. (1992). A Theory of Self-regulation: Action versus State Orientation, Self-
discrimination, and Some Applications. Applied Psychology, 41(2), 97–129. 
Kuhl, J. (1994). A theory of action and state orientations. In J Kuhl & J. Beckmann 
(Eds.), Volition and personality: Action versus state orientation. (pp. 9–46). 
Seattle, WA: Hogrefe & Huber. 
 ~ 213 ~ 
 
Kuhl, J. (2000). A functional-design approach to motivation and self-regulation. 
Handbook of Self-Regulation (pp. 111–169). 
Kuhl, J, & Kazén, M. (1994). Self-discrimination and memory: State orientation and 
false self-ascription of assigned activities. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 66(6), 1103–1115. 
Landman, J., & Petty, R. (2000). ‘It could have been you’: How states exploit 
counterfactual thought to market lotteries. Psychology and Marketing, 17(4), 
299–321. 
Laor, N. (1982). Old whig psychiatry: the Szaszian variant. The Israel Journal of 
Psychiatry and Related Sciences, 19(3), 215–227. 
Leach, J. K., & Patall, E. A. (2013). Maximizing and Counterfactual Thinking in 
Academic Major Decision Making. Journal of Career Assessment. 
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem: 
Sociometer theory. Advances in experimental social psychology, 32, 1-62. 
Mahler, M. S., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The psychological birth of the 
human infant: symbiosis and individuation. London: Hutchinson and Co Ltd. 
Mandel, D. (2003). Counterfactuals, emotions, and context. Cognition & Emotion, 
17(1), 139–159. 
Mandel, D., Hilton, D., & Catellani, P. (2005). The pyschology of counterfactual 
thinking. New York: Routledge. 
Mandel, D., & Dhami, M. K. (2005). ‘What I did’ versus ‘what I might have done’: 
Effect of factual versus counterfactual thinking on blame, guilt, and shame in 
prisoners. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(6), 627–635. 
 ~ 214 ~ 
 
Marguc, J., Förster, J., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2011). Stepping back to see the big 
picture: when obstacles elicit global processing. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 101(5), 883–901. 
Markman, G. D., Balkin, D. B., & Baron, R. A. (2002). Inventors and New Venture 
Formation: the Effects of General Self‐Efficacy and Regretful Thinking. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(2), 149–165. 
Markman, K., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S., & McMullen, M. (1993). The mental 
simulation of better and worse possible worlds. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 29(1), 87–109. 
Markman, K., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S., & McMullen, M. (1995). The impact of 
perceived control on the imagination of better and worse possible worlds. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(6), 588 –595. 
Markman, K., Klein, W., & Suhr, J. (Eds.). (2008). Handbook of imagination and 
mental simulation (1st ed.). New York: Taylor and Francis Group. 
Markman, K., Lindberg, M., Kray, L., & Galinsky, A. (2007). Implications of 
counterfactual structure for creative generation and analytical problem 
solving. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(3), 312–324. 
Markman, K., & McMullen, M. (2003). A reflection and evaluation model of 
comparative thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review: An Official 
Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc, 7(3), 244–
267. 
Markman, K., McMullen, M., & Elizaga, R. (2008). Counterfactual thinking, 
persistence, and performance: A test of the Reflection and Evaluation Model. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(2), 421–428. 
 ~ 215 ~ 
 
Markman, K., & Miller, A. K. (2006). Depression, control, and counterfactual 
thinking: functional for whom? Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 
25(2), 210–227. 
Markman, K., & Tetlock, P. (2000). ‘I couldn’t have known’: accountability, 
foreseeability and counterfactual denials of responsibility. The British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 313–325. 
Markman, K., & Weary, G. (1998). Control motivation, depression, and 
counterfactual thought. In M. Kofta, G. Weary, & G. Sedek (Eds.), Personal 
control in action:  Cognitive and motivational mechanisms (pp. 363–390). 
New York,  NY,  US: Plenum Press. 
McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable 
events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071–1078. 
McElroy, T., & Dowd, K. (2007). Action orientation, consistency and feelings of 
regret. Judgment and Decision Making, 2, (6), 333–341 
McFarland, C., & Alvaro, C. (2000). The impact of motivation on temporal 
comparisons: coping with traumatic events by perceiving personal growth. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 79(3), 327–343. 
McMullen, M., & Markman, K. (2000). Downward counterfactuals and motivation: 
The wake-up call and the pangloss effect. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 26(5), 575–584. 
Medvec, V., Gilovich, T., & Madey, S. (1995). When less is more - counterfactual 
thinking and satisfaction among olympic medalists. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 69(4), 603–610. 
 ~ 216 ~ 
 
Meyerslevy, J., & Maheswaran, D. (1992). When timing matters - the influence of 
temporal distance on consumers affective and persuasive responses. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 19(3), 424–433. 
Miller, D., & McFarland, C. (1986). Counterfactual thinking and victim 
compensation - a test of norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 12(4), 513–519. 
Miller, D., Turnbull, W. & McFarland, C. (1990). Counterfactual thinking and social 
perception: Thinking about what might have been. (In M. P. Zanna 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 23, 305-331. 
Monson, T. C., Hesley, J. W., & Chernick, L. (1982). Specifying when personality 
traits can and cannot predict behavior: An alternative to abandoning the 
attempt to predict single-act criteria. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 43(2), 385–399. 
Morris, M., & Moore, P. (2000). The lessons we (don’t) learn: Counterfactual 
thinking and organizational accountability after a close call. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 45(4), 737–765. 
Murphy, J. (2005). Individual differences in counterfactual thinking: The role of 
personality and health (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Adelphi 
University, Long Island, New York. 
Nasco, S., & Marsh, K. (1999). Gaining control through counterfactual thinking. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(5), 556–568. 
Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). ‘If only I weren’t’ versus 
‘if only I hadn’t’: distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 585–595. 
 ~ 217 ~ 
 
Niemiec, C. P., & Ryan, R. (2009). Autonomy, competence, and relatedness in the 
classroom: applying self-determination theory to educational practice. Theory 
and Research in Education, 7(2), 133–144. 
Page, C., & Colby, P. (2003). If only I hadn’t smoked: The impact of counterfactual 
thinking on a smoking-related behavior. Psychology & Marketing, 20(11), 
955–976. 
Parker, A. M., Bruine de Bruin, W., & Fischoff, B. (2007). Maximizer versus 
satisficers: Decision-making styles, competence, and outcomes. Judgement 
and Decision Making, 2, 342–350. 
Pelletier, L., Fortier, M., Vallerand, R., & Briere, N. (2001). Associations among 
perceived autonomy support, forms of self-regulation, and persistence: A 
prospective study. Motivation and Emotion, 25(4), 279–306. 
Petrocelli, J. V., Percy, E. J., Sherman, S. J., & Tormala, Z. L. (2011). 
Counterfactual potency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
100(1), 30–46. 
Pietersma, S., & Dijkstra, A. (2012). Cognitive self-affirmation inclination: an 
individual difference in dealing with self-threats. The British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 51(1), 33–51. 
Pighin, S., Byrne, R. M., Ferrante, D., Gonzalez, M., & Girotto, V. (2011). 
Counterfactual thoughts about experienced, observed, and narrated events. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 17(2), 197–211. 
Reed M.B., & Aspinwall L.G. (1998). Self-affirmation reduces biased processing of 
health-risk information. Motivation and Emotion, 22(2), 99–132. 
Rippere, V. (1977). ‘What’s the thing to do when you’re feeling depressed?’ --a pilot 
study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 15(2), 185–191. 
 ~ 218 ~ 
 
Roberts, B., Chernyshenko, O., Stark, S., & Goldberg, L. (2005). The structure of 
conscientiousness: an empirical investigation based on seven major 
personality questionnaires. Personnel Psychology, 58(1), 103–139. 
Roese, N. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 805–818. 
Roese, N. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 133–148. 
Roese, N., & Hur, T. (1997). Affective Determinants of Counterfactual Thinking. 
Social Cognition, 15(4), 274–290. 
Roese, N., & Olson, J. (1993a). Self-esteem and counterfactual thinking. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 199–206. 
Roese, N., & Olson, J. (1993b). The structure of counterfactual thought. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(3), 312 –319. 
Roese, N., & Olson, J. (1995). What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of 
Counterfactual Thinking. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Roese, N., & Olson, J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking: The intersection of affect 
and function. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 1–59. 
Rothbart, M. K., & Rueda, M. R. (2005). The development of effortful control. In U. 
Mayr, E. Awh, & S. W. Keele (Eds.), Developing individuality in the human 
brain: A tribute to Michael I. Posner. (pp. 167–188). Washington, DC, US: 
American Psychological Association. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of 
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(1), 1–28. 
Ryan, R., Rigby, S., & King, K. (1993). 2 types of religious internalization and their 
relations to religious orientations and mental-health. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 65(3), 586–596. 
 ~ 219 ~ 
 
Saffrey, C., Summerville, A., & Roese, N. (2008). Praise for regret: People value 
regret above other negative emotions. Motivation and Emotion, 32(1), 46–54. 
Sanna, L. (1996). Defensive Pessimism, Optimism, and Simulating Alternatives: 
Some Ups and Downs of Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 71(5), 1020–1036. 
Sanna, L. (1997). Self-efficacy and counterfactual thinking: Up a creek with and 
without a paddle. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(6), 654–
666. 
Sanna, L. (1998). Defensive pessimism and optimism: The bitter-sweet influence of 
mood on performance and prefactual and counterfactual thinking. Cognition 
& Emotion, 12(5), 635–665. 
Sanna, L. (2000). Mental simulation, affect and personality: A conceptual 
framework. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(5), 168–173. 
Sanna, L, Chang, E., & Meier, S. (2001). Counterfactual thinking and self-motives. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(8), 1023–1034. 
Sanna, L, Meier, S., & Turley-Ames, K. (1998). Mood, self-esteem, and 
counterfactuals: Externally attributed moods limit self-enhancement 
strategies. Social Cognition, 16(2), 267–286. 
Sanna, L, & Meier, S. (2000). Looking for clouds in a silver lining: self-esteem, 
mental simulations, and temporal confidence changes. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 34(2), 236–251. 
Sanna, L, & Turley-Ames, K. (1996). Antecedents to spontaneous counterfactual 
thinking: effects of expectancy violation and outcome valence. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(9), 906–919. 
 ~ 220 ~ 
 
Sanna, L, Turley-Ames, K., & Meier, S. (1999). Mood, self-esteem, and simulated 
alternatives: thought-provoking affective influences on counterfactual 
direction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(4), 543–558. 
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. 
R. (2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of 
choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(5), 1178-1197. 
Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self evaluation: To thine own self be good, to 
thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be 
better. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 209–269. 
Seta, C. E., Seta, J. J., McElroy, G. T., & Hatz, J. (2008). Regret: The roles of 
consistency-fit and counterfactual salience. Social Cognition, 26(6), 700-719. 
Shepperd, J. A., & Arkin, R. M. (1991). Behavioral other-enhancement: Strategically 
obscuring the link between performance and evaluation. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 60(1), 79-88 
Sherman, D., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C. M. (2000). Do messages about health risks 
threaten the self? Increasing the acceptance of threatening health messages 
via self-affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 
1046–1058. 
Sherman, D., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self‐defense: 
Self‐affirmation theory. Advances in experimental social psychology, 38, 
183-242. 
Sherman, D., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: self–
affirmation and the reduction of defensive biases. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 11(4), 119–123. 
 ~ 221 ~ 
 
Showers, C. (1992). The motivational and emotional consequences of considering 
positive or negative possibilities for an upcoming event. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63(3), 474-484. 
Sirois, F. M. (2004). Procrastination and counterfactual thinking: avoiding what 
might have been. The British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 269–286. 
Sirois, F. M., Monforton, J., & Simpson, M. (2010). ‘If only I had done better’: 
perfectionism and the functionality of counterfactual thinking. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1675–1692. 
Smallman, R., & Roese, N. (2009). Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral 
intentions. Journal of experimental social psychology, 45(4), 845–852. 
Snyder. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 30(4), 526–537. 
Sorrentino, R., Short, J.A., & Raynor, J. O. (1984). Uncertainty orientation: 
Implications for affective and cognitive views of achievement behavior. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(1), 189–206. 
Sparks, E. A., Ehrlinger, J., & Eibach, R. P. (2012). Failing to commit: Maximizers 
avoid commitment in a way that contributes to reduced satisfaction. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 72–77. 
Squire, S. J. C., & Churchill, W. (1931). If it had happened otherwise. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Stagner, R. (1977). On the reality and relevance of traits. The Journal of general 
psychology, 96, 185–207. 
Steele, C.M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: sustaining the integrity of 
the self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 261–302. 
 
 ~ 222 ~ 
 
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002). Contending with group image: 
The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. Advances in 
experimental social psychology, 34, 379-440. 
Stefanou, C. R., Perencevich, K. C., DiCintio, M., & Turner, J. C. (2004). 
Supporting autonomy in the classroom: ways teachers encourage student 
decision making and ownership. Educational Psychologist, 39(2), 97–110. 
Summerville, A., & Roese, N. (2008). Dare to compare: fact-Based versus 
simulation-based comparison in daily life. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44(3), 664–671. 
Tal-Or, N., Boninger, D., Poran, A., & Gleicher, F. (2004). Counterfactual thinking 
as a mechanism in narrative persuasion. Human Communication Research, 
30(3), 301–328. 
Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theory of cognitive 
adaptation. American Psychologist, 38(11), 1161–1173. 
Tesser, A. (2000). On the confluence of self-esteem maintenance mechanisms. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4(4), 290 –299. 
Tesser, A., & Cornell, D. P. (1991). On the confluence of self processes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 501–526. 
Trotter, E. (2006). Student perceptions of continuous summative assessment. 
Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 31(5), 505–521. 
Turnbull, W. (1981). Naive conceptions of free will and the deterministic paradox. 
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 13(1), 1–13. 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal agency: Individual 
variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 57(4), 660–671. 
 ~ 223 ~ 
 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & Van Dijk, E. (2009). Dealing with missed 
opportunities: Action vs. state orientation moderates inaction inertia. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 808–815. 
Walsh, C. R., & Byrne, R. M. (2004). Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order 
effect. Memory & cognition, 32(3), 369–378. 
Walsh, C. R., & Byrne, R. M. (2005). The mental representation of what might have 
been. In D. R. Mandel, D. J. Hilton, & P. Catellani (Eds.), The psychology of 
counterfactual thinking. (pp. 61–73). New York, NY US: Routledge. 
Walsh, C. R., & Byrne, R. M. (2007). How people think ‘If only...’ about reasons for 
actions. Thinking & Reasoning, 13(4), 461–483. 
Wanberg, C. R., Zhu, J., & van Hooft, E. A. (2010). The job search grind: perceived 
progress, self-reactions, and self-regulation of search effort. Academy of 
Management Journal, 53(4), 788-807. 
Watkins, E., & Baracaia, S. (2002). Rumination and social problem-solving in 
depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(10), 1179–1189. 
Weiss, H. M., & Adler, S. (1984). Personality and organizational behavior. Research 
in Organizational Behavior, 6, 1–50. 
Wells, G., & Gavanski, I. (1989). Mental simulation of causality. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 56(2), 161–169. 
Wells, G., Taylor, B.R., & Turtle, J.W. (1987). The undoing of scenarios. Journal 
  of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 421 - 430. 
White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2005). Looking on the bright side: downward 
counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(10), 1413 –1424. 
 
 ~ 224 ~ 
 
Zuckerman, M., Levitt, E., & Lubin, B. (1961). Concurrent and construct validity of 
direct and indirect measures of dependency. Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 25(4), 316-323. 
 
 
 ~ 225 ~ 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A:  Vignette used in Experiment 1 
 
 “Imagine you have been asked to participate in an experiment that is trying to 
examine how people reason. You agree to participate in the study. The experimenter 
explains that you will be asked to attempt a mental multiplication task. If you give 
the correct answer, you will be rewarded with a prize. You are brought into a room 
to be given the task. When in the room, the experimenter shows you two identical 
envelopes and explains that within one of them is a difficult mental multiplication 
task while the other contains an easy mental multiplication task. You are asked to 
make a choice. You are then told that when the envelope is opened and you are 
shown the task, you will have 30 seconds to solve it. The experimenter opens the 
card you chose and it turns out to be the difficult task (68x72). You attempt to solve 
the problem but before you arrive at the correct answer, your time elapses. You have 
failed the task. You receive no prize”. 
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Appendix B:  Counterfactual generation sheet 
 
Please list at least one way in which things could have been different, using “If only” 
type statements. 
1) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
2) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
3) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
4) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
5) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C:  Autonomy questionnaire (Bekker & van Assen, 2006) 
 
Below is a list of statements with possible responses ranging from 1 (Doesn’t fit 
me) to 7 (Completely fits me). Please tick the response that best applies to you. 
 
1. I often go into the feelings and experiences of others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am seldom occupied with the feelings and experiences 
of others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am rarely occupied with other people’s view of me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I often wonder what other people think of me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I can easily put aside other people’s comments. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I can hardly bear it when other people are angry with 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I hate detachment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. When I take important decisions about my life, I leave 
other people’s wishes and opinions out of consideration. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I feel a strong need for other people’s advice and 
guidance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. If I do something that bothers other people, I can easily 
dismiss that from my mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I am seldom inclined to ask other people’s advice. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I can easily back out of the things that people who are 
important to me want me to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I often long for love and warmth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Usually I can dismiss another person’s misery from my 
mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. If I imagine myself having to say goodbye to a beloved 
person, I feel broken hearted in advance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. If I have things my own way against the will of others, 
I usually get very restless. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Somebody else’s experiences leave a strong mark on 
my own moods. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I quickly feel at ease in new situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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19. I easily come to grips with a new problem on my own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I need a lot of time to get accustomed to a new 
environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. I am a very adventurous type. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. If it were up to me, I would spend most of my time in 
familiar surroundings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I find it hard to start new activities on my own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. I often don’t know what my opinion is. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I have outspoken opinions on most subjects. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I often find it difficult to determine what I really want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Usually it is very clear to me what I like most. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. If I disagree with others, I make that very plain. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. If I am asked what I want, I mostly know the answer 
immediately. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. Hearing the opinions of other people often makes me 
change my mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix D:  Information sheet 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
PLEASE KEEP THIS PAGE FOR YOUR INFORMATION 
My name is David Maloney and I am currently conducting postgraduate research in 
the Department of Psychology in Mary Immaculate College under the supervision of 
Dr. Suzanne Egan. You are being invited to participate in my study. Thank you for 
taking time to read this information. 
STUDY TITLE: Self-regulatory individual differences and counterfactual thinking 
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY? In my research, I am 
interested in finding out whether personal motivation influences how people think 
counterfactually. Counterfactual thinking is the ability to think about what might 
have been.  
WHY HAVE I BEEN CHOSEN? You have been approached to participate in this 
research as participants are being selected from the student body of Mary 
Immaculate College. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF I VOLUNTEER? Your participation is entirely 
voluntary. If you initially decide to take part you can subsequently change your mind 
and withdraw from the study without penalty. If you agree to participate you will be 
asked to engage with cognitive exercises, and complete an anonymous questionnaire. 
Participation will take 10-15 minutes approximately and will take place on campus. 
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: You can withdraw from the study at any point prior to 
returning your questionnaires. However, once the questionnaire has been returned it 
is not possible to withdraw your data as it will be anonymous. 
 
ARE THERE ANY BENEFITS FROM MY PARTICPATION? Studies like 
these can make an important contribution to our understanding of the factors 
effecting how people think counterfactually. As such, the findings from this study 
may be presented at national and international conferences and may be submitted for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals. However no individual participant will be 
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identified in any publication or presentation. Individuals will not be offered any 
monetary or other rewards for their participation. 
ARE THERE ANY RISKS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATING? The risks 
associated with participation are minimal and any inconvenience involved in taking 
part will be limited.  
WHAT HAPPENS IF I DO NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE? Participation is 
voluntary so you are not obligated to take part in the study if you do not wish to. 
There is no penalty for not participating. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: All individual information collected as part of the study 
will remain anonymous and you will be instructed not to put your name anywhere on 
the questionnaires. Hard copies of questionnaires will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet. Hard copies of the data will be held for 5 year after the research has been 
published, while electronic data will also be held for a period of 5 years, after 
publication. The research will act in accordance to the data protection act. 
 
CONTACT DETAILS If you have any further questions about the research you can 
contact: 
 
David Maloney (Researcher): david.maloney@mic.ul.ie  
 
Dr. Suzanne Egan (Supervisor): Suzanne.egan@mic.ul.ie  
 
If you have any concerns about this study and wish to contact someone 
independently, you may contact: 
 
Emma Barry, 
MIREC Administrator, 
Mary Immaculate College, 
South Circular Road, 
Limerick, 
061-204515 
Emma.barry@mic.ul.ie 
 
Thank You, 
David Maloney. 
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Appendix E:  Consent form 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
Self-regulatory individual differences and counterfactual thinking 
 
My name is David Maloney and I am currently conducting postgraduate research in 
the Department of Psychology in Mary Immaculate College under the supervision of 
Dr. Suzanne Egan. Thank you for your interest in taking part in my study. 
Please note that participation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw your 
participation at any time without penalty.  
As described in the information sheet any data you provide will be stored 
anonymously and cannot be traced back to you.  
 
By signing in the space below I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older, that I 
have read and understood this form and the information sheet completely and I 
consent to participant in the above named study. 
 
 
Signed:_____________________________        Date:__________________ 
 
Thank You, 
David Maloney. 
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Appendix F:  Anagrams used in Experiments 2, 3 & 6 
 
Score of 1 point for each correct answer here: 
ACNFY  
CNIFH  
HSAFL  
NRTOF  
AUGRD  
NOEHY  
Score of 3 points for each correct answer here: 
ODRCW  
PHTED  
LTIGN  
FNKIE  
EMCYR  
KASNC  
Score of 5 points for each correct answer here: 
GBTIO  
TELSY  
OUSTC  
RETIV  
OFREC  
HRCUS  
 
                                      Total      
 
Answers: 
FANCY, FINCH, FLASH, FRONT, GUARD, HONEY. 
CROWD, DEPTH, GLINT, KNIFE, MERCY, SNACK. 
BIGOT, STYLE, SCOUT, RIVET, FORCE, CRUSH. 
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Score of 1 point for each correct answer here: 
NEIBR  
BNHUC  
CIAHR  
HMIEC  
OWNLC  
NIRDK  
 
Score of 3 points for each correct answer here: 
ONAPR  
ADEBL  
PLIMB  
NBIAC  
LKCOA  
TCUON  
 
Score of 5 points for each correct answer here: 
CRIAV  
IUNYT  
KTENO  
GBRUY  
YAORV  
HAENY  
 
                Total             
Answers: 
BRINE, BUNCH, CHAIR, CHIME, CLOWN, DRINK. 
APRON, BLADE, BLIMP, CABIN, CLOAK, COUNT 
VICAR, UNITY, TOKEN, RUGBY, OVARY, HYENA. 
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Appendix G:  Manipulation check of participant satisfaction used in 
Experiments 2, 3 & 7 
 
To assist you in determining how you did in the anagram task, below you will find a 
scale indicating how performance in the task is usually determined. In theory, by 
answering all the anagrams correctly, a score of 54 is possible. 
 
40 – 54: Excellent 
30 – 40: Good 
20 – 30: Average 
10 – 20: Below average 
0 – 10: Poor 
 
How satisfied are you with your performance on the anagrams? 
Not satisfied at all     Somewhat satisfied  Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix H:  Filer task used in Experiments 2, 3 & 6 
 
Look at these sentences. Is there anything wrong with them grammatically? Would 
you like to make any changes? 
1. I liked that film we saw last night and Lucy did to. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Albert Thomas 1932 - 1993 wrote some intresting guide books they 
demonstrated a wide understanding of these areas.. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It was a hot humid day and he was sat down reading a book when his sister 
Tracy came to visit him she was sweating a lot. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
4. She said that, 21% of students in the university were from the city. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix I:  Control perception measure used in Experiment 2 
 
 
I am largely in control of the outcome of my score in the next trial 
 
Disagree completely                Agree completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix J:  Cognitive puzzles used in training phase of Experiments 
4 and 5 
 
 
 
 
Anagrams (there will be 7) 
Make a word out of all of the letters provided.  
 
Sample:       Answer: 
                   ACNFY  FANCY 
               
AlphaGRAMS (there will be 5) 
Solve the anagrams. The solutions are in consecutive alphabetical 
order. 
Sample:          Answers: 
ROWEL          LOWER 
SAMPLE          MAPLES 
RUN LAME                NUMERAL 
ROASTING                   ORGANIST 
SIP SCARLET                   PARTICLES 
 
Word circles (there will be 5) 
Figure out the missing letter which completes an eight-letter word 
reading either clockwise or anticlockwise 
Sample     Answer: DETONATED 
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Word wheels (there will be 5) 
Find the 9 letter word that is scrambled below. It starts with the 
centre letter  
Sample: 
 
Answer: SATELLITE 
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Appendix K:  Cognitive puzzles used in Experiments 4and 5 
 
 
 
 
Word circle 
Figure out the missing letter which completes an eight-letter word reading either clockwise or 
anticlockwise. 
                  
                                 
 
Word wheel 
Find the 9 letter word that is scrambled below. It starts 
with the centre letter. 
              
_______________________       ________________________     ________________________ 
   
 ____________________         _______________________ 
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Anagrams 
Make a word out of all of the letters provided 
  Answers: 
      HSAFL  ____________ 
                 NRTOF  ____________ 
     LTIGN  ____________ 
                 FNKIE  ____________ 
     GBTIO  ____________   
     TELSY  ____________ 
     OUSTC  ____________    
 
AlphaGRAMS 
Solve the anagrams. The solutions are in consecutive alphabetical order. 
 
           Answers: 
LEASE   ___________________ 
HOT FUR   ___________________ 
NOUGHTS  ___________________ 
TEACHERS              ___________________ 
SUNLIT SEA  ___________________ 
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Word circle 
Figure out the missing letter which completes an eight-letter word reading either 
clockwise or anticlockwise. 
   
          
                          
 
 
Anagrams 
Make a word out of all of the letters provided 
 
         Answers: 
      AUGRD  ____________ 
                NOEHY  ____________ 
     EMCYR              ____________ 
                KASNC  ____________ 
     RETIV  ____________   
     OFREC  ____________ 
     HRCUS  ____________   
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AlphaGRAMS 
Solve the anagrams. The solutions are in alphabetical order. 
 
           Answers: 
OMITS   ___________________ 
INSECT   ___________________ 
NO CIGAR   ___________________ 
PIE CRUST    ___________________ 
TOO QUAINT  ___________________ 
 
 
Word wheel 
Find the 9 letter word that is scrambled below. It starts 
with the centre letter. 
     
__________________________      ______________________________   ___________________________ 
                            
______________________________      _____________________________ 
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Appendix L:  Manipulation check of participant satisfaction used in 
Experiments 4 and 5 
 
 
How satisfied are you with your performance on the puzzles? 
Not satisfied at all     Somewhat satisfied   Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 ~ 244 ~ 
 
  
Appendix M:  Action\state orientation measure (Diefendorff, 2005) 
used in Experiments 4 and 5 
 
 
Please tick the letter of the sentence that best describes you for each pair of 
statements 
 
1. When I have lost something that is very valuable to me and I can’t find it 
anywhere: 
(a) I have a hard time concentrating on something else. 
(b) I put it out of my mind after a little while. 
 
2. When I know I must finish something soon: 
(a) I have to push myself to get started. 
(b) I find it easy to get it done and over with. 
 
3. When I have learned a new and interesting game: 
(a) I quickly get tired of it and do something else. 
(b) I can really get into it for a long time. 
 
4. If I’ve worked for weeks on one project and then everything goes completely 
wrong with the project: 
(a) It takes me a long time to adjust myself to it. 
(b) It bothers me for a while, but then I don’t think about it anymore. 
 
5. When I don’t have anything in particular to do and I am getting bored: 
(a) I have trouble getting up enough energy to do anything at all. 
(b) I quickly find something to do. 
 
6. When I’m working on something that’s important to me: 
(a) I still like to do other things in between working on it. 
(b) I get into it so much that I can work on it for a long time. 
 
7. When I am in competition and have lost every time: 
(a) I can soon put losing out of my mind. 
(b) The thought that I lost keeps running through my mind. 
 
8. When I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem: 
(a) It feels like I am facing a big mountain that I don’t think I can climb. 
(b) I look for a way that the problem can be approached in a suitable manner. 
 
9. When I’m watching a really good movie: 
(a) I get so involved in the film that I don’t even think of doing anything else. 
(b) I often want to get something else to do while I’m watching the movie. 
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10. If I had just bought a new piece of equipment (for example, a tape deck) and it 
accidentally fell on the floor and was damaged beyond repair: 
(a) I would manage to get over it quickly. 
(b) It would take me a long time to get over it. 
 
11. When I have to solve a difficult problem: 
(a) I usually don’t have a problem getting started on it. 
(b) I have trouble sorting things out in my head so that I can get down to working on 
the problem. 
 
12. When I have been busy for a long time doing something interesting (for example, 
reading a book or working on a project): 
(a) I sometimes think about whether what I’m doing is really worthwhile. 
(b) I usually get so involved in what I’m doing that I never think to ask whether it’s 
worthwhile. 
 
13. If I have to talk to someone about something important and, repeatedly, can’t 
find her/him at home: 
(a) I can’t stop thinking about it, even while I’m doing something else. 
(b) I easily forget about it until I can see the person again. 
 
14. When I have to make up my mind about what I am going to do when I get some 
unexpected free time: 
(a) It takes me a long time to decide what I should do during this free time. 
(b) I can usually decide on something to do without having to think it over very 
much. 
 
15. When I read an article in the newspaper that interests me: 
(a) I usually remain so interested in the article that I read the entire article 
(b) I still often skip to another article before I’ve finished the first one. 
 
16. When I have bought a lot of stuff at a store and realize when I get home that I 
paid too much - but can’t get my money back: 
(a) I can’t concentrate on anything else. 
(b) I easily forget about it. 
 
17. When I have work to do at home: 
(a) It is often hard for me to get the work done. 
(b) I usually get it done right away. 
 
18. When I’m on vacation and having a good time: 
(a) After a while, I really feel like doing something completely different. 
(b) I don’t even think about doing anything else until the end of vacation. 
 
19. When I am told that my work has been completely unsatisfactory: 
(a) I don’t let it bother me for too long. 
(b) I feel paralysed. 
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20. When I have a lot of important things to do and they must all be done soon: 
(a) I often don’t know where to begin. 
(b) I find it easy to make a plan and stick with it. 
 
21. When one of my co-workers brings up an interesting topic of discussion: 
(a) It can easily develop into a long conversation. 
(b) I soon lose interest and want to go do something else. 
 
22. If I am stuck in traffic and miss an important appointment: 
(a) At first, it’s difficult for me to start doing anything else at all. 
(b) I quickly forget about it and do something else. 
 
23. When there are two things that I really want to do, but I can’t do both of them: 
(a) I quickly begin one thing and forget about the other thing I couldn’t do. 
(b) It’s not easy for me to put the other thing I couldn’t do out of my mind. 
 
24. When I am busy working on an interesting project: 
(a) I need to take frequent breaks and work on other projects. 
(b) I can keep working on the same project for a long time. 
 
25. When something is very important to me, but I can’t seem to get it right: 
(a) I gradually lose heart. 
(b) I just forget about it and go do something else. 
 
26. When I have to take care of something important which is also unpleasant: 
(a) I do it and get it over with. 
(b) It can take a while before I can bring myself to it. 
 
27. When I am having an interesting conversation with someone at a party: 
(a) I can talk to him or her the entire evening. 
(b) I prefer to go do something else after a while. 
 
28. When something really gets me down: 
(a) I have trouble doing anything at all. 
(b) I find it easy to distract myself by doing other things. 
 
29. When I am facing a big project that has to be done: 
(a) I often spend too long thinking about where I should begin. 
(b) I don’t have any problems getting started. 
 
30. When it turns out that I am much better at a game than the other players: 
(a) I usually feel like doing something else. 
(b) I really like to keep playing. 
 
31. When several things go wrong on the same day: 
(a) I usually don’t know how to deal with it. 
(b) I just keep on going as though nothing had happened. 
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32. When I have a boring assignment: 
(a) I usually don’t have any problems getting through it. 
(b) I sometimes can’t get moving on it. 
 
33. When I read something I find interesting: 
(a) I sometimes want to put the article down and do something else. 
(b) I will sit and read the article for a long time. 
 
34. When I have to put all my effort into doing a really good job on something and 
the whole thing doesn’t work out: 
(a) I don’t have too much difficulty starting something else. 
(b) I have trouble doing anything else at all. 
 
35. When I have an obligation to do something that is boring and uninteresting: 
(a) I do it and get it over with. 
(b) It can take me a while before I can bring myself to do it. 
 
36. When I am trying to learn something new that I want to learn: 
(a) I’ll keep at it for a long time. 
(b) I often feel like I need to take a break and go do something else for a while. 
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Appendix N:  Self-affirmation exercises used in Experiments 6 and 7 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, 
some of which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order 
of their importance to you, from 1 to 11 (1 = most important item, 11 = least 
important item).  Use each number only once. 
 
 
Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation 
Sense of humour 
Relations with friends/family 
Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
Social skills 
Athletics 
Musical ability/appreciation 
Physical attractiveness 
Creativity 
Business/managerial skills 
Romantic values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ~ 249 ~ 
 
(Self-Affirmation Condition) 
 
Write a short paragraph explaining why your top-ranked value (from the previous 
page) is important to you and describe a time in your life when it has been 
particularly important. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(No self-affirmation condition) 
 
Write a short paragraph explaining why and when the value you ranked 7th in 
importance on the previous page might be important to the average college student. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix O:  Filler task used in Experiment  6 
 
Look at these sentences. Is there anything wrong with them grammatically? Would 
you like to make any changes? 
1. I saw her in the morning she left her house at 10 oclock. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I like George in some ways unfortunately his eating habits put me of. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The teacher looked at her and said, ‘Your not working hard enough.’ 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Birmingham Area registers about 70% of all patients in the UK each 
year many of them are concerned with electronics. 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix P:   Cognitive self-affirmation inclination measure  
(Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012) 
 
Below is a list of statements with possible responses ranging from 1 to 5. Please tick 
the response that best applies to you. 
 
I realize that besides all the “stupid” things I do, I also do some things very well. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
 
I think about the past and all the things that I have successfully accomplished. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
 
I notice that I do some things very well. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
 
When I feel bad about myself, I think about all the things that I can be proud 
of. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
 
I think about all the things that I have successfully accomplished. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
 
When I have done something wrong that makes me feel dissatisfied with myself, 
I tell myself that I do not do everything wrong. 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Very often 
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Appendix Q:  Negative event description used in Experiment 7 
 
Everyone experiences setbacks at some stage in their life. Be it relationships, career 
advancement, academics, or even sporting pursuits, most of us have experienced at 
least some degree of disappointment. Think back and try to recall something you 
wanted to achieve or be successful in but ultimately were left feeling less than 
satisfied with the outcome. It can be from any aspect of your life. Please respond 
below. Remember, this exercise is completely anonymous; not even the 
experimenter will be aware of your responses. 
In what area of your life was the goal/desire (e.g. sports, family, music, money)? 
 
Please write about your goal/desire and what transpired.  
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________ 
 
To what extent do you feel success in this goal/desire defines who you are as a 
person? 
     Not at all         Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Are you committed to eventually achieving success in relation to this goal/desire? 
     Not at all         Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
